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Wealth-Based Penal
Disenfranchisement
Beth A. Colgan*
This Article offers the first comprehensive examination of the way
in which the inability to pay economic sanctions-fines, fees, surcharges,
and restitution-may prevent people of limited means from voting. The
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of penal
disenfranchisement upon conviction, and all but two states revoke the
right to vote for at least some offenses. The remaining jurisdictions allow
for reenfranchisement for most or all offenses under certain conditions.
One often overlooked condition is payment of economic sanctions
regardless of whether the would-be voter has the ability to pay before an
election registration deadline. The scope of wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement is grossly underestimated, with commentators
typically stating that nine states sanction such practices. Through an in-
depth examination of a tangle of statutes, administrative rules, and
policies related to elections, clemency, parole, and probation, as well as
responses from public disclosure requests and discussions with elections
and corrections officials and other relevant actors, this Article reveals
that wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is authorized in forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia.
After describing the mechanisms for wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement, this Article offers a doctrinal intervention for
dismantling them. There has been limited, and to date unsuccessful,
litigation challenging these practices as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection and due process clauses. Because voting
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eligibility is stripped of its fundamental nature for those convicted of a
crime, wealth-based penal disenfranchisement has been subject to the
lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis review, leading lower courts to
uphold the practice. This Article posits that these courts have
approached the validity of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
through the wrong frame-the right to vote when the proper frame is
through the lens of punishment. This Article examines a line of cases in
which the Court restricted governmental action that would result in
disparate treatment between rich and poor in criminal justice practices,
juxtaposing the cases against the Court's treatment of wealth-based
discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine and the
constitutional relevance of indigency in the criminal justice system
broadly. Doing so supports the conclusion that the Court has departed
from the traditional tiers of scrutiny. The resulting test operates as a flat
prohibition against the use of the government's prosecutorial power in
ways that effectively punish one's financial circumstances unless no
other alternative response could satisfy the government's interest in
punishing the disenfranchising offense. Because such alternatives are
available, wealth-based penal disenfranchisement would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment under this approach.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2017, Alabama Governor Kay Ivey signed into law a
statute that resolved a long-standing question regarding the right to
vote in the state: What constitutes a crime of "moral turpitude" that
results in voter disenfranchisement upon conviction?1 The term
appeared in Alabama's Constitution as early as its adoption in 1901,2
but in the intervening years, beyond a smattering of opinions by
Alabama's Attorney General, 3 discerning the breadth of crimes that
could result in disenfranchisement was left to the discretion of election
officials in each of Alabama's sixty-seven counties.4 The new law
1. ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1 (2018); see also Connor Sheets, Gov. Ivey Signs Bill Restoring
'Thousands'of Alabama Felons'Right to Vote, AL.COM (May 25, 2017), https://www.al.comlnews/
index.ssf/2017/05/govjivey-signs bill-restoring.html [https://perma.cc/GX6M-5MC4].
2. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177(b).
3. See Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The Case of
Legal Financial Obligations, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 318 (2017).
4. See Connor Sheets, Alabama Election Officials Remain Confused Over Which Felons
Should Be Able to Vote, AL.coM (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.al.comlnews/index.ssfl2017/10/
alabama-election-officials-rem.html [https://perma.cc/9GJP-NJC9].
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resolved inconsistencies between the counties by designating forty-two
felonies as crimes of moral turpitude.5
A question soon arose regarding the status of people who had
been disenfranchised prior to the law's amendment for crimes not on
the list of felonies set forth in the new statute and who had not yet
regained the right to vote under Alabama's reenfranchisement laws
because those laws required the complete payment of all economic
sanctions6 imposed upon conviction, including "all fines, court costs,
fees, and victim restitution."7 Alabama Secretary of State John H.
Merrill initially advised that people would have to pay in full before
regaining the right to vote, regardless of the fact that the felonies for
which they were convicted now clearly did not qualify as crimes of moral
turpitude and thus could not be disenfranchising in the first instance.8
After a quick backlash in the media, Secretary Merrill issued a
correction, stating that people convicted of nondisenfranchising felonies
could register to vote, regardless of whether they had outstanding
criminal debt.9
While the clarification of Alabama's disenfranchisement laws
resulted in the reenfranchisement of thousands of the state's citizens,10
for those convicted of offenses now designated crimes of moral
turpitude, the inability to pay economic sanctions still leaves voting out
5. ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1. These felonies include an array of violent offenses, sex offenses,
drug offenses, and offenses involving real and intellectual property. Id.
6. This Article uses the term "economic sanctions" to refer to any form of financial penalty,
including statutory fines, surcharges, administrative fees, and restitution because the Supreme
Court has explicitly declined to distinguish between these forms of punishments in the cases
offering the relevant constitutional analysis. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662, 667 (1983)
(applying the prohibition on automatic revocation of probation for failure to pay to both statutory
fines and restitution); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239, 244 n.20 (1970) (explaining that the
prohibition on automatic conversion of statutory fines to incarceration applies equally to court
costs).
7. ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(a)(3) (2018).
8. Connor Sheets, Too Poor to Vote: How Alabama's 'New Poll Tax'Bars Thousands ofPeople
from Voting, AL.COM, https://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2017/10/too poor to vote how
alabamas.html (last updated July 24, 2018) [https:/perma.cclD5GX-EGB8] ("In order for you to
have your voting rights restored, you have to make sure all of your fines and restitution have been
paid." (quoting Alabama Secretary of State John Merrill)).
9. Connor Sheets, In Wake of Reports, Alabama Clarifies that Some Felons Can Vote Despite
Debts, AL.coM, https://www.al.com/news/index.ssfl2017/10/inwakeofreports alabamacla.html
(last updated Aug. 26, 2018) [https://perma.ce/E57V-QWFK].
10. Connor Sheets, Thousands of Alabama Felons Register to Vote in Last-Minute Push,
AL.COM (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.al.com/news/index.ssfl2017/11/advocatesmakelast-
minutepus.html [https://perma.cc/933X-JNGA].
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of reach." These outstanding sanctions effectively operate as what this
Article refers to as "wealth-based penal disenfranchisement." 1 2
In Part I, this Article provides the first comprehensive
examination of the structures through which the inability to pay
economic sanctions may prevent people from voting. 13 The number of
11. See ALA. CODE §17-3-30.1 (2018) (listing crimes of moral turpitude).
12. I do not refer to this form of penal disenfranchisement as "poverty-based" because the loss
of access to voting through the mechanisms detailed herein is not limited to people who live below
any particular poverty threshold, but rather applies to any person who does not have the financial
capacity to meet a jurisdiction's payment requirements in advance of the registration deadline for
an election. This is in keeping with the key case upon which the doctrinal intervention provided in
this Article arises, in which the Court understood poverty as operating not as a class, but as a
barrier to fair treatment in criminal justice systems for any person unable to make a required
payment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 n.8 (1983) ("[I]ndigency in this context is a relative
term rather than a classification . . . ."); id. ("[A] defendant's level of financial resources is a point
on a spectrum rather than a classification."). The term "wealth-based" is also in keeping with the
phrase "wealth-based discrimination," commonly used to discuss cases arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment that implicate a person's financial condition.
Additionally, I use the term "penal disenfranchisement" rather than "felon
disenfranchisement" intentionally. Most jurisdictions disenfranchise for all or a subset of felony
convictions. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2; supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. In some
jurisdictions misdemeanor convictions also may be disenfranchising. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.02(7)
(2018); KY. CONST. § 145(1) (2018); Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.133.2(2)-(3) (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-
5-120(B)(2) (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101(2) (LexisNexis 2018); Letter from Steven L.
Beshear, Ky. Att'y Gen., to Tipton Baker, Harlan Cty. Judge (Apr. 24, 1980), Ky. OAG80-234, 1980
WL 103047 (stating that the legislature has never defined "high misdemeanors" and therefore the
disenfranchisement provision is inoperable as to such offenses). But see Erika Wood & Rachel
Bloom, De Facto Disenfranchisement, AM. CIVIL LIB. UNION & BRENNAN CTR. FOR J. 2-3 (2008),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/09.08.DeFacto.Disenfranchis
ement.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3ZV-QQCU] (reporting that forty percent of county clerks
interviewed in Kentucky believed that people with misdemeanor convictions were
disenfranchised). Florida and Louisiana even require payment of economic sanctions imposed as
punishment for nondisenfranchising convictions and traffic offenses to be eligible for
reenfranchisement, extending the effects of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement to even petty
offenses. See Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Rules of Executive Clemency § 6, (Mar. 9, 2011)
[hereinafter Fla. Clemency Rules], https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/ 2 011/03/2011-
Amended-Rules-for-Executive-Clemency.final_.3-9.pdf [https://perma.cclR8L8-WETP]; LA. ADMIN
CODE tit. 22, § 203(A)(1) (2018); infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (regarding the
continuation of those requirements in Florida for people convicted of murder and sex offenses).
The constitutionality of disenfranchisement for misdemeanors or petty offenses is an open
question. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974) (upholding disenfranchisement for
felony convictions as constitutional, but not discussing other offenses); Richard M. Re &
Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction
Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1648-51 (2012) (reviewing the historical record and arguing
that it does not support the constitutionality of disenfranchisement for lower-level felonies and
misdemeanors).
13. The Restoration of Rights Project, produced by the Collateral Consequences Resource
Center, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, and the National HIRE Network, is an excellent resource regarding penal
disenfranchisement generally, but does not distinguish wealth-based penal disenfranchisement.
See RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT, http://restoration.ccresourcecenter.org/ (last visited Sept.
1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/E5AK-DJ7T]. In 2016, the Alliance for a Just Society published an
overview of laws that result in continued disenfranchisement due to the failure to pay economic
sanctions. See generally Allyson Fredericksen & Linnea Lassiter, Disenfranchised by Debt:
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jurisdictions in which wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is
authorized is grossly underestimated. Commentators typically state
that nine jurisdictions-including Alabama-require full payment to be
eligible for reenfranchisement.14 To understand the reach of wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement, this Article provides an in-depth
examination of a tangle of election, clemency, parole, and probation
statutes, rules, and policies, along with an analysis of responses to
formal and informal public disclosure requests and discussions with
elections and corrections officials and other relevant actors. 15 This
Article reveals that wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is
sanctioned under the laws of forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia, 16 potentially preventing up to a million people or more from
voting,17 particularly in low-income communities and communities of
Millions Impoverished by Prison, Blocked from Voting, ALLIANCE FOR JUST SOC'Y (Mar. 2016),
http://allianceforajustsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Disenfranchised-by-Debt-FINAL-
3.8.pdf [https://perma.ccYY6U-SQZZ]. The report marks the first significant attempt to marshal
legal authorities on this topic. This Article significantly expands on that effort by examining
additional jurisdictions not included in the report, considering wealth-based restrictions on
obtaining clemency, correcting portions of the analysis that conflate parole and probation, and
assessing disenfranchisement stemming from federal and out-of-state convictions. Finally, a 2017
investigation into the use of economic sanctions in nine states provides useful information about
the relationship between voting restrictions and criminal debt in those jurisdictions. See ALEXES
HARRIS ET AL., MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF LAW AND
POLICY IN CALIFORNIA, GEORGIA, ILLINOIS, MINNESOTA, MISSOURI, NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA,
TEXAS, AND WASHINGTON (Apr. 2017), http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-content/uploads/
2 017/04/Monetary-Sanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/76QN-C67M].
14. See, e.g., Robert Reich, The Poor Are Being Barred from Voting, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 21,
2017, 10:03 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/robert-reich-poor-are-being-barred-voting-and-
thats-unconstitutional-718117 [https://perma.cc/CQ7S-EDTS] (stating that people cannot vote due
to outstanding fees and fines "[iJn nine states"); Sheets, supra note 8 ("[I]n Alabama and eight
other states from Nevada to Tennessee, anyone who has lost the franchise cannot regain it until
they pay off any outstanding court fines, legal fees and victim restitution.").
15. See infra Appendices A-F.
16. See infra Part I.
17. Additional research is needed to discern the number of people subject to wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement, but what data is available suggests the figure could be over one million
people. Christopher Uggen and his colleagues have estimated that, as of 2016, over 1.8 million
people subject to penal disenfranchisement are on parole or probation. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET
AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at
15 tbl.3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-miion-lost-voters-state-level-
estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [https://perma.cc/T2EL-NGL7]; see also infra
Appendices C-D. That figure is certainly overrepresentative of wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement: not all people on parole or probation will have outstanding criminal debt; in
at least some cases people will have a meaningful ability to pay what debt does exist, and people
may be retained on or revoked from parole or probation for multiple reasons in addition to a failure
to pay economic sanctions. Given, however, both the overreliance on supervision fees that often
compound criminal debt in the parole and probation context, as well as the financial vulnerability
of people with felony convictions, it is reasonable to believe that a significant portion of people on
community supervision will be subjected to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. See, e.g., ABA
WORKING GROUP ON BLDG. PUB. TR. IN THE AM. JUST. SYS., TEN GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES AND
FEES 2 (Aug. 2018) [hereinafter ABA, TEN GUIDELINES], https://www.americanbar.org/
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color. 18
While well-informed legislative advocacy responsive to the
intricacies of the various laws and policies identified herein could
secure meaningful reform, litigation may be necessary to bring about
change in many jurisdictions,19 and so Part II offers a doctrinal
intervention. There has been limited, and to-date unsuccessful,
litigation challenging wealth-based penal disenfranchisement on the
grounds that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and
equal protection clauses. 20 The lower courts have approached the
content/dam/abalimages/abanews/2018-AM-Resolutions/114.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5RC-SQT3];
Statement on the Future of Community Corrections, COLUM. JUST. LAB (May 17, 2018),
http://justicelab.iserp.columbia.edulstatement.html [https://perma.ccl8MEN-HCLH]. Those
figures also do not include people who may have been discharged from parole or probation but live
in a jurisdiction in which payment of economic sanctions is independently required to regain the
vote even if the person has completed all other terms of his or her sentence. See infra Appendix B.
For example, a recent estimate of the effect of reforms in 2018 to Florida's reenfranchisement law
suggested that 560,000 people in that state alone may remain disenfranchised upon completion of
parole and probation due to outstanding criminal debt should the new law be interpreted to require
payment. See Memorandum from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU of Florida and Marc Mauer,
Exec. Dir., Sentencing Project, to Executive Board, Second Chances Team (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://docs.google.com/document/d/lom20yU-Ri8GKBdtYUuur-R-RyAagoY1SvmWDWRYghVss/
edit# [https://perma.cc/RZV8-D5Y5]. Further study should also include the ripple effects of wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement policies on eligible voters. Voting rights information provided by
elections and corrections officials often lacks clarity regarding when the right to vote is restored.
See, e.g., infra notes 64, 149; see also Eli Hager, More Ex-Prisoners Can Vote-They Just Don't
Know It, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/01/more-
ex-prisoners-can-vote-they-just-don-t-know-it [https://perma.cc/TV64-92NZ]. Particularly when
combined with the risk of prosecution for voting post-conviction if those rules are misunderstood,
unclear information may dissuade eligible voters with criminal records from registering. See, e.g.,
Jack Healy, Arrested & Charged with a Felony. For Voting., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/us/arrested-voting-north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/
94MQ-H8PE] (describing efforts in several states to prosecute people for illegal voting even if they
misunderstood the state's disenfranchisement laws); Vanessa Romo, Texas Woman Sentenced to 5
Years for Illegal Voting, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/03/31/598458914/texas-woman-sentenced-to-5-years-for-illegal-voting [https://perma.cc/
X8C4-D6KG] (regarding the sentence imposed on Virginia Mason for voting while still
disenfranchised for a felony despite her lack of understanding that she was prohibited from
voting).
18. See infra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Rebecca Beitsch, Felony Voting Laws Are Confusing; Activists Would Ditch Them
Altogether, HUFFPOST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/felony-voting-laws-
are-confusing-activists-would-ditch us_5ac6371ce4b01l90cled6e41 [https://perma.cclR4D3-
UVKV] ("Nebraska Gov. Pete Ricketts, a Republican, vetoed a bill last year that would have
allowed felons to vote once they left prison.").
20. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding Tennessee had a rational
basis for the state's disenfranchisment statute); Madison v. Washington, 163 P.3d 757 (Wash.
2007) (holding that Washington's disenfranchisement statute was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest). There is a growing literature on penal disenfranchisement generally.
See, e.g., JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 84 (2006); KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN
AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND MODERN CONSEQUENCES (2005);
Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate Over Felon
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1148 n.8 (2004) (providing examples of recent
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1:55
question through a voting rights frame, employing the traditional tiers
of scrutiny approach; upon finding that the right to vote is no longer
fundamental for those who are disenfranchised as the result of a
conviction, the courts have subjected the practice to only rational basis
review. 21
To examine the possibility of an alternative doctrinal challenge
to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement, this Article recasts the
constitutional question through the frame of punishment. This
intervention is based on a set of cases dating back to 195622 and upon
which the Supreme Court continues to rely. 23 These cases are referred
to here as the "Bearden line," after Bearden v. Georgia,24 a case that is
most closely associated with the use of "poverty penalties" imposed on
people of limited means for the failure to pay economic sanctions. 25 I
scholarship); Mary Sigler, Defensible Disenfranchisement, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1725 (2014); see also
infra notes 162, 167 (citing sources). Wealth-based penal disenfranchisement, however, has
received only limited attention in the literature. See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony
Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 357 (2012); Jill E.
Simmons, Beggars Can't Be Voters: Why Washington's Felon Re-enfranchisement Law Violates the
Equal Protection Clause, 78 WASH. L. REV. 297, 318-20 (2003); Cherish M. Keller, Note, Re-
Enfranchisement Laws Provide Unequal Treatment: Ex-Felon Re-enfranchisement and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 199, 212-16 (2006); see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra,
at 84 (noting briefly that full payment of criminal debt is required for reenfranchisement in some
states).
21. See Johnson, 624 F.3d 742; Madison, 163 P.3d 757.
22. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
23. The Court has turned to this line of cases to confirm its understanding of due process and
equal protection as providing amplified protection where the individual interest in avoiding unfair
treatment due to one's financial condition involves the criminal justice system or other
fundamental rights, as well as its concerns regarding the unique risk posed by the use of the
prosecutorial power. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015) (regarding the
proposition that the two clauses "are connected in a profound way, though they set forth
independent principles"); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 104, 106, 119-20 (1996) (relying on the
dual use of the equal protection and due process clauses to conclude that court fees preventing a
parent from warding off state efforts to terminate parental rights in light of the fundamental
interest at stake for the parent); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 76 n.3 (1985) (relying on the
line for the proposition that indigent defendants must be protected "when a State brings its judicial
power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding"). In cases where the Court has
afforded special protection in relation to wealth outside of the criminal context, it has bolstered its
decisions by characterizing the potentially adverse consequences at issue as rendering the
proceedings "quasi-criminal." See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124-25 (regarding termination of parental
rights); see also id. at 139-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority failed to preserve
the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, the latter of which involved numerous
constitutional protections, including not only liberty interests but the interest in avoiding
excessive fines). In contrast, the Court has declined to extend such protections to areas it deemed
wholly distinct from the criminal justice system and not otherwise implicating a fundamental
right. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-48, 462 n.* (1988) (regarding
school bus user fees).
24. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
25. See Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors'Prison,
65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 2-12 (2018) (describing various poverty penalties imposed for the failure to
62
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Bearden, the Court held that when payment of a fine or restitution is
made a condition of probation, the state may not automatically revoke
probation for a failure to pay without first considering whether the
violation was willful or due instead to the person's financial
circumstances. 26 An examination of the Bearden line, juxtaposed
against both its treatment of wealth-based discrimination elsewhere in
the Fourteenth Amendment and indigency in the criminal justice
system broadly, suggests that the Court has departed from the
traditional tiers of scrutiny approach. In Bearden, that resulted in a test
that operates as a flat ban on the government's use of its prosecutorial
power in ways that effectively punish a person for her financial
condition rather than her culpability. Because alternatives to the use of
wealth-based penal disenfranchisement that protect the government's
interest in punishing the disenfranchising offense while also protecting
against the punishment of one's financial condition exist-including
severing the link between payment and reenfranchisement, reducing
economic sanctions to a payable amount, and creating provisional
restoration opportunities during a payment period-wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement would violate the Fourteenth Amendment
under this approach.27
Though this Article is focused on exploring what the parameters
of the test announced in Bearden are and, more specifically, the ways
in which that test may be used, to challenge wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement, it additionally contributes to a broader theoretical
inquiry regarding what justifies 28 and constituteS 29 punishment, as well
pay, including costs of collection and interest, loss of driver's and occupational licenses, and loss of
public benefits).
26. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
27. See infra Section II.D.2.
28. Cf. Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 462-63
(2005) ("The principles reflect familiar liberal ideals: that ... any violation of the liberty and
dignity of citizens by the state demands compelling justification."); Mary Sigler, Private Prisons,
Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. L. REV. 149, 163 (2010) (arguing
that to impose "the sort of treatment that we call punishment-taking life, liberty, or property"
requires justification in order to avoid "a grave injustice").
29. As detailed in Part II, this inquiry raises the question of whether penal
disenfranchisement constitutes punishment regardless of whether it also has regulatory qualities.
The question of how to draw appropriate lines between criminal and civil matters has been the
subject of a rich literature. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies
to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking
Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1827-28 (2012); Donald
Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a 'Regulatory Model" of, or 'Pathological
Perspective" on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199 (1996); Kenneth
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795 (1992); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 799 (1997); Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple
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as the relevance of one's financial condition to interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment more broadly. Regarding the former, these
cases affirm that when the government wields its prosecutorial power,
it "takes its most awesome step,"30 and that the Constitution is
"designed to wrap [its] protection ... around all defendants upon whom
the mighty powers of government are hurled to punish for crime." 31
These cases, therefore, are animated by the overarching norm that
when the government employs that mighty power, it must be justified
in doing so, and that nonwillful behavior stemming from a person's
financial circumstances cannot serve as justification.32 These normative
commitments, along with the Court's related understanding that
fundamental rights may not be constrained due solely to one's financial
condition, 33 find a home in the due process and equal protection clauses
because both the fairness of systems concerning criminal and
fundamental rights and the demand that all people be treated equally
within them regardless of financial condition are implicated. Together
those clauses bolster and reinforce each other, providing greater
protection than either would have on its own.34 In short, these
Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901 (1992); see also Sessions v.
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(calling into question the distinction between criminal and civil law in light of the significant
penalties-including fines and forfeitures-that can be imposed in nominally civil settings).
30. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1962).
31. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 390-91 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); see also infra
notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part II.
33. The Court's reliance on both the due process and equal protection clauses also has
relevance for other rights that the Court understands to be explicitly or implicitly subjected to
constitutional protection. See, e.g., supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Cary Franklin,
Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 818-
19, 873-74, 881, 888 (2014) (examining the ways in which courts' increased understanding of the
historical discrimination of LGBTQ people, which implicates equal protection concerns, has
resulted in a broader conception of liberty interests under the due process clause).
34. See infra Section II.A.2. A handful of scholars have argued that the dual use of
constitutional provisions, including the due process and equal protection clauses, can render the
provisions mutually reinforcing, providing greater protection together than either provision might
provide independently. See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional
Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1313-14 (2017) (describing "intersectional rights" as existing "where
the action in question violates more than one constitutional provision and when the constitutional
provisions are read to inform and bolster one another"); Michael Coenen, Combining
Constitutional Clauses, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2016) ("The Court ... has combined
constitutional clauses, deriving an overall conclusion of constitutional validity (or invalidity) from
the joint decisional force of two or more constitutional provisions."); Franklin, supra note 33, at
818 ("Due process and equal protection often work in tandem to illuminate important aspects of
constitutional questions that can be seen less clearly through the lens of a single clause."); Pamela
S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33
McGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) ("[L]ooking at an issue stereoscopically-through the lenses of
both the due process clause and the equal protection clause-can have synergistic effects,
producing results that neither clause might reach by itself."); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v.
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underlying normative commitments not only explicate the test that
emerges from Bearden itself but offer meaningful guidance for
analyzing the constitutionality of governmental practices that price
people out of fair treatment in criminal justice systems and beyond.35
I. STATE MECHANISMS FOR WEALTH-BASED PENAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Though authorization for wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement is widespread, it is typically understood to exist in
only nine states. 36 This Part shows that it is actually authorized under
the laws and policies of forty-eight states and the District of Columbia. 37
This disparity is attributable to the fact that penal disenfranchisement
and reenfranchisement practices are not neatly laid out in a discrete set
of statutes. In each jurisdiction, conviction of certain offenses triggers
disenfranchisement. 38  Some crimes are permanently
disenfranchising, 39 but otherwise the satisfaction of certain conditions
makes a person automatically eligible to register to vote or eligible to
apply for reenfranchisement through a restoration process.
Ascertaining what those conditions are involves an analysis of multiple
Texas: The 'Fundamental Right' That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898
(2004) ("[D]ue process and equal protection, far from having separate missions and entailing
different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix."); Katherine Watson, When
Substantive Due Process Meets Equal Protection: Reconciling Obergefell and Glucksburg, 21 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 245, 247, 253 (2017) (describing the Court as "undertak[ing] a hybrid approach
that ultimately gives each clause more teeth" and explaining that the overlap "can trigger a
synergy in which each clause broadens the scope of the other"); cf. Akhil Reed Amar,
Intertextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 772-73 (1999) (positing that the Fourteenth Amendment's
framers would have understood the Fifth Amendment's due process clause as incorporating equal
protection principles, but added the explicit requirement of equal protection to the Fourteenth
Amendment as a "clarifying gloss," and thus the clauses may readily be interpreted as addressing
interrelated concerns). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1173-75
(1988) (arguing that due process protects traditional practices and equal protection aims to disrupt
historical practices, so that these clauses are doing distinct work).
35. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971). See also supra note 33 and
accompanying text (regarding application of cases that, like Bearden, rely on due process and equal
protection in combination to afford protections related to fundamental rights); infra note 176 and
accompanying text (regarding application of the Bearden line to pretrial detention and detention
in advance of ability-to-pay hearings).
36. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
37. The constitutional provisions, statutes, rules, and policies set out in this Article are
current as of the 2018 midterm elections unless a given state had already passed a law scheduled
to go into effect in 2019, in which case those changes are reflected herein. See, e.g., 2018 La. Acts
636.
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(g) (2018) (listing convictions that permanently prohibit
reinstatement of voting rights, including impeachment, treason, murder, and certain violent and
sex offenses).
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layers of constitutional and statutory text, administrative rules, and
departmental policies, and necessitates an understanding of not just
voter registration procedures but also the intricacies of each
jurisdiction's clemency, parole, and probation systems. While much of
the often-complex array of documents needed to ascertain this
information is publicly available to those willing to excavate it, in many
instances practices could only be discerned through information
obtained via formal and informal public disclosure requests and
discussions with public officials who execute a jurisdiction's
reenfranchisement practices. 40
There are three key, and overlapping, difficulties in
understanding the full range of mechanisms by which jurisdictions
authorize wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. First, by focusing on
the sanctioning of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement through
what this Article refers to as "independent payment requirements"-so
named because they involve a requirement to pay economic sanctions
to become reenfranchised independent of any other aspect of a person's
sentence-obscures the role that one's parole or probation status plays
in eligibility for reenfranchisement. As detailed below, because
supervision status may be dependent on compliance with the conditions
of supervision, including the payment of economic sanctions, the link to
parole and probation significantly expands the authorization of wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement across the country.41 Second,
commentators fail to account for jurisdictions that impose penal
disenfranchisement not only for violations of their own laws but for
federal or out-of-state convictions as well. 4 2 Third, the relevant laws and
policies in many jurisdictions use vague language in which penal
disenfranchisement and restoration requirements are hidden. For
example, Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, and West Virginia each preclude
reenfranchisement until the sentence imposed on the would-be voter is
completed.4 3 Election officials in Georgia and Kansas have interpreted
40. In compiling the data for this project, I did not consider the effect of ability-to-pay
determinations that may be in play at sentencing. Some jurisdictions, for example, inquire into a
person's ability to pay in determining whether to impose, or the amount of, an economic sanction
in the first instance. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-11A-4(g) (2018). Such practices may limit the
number of people subjected to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement because they may render
payment of economic sanctions manageable, so long as a person has the ability to pay the amount
imposed before the next election registration deadline or has an opportunity to provisionally
register to vote during the payment period. See infra Section II.D.
41. See infra Section I.B, Appendices C-D.
42. See infra Section I.C, Appendix E.
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-216(b) (2018) (allowing registration upon "completion of the
sentence"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6613(a)-(b) (2018) (disenfranchising until the person has
"completed the terms of the authorized sentence"); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-122, 32-313 (2018)
(disenfranchising "until two years after he or she has completed the sentence"); W. VA. CONST. art.
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that requirement to include full payment of economic sanctions to
regain eligibility to vote 44-thus authorizing wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement through an independent payment requirement-
whereas Nebraska and West Virginia election officials have not. 4 5
Similarly, ascertaining whether a jurisdiction disenfranchises for
federal or out-of-state convictions is often dependent on interpretive
decisions of administrative officials that are not readily available to the
public. For example, a request to Alaska election officials for additional
information was necessary to discern that its officials have interpreted
its statutory reference to crimes of moral turpitude to include federal
but not out-of-state convictions. 4 6 In contrast, officials in Delaware 4 7
and Wisconsin 4 8 have interpreted laws requiring disenfranchisement
upon conviction of a "felony" to include both federal and out-of-state
offenses. In a small handful of jurisdictions in which relevant statutes,
rules, and policies do not explicitly state whether disenfranchisement
occurs upon conviction of federal or out-of-state offenses, no official
interpretation could be obtained, 49 leaving the scope of penal dis-
enfranchisement-let alone wealth-based penal disenfranchisement-
unclear.50
The difficulty of discerning the full array of mechanisms
sanctioning wealth-based penal disenfranchisement raises interesting
questions beyond the scope of this Article regarding institutional design
and public choice.5 1 The labyrinth of laws, policies, and practices that
IV, § 1 (stating that people are disenfranchised upon conviction "while such disability continues");
W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3 (2018) (same); W. VA. CODE § 3-2-2(b) (2018) (stating that disenfranchisement
continues "while serving his or her sentence, including any period of incarceration, probation, or
parole related thereto" (emphasis added)).
44. GA. JUST. PROJECT, 2014 FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT STUDY REPORT 1 (2014),
https://www.gjp.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/648T-3UVV];
Telephone Interview with Jameson Beckner, Asst. Dir. of Elections, Kan. Sec'y of State (June 6,
2018).
45. Telephone Interview with Wayne Bena, Neb. Deputy Sec'y of State for Elections (June 7,
2018); E-mail from Stephen R. Connolly, Deputy Sec'y & Chief Legal Counsel, W. Va. Sec'y of
State, to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (June 8, 2018) (on file with author).
46. E-mail from Jeremy Johnson, Region III Election Supervisor, Alaska Div. of Elections, to
Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with author).
47. Email from Elaine Manlove, State Election Comm'r, to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law,
UCLA Sch. of Law (Dec. 4, 2017) (on file with author).
48. Email from Michael R. Haas, Staff Counsel, Wis. Elections Comm'n, to Beth A. Colgan,
Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Mar. 19, 2018) (on file with author).
49. See infra Appendix E.
50. Woods & Bloom, supra note 12, at 6-7 (documenting confusion among election officials
regarding the applicability of disenfranchisement laws to federal and out-of-state convictions).
51. For examples of the use of institutional design and public choice theory to assess the
development and effects of criminal practices and procedures, see Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2010); Keith N. Hylton &
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
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sanction wealth-based penal disenfranchisement could reflect many
things, including an intentional effort to punish 52 or to prevent people
from voting,53 a desire to promote collections of economic sanctions
aimed at a jurisdiction's revenue-generation goals, 54 or a mere accident
stemming from the unfamiliarity of lawmakers with the effect of an
array of criminal and election laws layered over time.55 In addition,
because blocking people from voting eligibility may make elected
officials less responsive to disenfranchised communities and therefore
less likely to reform laws precluding reenfranchisement, the practices
may be self-perpetuating. 5 6
Further, even with the robust examination offered here, it is
important to note that this Article is focused on identifying when
wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is authorized by the law on the
books, rather than an assessment of the law in action.5 7 In some
jurisdictions, wealth-based penal disenfranchisement practices are
undoubtedly preventing people from voting due to the ubiquity of
economic sanctions,58 the likelihood that people required to pay
economic sanctions and subject to disenfranchisement have limited
61 (2007); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 715 (2013); and Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
183 (2003).
52. For a discussion of how the use of penal disenfranchisement evinces punitive intent, see
infra Part II.C.2.
53. See infra notes 461-462 and accompanying text.
54. Cf. generally Colgan, supra note 25.
55. See, e.g., Sigler, supra note 20, at 1741 (noting that the scope of what constitutes a felony,
and thus a disenfranchising crime, has expanded well beyond what was recognized at the common
law).
56. See Murat C. Mungan, Over-Iacarceration and Disenfranchisement, 172 PUB. CHOICE 377
(2017) (positing that disenfranchisement laws reduce political pressure on politicians to respond
to people with convictions, thereby pushing politicians away from optimal sentencing); see also
George Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1906 (1999) ('V]oting is precisely about expressing biases, loyalties,
commitments, and personal values" and so "[e]xcluding from the electorate those who have felt the
sting of criminal law obviously skews the politics of criminal justice toward one side of the debate");
infra notes 460-462 and accompanying text; cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics
as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646-48 (1998)
(comparing the political process with competitive markets in which "anticompetitive entities alter
the rules of engagement to protect established powers from the risk of successful challenge," and
thus remain vital only with a robust competition arising through a diversity of ideas).
57. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 34 (1910)
("[T]he law upon the statute books will be far from representing what takes place actually."). See
generally Roger A. Shiner, Theorizing Criminal Law Reform, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 167 (2009)
(regarding the value of understanding doctrine (law on the books) and the sociologist's and
criminologist's account of the law (law in action) despite critiques that even together they do not
adequately account for societal and political forces).
58. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 25, at 6-7.
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means or otherwise cannot complete payment prior to an election, 59 and
the fact that exclusion from the vote is expressly mandated until
payment is made. 60 In others, whether a person will be subject to
wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is less certain, because its
application will depend on discretionary decisions regarding a would-be
voter's financial capacity that are made by individual governors, courts,
or corrections personnel in a given case. For example, a judge or
corrections officer may have sufficient authority to respond to a failure
to pay economic sanctions by expanding the term of parole or probation,
and thus the period of disenfranchisement, depending on whether or
not she believes that the person made reasonable efforts to pay. 6 1  }hile
systems can be carefully designed to appropriately capture a person's
financial capacity, 62 absent such care, the likelihood that wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement will occur increases. 63  Further,
implementation decisions regarding disenfranchisement and
reenfranchisement may rest in the hands of a disparate array of local
election officials across counties or municipalities, and so the potential
ways that each jurisdiction's laws allow for wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement may be exacerbated by local decisionmaking. 64
59. See, e.g., Nathan W. Link, Criminal Justice Debt During the Prisoner Reintegration
Process: Who Has It & How Much?, 46 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 154 (2018).
60. See, e.g., infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
62. See generally Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to
Pay, 103 IOwA L. REV. 53 (2017).
63. See infra Section II.D.
64. A joint study conducted by the ACLU and the Brennan Center for Justice involving
interviews of election officials in twenty-three states showed a widespread misunderstanding of
voter eligibility rules, including confusion about which offenses were disenfranchising, whether
disenfranchisement applied to people on parole or probation, the scope of other eligibility
requirements such as waiting periods, and whether documentation of eligibility was required to
register. See Wood & Bloom, supra note 12. As another example, even after Alabama clarified the
definition of moral turpitude in its disenfranchisement statute and provided guidance to local
election officials regarding the change, several officials reported that they were unsure of how to
implement the new law. See Sheets, supra note 4. Similarly, Maryland's Parole Commission's
website still says that a person must complete parole or probation to be eligible to vote despite a
change in the law in 2016 allowing restoration upon release from incarceration. Compare
Frequently Asked Questions, MD. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERV.,
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/about/FAQmpc.shtml#pardon (last visited Sept. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/XV8E-QYCQ], with MD. CODE ANN., ELEc. LAw, § 3-102(b)(1) (LexiNexis 2018).
See also Cammett, supra note 20, at 376-77 (noting that in many cases neither election officials
nor potential voters understand disenfranchisement laws); Marc Mauer, Felon Voting
Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Consequence of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENT'G
REP. 248, 249 (2000) (describing confusion among local election officials); infra note 149; cf. Justin
Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747 (2016) (documenting
implementation and enforcement difficulties when election laws are administered at the local
level).
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Understanding how wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is
authorized is essential for reform efforts directed at legislative and
executive officials as well as through the courts. For example, in 2013,
in an attempt to eliminate wealth-based penal disenfranchisement,
Delaware amended its constitution to remove an independent payment
requirement mandating full payment of "fees, fines, costs, and
restitution" to be eligible for reenfranchisement. 65 The amended
constitutional provision, however, continues to require "expiration of
the sentence," 66 which includes completion of parole or probation.67
Because the length of such supervision may be dependent on full
payment of economic sanctions,68  wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement remains authorized in Delaware. 69 The same is
true for the rejection of independent payment requirements by the two
most recent governors of Virginia, detailed below. 70 While that reform
provided relief for people no longer on supervision but struggling with
criminal debt, for the potentially tens of thousands of people on parole
or probation in Virginia who are required to pay economic sanctions as
a condition of supervision,71 wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
remains possible. In addition to ensuring meaningful policy reform, for
any litigator seeking to challenge wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement as unconstitutional, understanding each
authorization mechanism is necessary to ensure that the relief sought
addresses the full scope of the problem. 72
Therefore, this Part details three types of conditions necessary
to regain the right to vote that can result in wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement: independent payment requirements, payment
requirements tied to one's parole or probation status, and payment
requirements related to federal and out-of-state convictions.
65. 311 Del. Laws 242 (2016).
66. DEL. CONST. amend. art. V, § 2.
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 6102(a)(4); 6104(a), (c) (2000).
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4104, 4321, 4347(j) (2018); State of Del. Dep't of Corr.,
Procedure Number 7.5: The Collection of Monies (Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with author).
69. Delaware also has a possibility of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement in its
restoration application because it requires the applicant to provide payment-history information
for the purposes of merits consideration. See Delaware Board of Pardons Instructions, STATE DEL.
BD. PARDONS 2, https://pardons.delaware.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/42/2017/1 1/pardon
checklist_ 11142017.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cclN9X4-XLBS]; see also infra
notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
71. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 17 (estimating that 1,604 Virginia residents are
disenfranchised while on parole supervision and 56,908 are disenfranchised while on probation
supervision); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Section I.D.
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A. Independent Payment Requirements
As detailed below, twenty-eight jurisdictions require either full
or partial payment of economic sanctions to regain eligibility to vote,
independent of any other sentencing requirements.
1. Full Payment Required
That reenfranchisement is out of reach for those with no
meaningful ability to pay is most evident in the eight states that
explicitly mandate full payment of economic sanctions to regain
eligibility in their primary reenfranchisement laws, whether as a
restriction on eligibility for automatic reenfranchisement,
reenfranchisement through a discretionary application processes, or
both.73 In addition to Alabama's requirement, 74 Arizona,75 Arkansas,76
Connecticut,7 7 Florida,78 Kentucky, 79 Tennessee,80 and Texas 81 each
73. For a breakdown of the mechanisms by which disenfranchisement occurs, see infra
Appendix A.
74. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
75. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-912 (2018). Arizona also requires full payment of economic
sanctions to be eligible for relief through its general clemency process. See Ariz. Bd. of Exec.
Clemency, Pardon Application at 1 (last updated Jan. 9, 2015) (on file with author); infra note 82
and accompanying text.
76. ARK. CONST. amend. LI, § 11(d)(2)(A), (C)-(D).
77. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a(a) (2018).
78. Fla. Clemency Rules, supra note 12, at 7, 10-11, 14-15; Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency,
Application for Clemency (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/clemency/
ClemencyApplication.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7BV-FUUA]. Though Florida voters amended the
state's constitution to allow automatic reenfranchisement for most felonies in 2018, people
convicted of murder or sex offenses must still apply for reenfranchisement through its clemency
process. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
79. Kentucky's statute refers only to completion of restitution, but its pardon application,
through which restoration must be sought, extends the statutory requirement to payment of fines.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.045(2)(c) (West 2018); Ky. Div. of Probation & Parole, Application for
Restoration of Civil Rights 2, https://corrections.ky.gov/Probation-and-Parole/Documents/
Civil%20Rights%20Application%2ORev%2011-25-2015.pdf (last updated July 2012)
[https:/perma.cclK2MT-VRCH].
80. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-29-202(b)(1) (2018). In addition to full payment of restitution,
Tennessee also requires payment of court costs, "except where the court has made a finding at an
evidentiary hearing that the applicant is indigent at the time of the [restoration] application." Id.
§ 40-29-202(b)(2).
81. The relevant provisions in Texas require payment unless fines and costs are "separately
remitted or discharged." TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002(A)(4)(A) (West 2018); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROc. ANN. § 43.01(a) (West 2018). Under Texas law, as is true in many states, the clemency power
includes authority to remit fines. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.71 (2017). Therefore, it is possible in
these states that a person could seek a remission of her fines in order to obtain eligibility for
reenfranchisement. The actual operation of remission awards is outside of the scope of this Article,
however, for several reasons. First, even where remission authority exists, it may rarely, if ever,
be used. Compare, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (providing authority for remitting fines), with DEL.
BD. PARDONS, https://pardons.delaware.gov/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc[L7WL-
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prohibit reenfranchisement until payment of restitution, fines, fees,
costs, or a combination thereof is complete.
Four additional states include explicit independent payment
requirements outside of their primary reenfranchisement codes. A
review of restoration application and general clemency 82 procedures
reveals that Idaho, 83 Nebraska, 84 South Carolina,85 and South Dakota 86
also each require full payment of economic sanctions to be eligible to
apply for relief.
A handful of additional states also have interpreted their
reenfranchisement codes as including an independent payment
requirement. In Georgia and Kansas, the relevant laws require
completion of the sentence, which state officials have interpreted to
include full payment of economic sanctions.87 Florida may soon join this
list. In 2018, Florida voters passed an amendment to the state's
constitution allowing for automatic reenfranchisement for most
disenfranchising felonies "upon completion of all terms of sentence
LWN2] (providing application materials for other forms of clemency but not remissions). Second,
though the term "fines" for the purpose of remission has not been interpreted in many states,
where it has, it has been strictly construed and therefore would not provide relief where wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement stems from an inability to pay restitution, fees, or other economic
sanctions. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.805 (2018) (requiring payment of costs in order to seek
remission of fines). Finally, eligibility for remission may be effectively impossible if it is only
available upon completion of parole or probation, the conditions of which may include full payment
of fines. See, e.g., Florida Clemency Rules, supra note 12 at 4.
82. General clemency would provide an alternative avenue for restoration of the vote, even
where it is not expressly tied to the jurisdiction's reenfranchisement processes. This Article
excludes such practices, however, if a person would have 'already been automatically
reenfranchised before becoming eligible for clemency, even if the clemency system could turn on
ability to pay. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-216(b) (2018) (allowing for automatic discharge upon
completion of sentence); id. § 42-9-54(a) (stating that pardon also restores the right to vote); GA.
COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.10 (2018) (requiring the completion of a sentence to be eligible to apply
for a pardon). Barriers to clemency due to an inability to pay may be separately unconstitutional.
See infra note 337.
83. IDAHO CODE § 50.01.01.550.02(b)(v) (2018); Pardon Application Information, IDAHO
COMM'N PARDONS & PAROLE, https://parole.idaho.gov/pardonsinfoandapppage.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2018) [https://perma.ccUY3K-GWHK].
84. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2264(2), (4) (2018); Neb. Bd. of Pardons, Pardon Application (2013),
http://www.pardons.nebraska.gov/content/2013-new-application [https://perma.cc/5ZCU-FTLZ];
Pardon Application Instructions, NEB. BD. PARDONS, http://www.pardons.nebraska.gov/
instructions.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5ZN2-JQQM].
85. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-25-322(E), 24-21-970 (2018); How to Apply for a Pardon, S.C. DEP'T
PROB., PAROLE & PARDON SERVS., https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/138528/
3154712/file/1118+Pardon+Application+Rvsd+12-19-17+Fillable.pdf (last updated Dec. 19, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Z5UTM-CM7A]; Frequently Asked Questions About Expungements and Pardons in
South Carolina Courts, S.C. JUD. DEP'T, https://www.sccourts.org/selfhelp/FAQExpungement
Pardon.pdf [https://perma.cc/6598-8JK8].
86. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Executive Clemency Application,
http://doc.sd.gov/documents/executiveclemencypardonapplication-3-.pdf (last updated June 2009)
[https://perma.cc/2NMZ-V33Q].
87. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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including parole or probation."88 While Florida's explicit requirement of
repayment continues to apply to people convicted of murder and sex
offenses, for those convicted of any other felony, it was an open question
at the time of publication as to whether "completion" includes payment
of all economic sanctions.89 Whether Virginia law includes an
independent payment requirement is also in flux. Virginia's eligibility
for restoration requires a five-year waiting period that begins when a
person "has completed . .. service of any sentence."90 Under previous
administrations, this language had been treated as including an
independent payment requirement to be eligible for restoration.91 In
2015, however, then-Governor Terry McAuliffe announced a policy
change that ongoing criminal debt would not preclude
reenfranchisement 92-effectively interpreting the "completed ...
service" language to refer only to terms of incarceration, parole, or
probation.93 It appears that current-Governor Ralph Northam will
continue in that vein.94 In other words, the actual imposition of wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement depends upon the political will of the
executive, which can be altered upon a change in attitude or the loss of
88. Constitutional Amendment Petition Form, Amendment to Florida Constitution Article
VI, § 4, https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/64388-l.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8TDW-RCDC].
89. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Glenn Fleishman, Florida Felons
Regain Voting Rights, But How Many Can Actually Pass the Hurdles, Then Register, and Finally
Vote?, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/11/08/florida-felons-vote-rights-restored-
initiative/ [https://perma.cc/G8TH-5ST3]. At the time of publication, Florida's Division of Elections
declined to provide direction to county election officials, claiming that deciphering the meaning of
the amendment would require legislative action. See Steve Bousquet et al., Confusion Clouds
Restoration of Florida Felons' Voting Rights, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/12/04/confusion-and-uncertainty-cloud-
restoration-of-felons-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/Q87M-4WT9].
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (2018).
91. See 148 CONG. REC. 797 (2002) (statement of Sen. George Allen) (regarding his practices
related to reenfranchisement while serving as Virginia's governor: "I always looked at restitution
and court costs in my assessment" of whether to allow restoration; and explaining that while full
payment of restitution and costs was not a complete bar, "I cared a great deal about restitution
and court costs" and noting that payment was often a condition of probation).
92. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Va., Governor McAuliffe Announces New Reforms
to Restoration of Rights Process (June 23, 2015), https://governor.virginia.gov/newsrooml
newsarticle?articleId=11651 [https://perma.cc/89R9-HUAC].
93. Id.
94. See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Letting Felons Vote is Changing Virginia, ATLANTIC (Jan.
8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politicslarchive/2018/01/virginia-clemency-restoration-of-
rights-campaigns/549830/ [https://perma.cclN538-FEJ8] (noting that Governor Northam "has said
every time he's had the opportunity to say it that he's proud of the work we've done [regarding
voting restoration] and wants to continue it"); Restoration of Rights, SEC'Y COMMONWEALTH VA.,
https://commonwealth.virginia.gov/judicial-system/restoration-of-rights/ (last visited Sept. 14,
2018) [https://perma.cclL8DL-RPTZ] ("To be eligible for restoration of civil rights, an individual
must have a felony conviction and be free from any term of incarceration and/or supervision
resulting from felony conviction(s).").
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an election. In fact, we have seen this exact reversal happen before in
the context of penal disenfranchisement more broadly. Between 2005
and 2015, governors in Florida, Iowa, and Kentucky each issued
executive orders to allow automatic restoration of voting rights only to
have those actions undone by their successors, returning would-be
voters to seek reenfranchisement through onerous, and even arbitrary,
discretionary procedures. 95 Therefore, because this policy is so readily
reversed and the laws allowing for wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement remain on the books, I categorize Virginia as
among the jurisdictions with laws and policies that establish
independent payment requirements.
2. Ongoing Payment Required
In addition to jurisdictions that have independent requirements
that make full payment of all economic sanctions necessary for
reenfranchisement, several jurisdictions also mandate ongoing
payments toward one's criminal debt to regain eligibility to vote.
Wealth-based penal disenfranchisement remains possible in these
jurisdictions because each requires or allows for a determination that a
person is not making sufficient efforts to pay. Whether these practices
result in wealth-based penal disenfranchisement therefore turns
entirely on whether the procedure for making that determination
adequately captures a person's financial circumstances. 96
95. See Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 194 (Iowa 2016); Jean Chung, Felony
Disenfranchisement: A Primer, SENTENCING PROJECT 2 (May 10, 2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Felony-Disenfranchisement-
Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM9K-T9XW]; David Weigel, Kentucky's New Governor Reverses
Executive Order that Restored Voting Rights for Felons, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/post-politics/wp/2015/12/23/kentuckys-new-governor-
reverses-executive-order-that-restored-voting-rights-for-felons/?utmterm=.9ffa785da5 10
[https://perma.cc/KTJ6-VDCB]; see also Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1308-09 (N.D. Fla.
2018) (finding that Florida's clemency process is unconstitutionally arbitrary), motion for stay
granted, 888 F.3d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 2018) (staying the district court's ruling during appeal
given the executive's broad clemency authority "even when the applicable regime lacks any
standards").
96. In a prior work, I examined how a system for graduating economic sanctions according to
ability to pay may be designed and operated so as to provide accurate information upon which a
person's financial condition can be efficiently and effectively calculated. In addition to ensuring
that a system does not result in artificial inflation of a person's means, I also raised questions of
institutional design regarding whether and how to include family resources or income derived from
criminal activity or off-the-books labor, as well as the role of statutory maximum caps. See Colgan,
supra note 62; see also ABA, TEN GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 11; Lawful Collection of Legal
Financial Obligations: A Bench Card for Judges, NAT'L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES AND BAIL
PRACS. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Images/Topics/Fines%2oFees/BenchCard
FINALFeb2_2017.ashx [https://perma.cclMXU7-PUUR] (providing factors to be considered in
determining whether a defendant can pay a court-ordered legal financial obligation).
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For example, Washington State has adopted a provisional
restoration process through which a person may vote so long as the trial
court does not find that she willfully failed to make payments toward
the completion of her economic sanctions. 97 If a person misses three
payments in a twelve-month period, the county clerk may require the
prosecutor to file a motion seeking revocation,98 at which time the court
must determine whether the failure to pay was willful or due to the
person's financial circumstances. 99 Absent a meaningful determination,
a person could lose eligibility to vote despite an inability to pay.
Further, if provisional reenfranchisement is revoked due to a finding of
willful nonpayment, the only way in which a person could obtain
reenfranchisement again is upon a showing of a good faith effort to
pay,100 a standard that is undefined in the relevant statutes. 101 Even
presuming the initial determination of a willful nonpayment was
proper, a person who experienced a change in financial circumstances
and thus became unable to pay before the registration deadline for the
next election remains at risk.102 Therefore, whether the good faith
determination is made at the point at which provisional restoration is
lost or is restored, people may be excluded from the franchise based only
on ability to pay if the mechanisms for making that determination are
not sufficiently robust.
Iowa's system for provisional reenfranchisement, which sets
substantial hurdles to initially qualify for provisional
reenfranchisement as well as to obtain permanent restoration, is even
more problematic. People in Iowa may apply to have voting rights
restored when they have ongoing criminal debt, 103 but Iowa's governor
is precluded from awarding provisional restoration unless the person is
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520(2)(a) (2018).
98. Id. § 29A.08.520(2)(b).
99. Id. § 29A.08.520(2)(a).
100. Id. § 29A.08.520(3).
101. Originally, Washington's provisional reenfranchisement statute pointed to a separate
statute that suggested a showing of good faith would be limited to circumstances in which the
person had paid the principal debt in full or made fifteen payments within an eighteen month
period. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090(2)(c) (2017) ("For the purposes of this section,
'good faith effort' means that the offender has either (i) paid the principle amount in full; or
(ii) made at least fifteen monthly payments within an eighteen-month period. . . ."). The statute
was subsequently amended to eliminate that language, 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 269, and so now
the primary disenfranchisement statute points to a definition of good faith effort to pay in a statute
in which there is none. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520(3) (2018) ("If the court revokes the
provisional restoration of voting rights, the revocation shall remain in effect until . . . the person
shows that he or she has made a good faith effort to pay as defined in [Wash. Rev. Code Section]
10.82.090.").
102. Cf. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662-63, 673-74 (1983) (describing the change in
financial circumstances that led to the revocation of Mr. Bearden's probation).
103. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 205-14.3(914)(3) (2018).
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current on all payments. 104 Therefore, if a person is unable to stay
current because a mandated payment is beyond her financial capacity,
this requirement would preclude access to the vote based only on an
inability to pay. Further, applicants must demonstrate that they are
paying in "good faith" through a payment plan, 105 and if economic
sanctions remain unpaid upon discharge of probation, the court may
recommend that Iowa's governor deny permanent restoration of the
vote.1 0 6 Again, were the governor to deny restoration on those grounds
in cases where an applicant had been unable to pay, the denial would
amount to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement.
In addition to the type of good faith inquiries required for
provisional restoration in Washington and Iowa, several jurisdictions
leave open the possibility of employing similar considerations in their
restoration application or general clemency processes by requiring
applicants to supply information and explanations regarding their
efforts to pay off criminal debt.1 07 The requirement that an applicant
provide such information does not mean it will be grounds for a denial.
Nevada's application, for example, explicitly indicates that
consideration will be given to one's ability to pay, and so wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement may be avoided if that review is
meaningful. 108 Similarly, while Washington requires an applicant to
provide information on unpaid economic sanctions, current-Governor
Jay Inslee does not treat criminal debt as a bar to obtaining clemency. 109
As with the executive order amending Virginia's requirement detailed
above, Governor Inslee, or his successor, has the power to change that
policy at any time. 110 If a restoration or general clemency application
were to be denied there or in any jurisdiction on the basis that the
applicant-who has no meaningful ability to pay-has outstanding
criminal debt, it would constitute wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement.
104. Streamlined Application for Restoration of Citizenship Rights, OFF. GOVERNOR,
https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Voting%20Applicationo.pdf (last visited
Sept. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5NXM-XDTX].
105. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) - Restoration of Citizenship Rights - Right to Vote
and Hold Public Office, GOVERNOR IOWA, https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/
documentsFAQ%20-%20Voting.pdf (last updated Sept. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2A9V-32FM].
106. IOWA CODE § 907.9(4)(a) (2018).
107. See infra Appendix B.
108. See Criteria and Application Instructions-Community Cases, STATE NEV. BD. PARDONS
1 (Apr. 25, 2017), http://pardons.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pardonsnvgov/content/About/CriteriaAnd
Applicationlnstructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6PW-F7ED].
109. E-mail from Taylor Wonhoff, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Office of Governor Jay Inslee, to Beth
A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Dec. 11, 2017) (on file with author).
110. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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B. Parole- and Probation-Based Requirements
Understanding the full scope of wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement requires a comprehensive inquiry into how
reenfranchisement is dependent on parole or probation status, and how
the failure to pay economic sanctions can alter those forms of
supervision.111
The role of parole and probation in authorizing wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement is widespread, with thirty-two states
requiring completion of parole, 112 probation, 113 or both in order to regain
the vote in a way that is dependent on a person's ability to pay economic
sanctions. Early discharge from parole or probation for completing
payment means that a would-be voter becomes eligible for
reenfranchisement sooner, but not a person who cannot pay in full. If
reenfranchisement is delayed due to an extension of parole or probation
terms in response to ongoing debt, that delayed access to the franchise
also would constitute wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. In some
jurisdictions, the relevant statutes and rules explicitly require payment
of economic sanctions to qualify for early termination or state that a
failure to pay constitutes grounds for an extension of supervision. 114 In
others, the link to payment is through a mandate to complete all
supervision conditions, of which payment would be one.115 In still
111. Appendices C and D include citations to economic sanctions that are indicative of the type
that may be made conditions of parole and probation, but do not include all forms of economic
sanctions that may be implicated. Further, there are numerous ways that parole and probation
conditions may be more difficult to meet due to a person's financial condition beyond requirements
to pay economic sanctions. For example, compliance with a requirement to maintain housing may
be cost-prohibitive and may also negatively impact parole or probation status. While the use of
such conditions may violate the due process and equal protection clauses, it would involve
extending the doctrine relied upon in Part II a step further than is necessary to address wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement stemming from the failure to pay economic sanctions, and
therefore is beyond the scope of this Article.
112. See infra Appendix C.
113. See infra Appendix D. In Florida, the effect of failure to pay economic sanctions varies
from circuit to circuit because state law allows the circuits to adopt alternative sanctions programs
for that and other technical probation violations. FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1)(h) (2018). Several circuits
have adopted alternative sanctions programs that allow for responses that do not alter the term
of probation. See, e.g., Fla. Fourth Jud. Cir., Admin. Order 2017-19, at 3 (on file with author).
Additionally, the First Judicial Circuit adopted a system in which probation may be terminated
prior to completion of payment of economic sanctions, with debt converted to a civil judgment. Fla.
First Jud. Cir., Admin. Order 2009-13, at 3, https://www.firstjudicialcircuit.org/sites/default/
files/document_1ibrary/A02009-13.pdf [https://perma.ccfF6SH-N28G]. In five other circuits,
however, failure to pay can result in an extension of the term of probation. See infra Appendix D
(Florida). For the remaining six circuits that have not adopted an alternative sanctions program
that addresses economic sanctions, the standard rules apply, including a loss of good time for
failure to pay. Id.
114. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-902(C)(1) (2018).
115. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 559.100(2) (2018).
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others, the relevant laws grant sufficiently expansive authority to
parole or probation officials to award early termination or extend
supervision-for example, by requiring that the "ends of parole have
been attained"-so that grounding that decision on early completion of
payment or on the failure to pay could fall within the official's
discretion.116
Mississippi provides an example of how requiring completion of
parole or probation-and the link between completion and payment-
can result in continued disenfranchisement. Mississippi provides three
mechanisms for reenfranchisement, all of which are tied explicitly or
implicitly to parole and probation.1 1 7 First, reenfranchisement can occur
through a gubernatorial pardon, 118 for which the applicant is required
to provide information about whether she ever violated a condition of
parole or probation.119 Second, Mississippi offers a separate process for
restoration of citizenship rights by the governor, which requires
completion of probation. 120 Third, restoration is possible via a favorable
vote of two-thirds of both houses of the legislature. 121 Of the thirty-nine
people who regained the right to vote through the legislative process
between 2008 and 2018, each one had completed all terms of their
sentences, including parole and probation. 122 Payment of economic
116. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 62-12-18 (2018) (allowing early discharge upon a determination
that "the ends of parole have been attained and the best interests of the state and the parolee will
be served thereby").
117. 29-201 MISS. CODER. § 2.6(A) (LexisNexis 2018).
118. Id.
119. Technically, Mississippi also automatically reenfranchises people who committed a
disenfranchising offense and subsequently served honorably in World War I or World War II, but
given the likelihood that no person could still take advantage of this mechanism, I exclude it here.
See Miss. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-37(1) (2018).
120. Id. § 47-7-41; 29-201 MIss. CODER. § 2.6(B) (LexisNexis 2018).
121. MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 253.
122. H.B. 1700, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018); H.B. 1691, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2018); H.B. 1690, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018); H.B. 1688, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018);
S.B. 2951, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018); H.B. 1750, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017); H.B.
1475, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017); H.B. 742, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017); H.B. 612,
2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017); S.B. 107, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017); H.B. 1689, 2015
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015); H.B. 1686, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015); H.B. 1685, 2015 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015); H.B. 1684, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015); H.B. 1649, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Miss. 2014); H.B. 652, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); S.B. 2035, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2014); H.B. 1703, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013); H.B. 1574, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2011); H.B. 1555, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.B. 1554, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011);
H.B. 1551, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.B. 1550, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.B.
1521, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); S.B. 3129, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.B. 1740,
2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010); H.B. 1711, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010); H.B. 1710, 2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010); H.B. 1709, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010); H.B. 1707, 2010 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010); H.B. 1706, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010); H.B. 1699, 2010 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Miss. 2010); H.B. 1683, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.B. 1681, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2008); H.B. 1675, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.B. 1674, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
78
2019] WEALTH-BASED PENAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
sanctions may be made a condition of parole or probation in
Mississippi. 12 3 Failure to pay in a given month can result in a loss of
earned time credits against the parole or probation terms, 124 and
Mississippi trial courts have broad authority to terminate probation
early1 25 or to extend the term of probation up to five years. 126 Therefore,
Mississippi's restoration processes are inherently bound to a person's
ability to pay.
In addition to the thirty-two jurisdictions that require
completion of parole, probation, or both, arguably the most hidden
mechanism for authorizing wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
exists in fifteen states and the District of Columbia. In each of these
jurisdictions, the right to vote is restored upon, or after a designated
period following, release from incarceration, regardless of whether a
person remains subject to a sentence of parole or probation. 127 At first
glance, these jurisdictions seemingly cannot be engaged in wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement because the only relevant bar to voting
is whether one is or is not incarcerated, regardless of the existence of
outstanding criminal debt. 128 Because, however, failure to pay economic
2008); H.B. 61, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.B. 59, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); S.B.
3099, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008). All bills are available at Mississippi Legislative Bill Status
System, Miss. LEGISLATURE, http://billstatus.1s.state.ms.us/sessions.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2018) [https://perma.cc/32G3-JUX9].
123. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 47-7-5(7)(a)-(b), -35(1)(h), -47(5), -49(1) (2018); 29-201 MISS. CODER.
§ 2.5(L) (LexisNexis 2018).
124. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 47-7-2(q); -38(5)(e); -40(1), (3), (5); -402(2), (5) (2018).
125. Id. § 47-7-37(1).
126. Id.
127. D.C. CODE § 1-1001.02(7) (2018); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 3, § 500.2(c) (2018); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 831-2(a)(1) (2018); ILL. CONST. art. III, § 2; 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-5 (2018); IND. CODE § 3-
7-13-4 (2018); 18 LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 102(A)(1), 104(C)(1)(b), 177(A)(1) (2018); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC.
LAW § 3-102(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2018); MASS. CONST. amend. art. I; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.758b
(2018); MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2(I) (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-33-01, -03(1) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01(A) (LexisNexis 2018); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 137.281(1), (3) (2018); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301(a) (2018); R.I. CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 20A-2-101.3(2); -101.5(2)(a), (c) (LexisNexis 2018). In addition, North Dakota, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania each have restoration application or general clemency procedures that take into
account whether parole or probation has been violated or revoked as part of a merits evaluation.
See infra Appendices C-D (North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania).
128. While other states may also have laws that result in parole or probation revocation for
failure to pay economic sanctions, I do not include them in this category because
disenfranchisement is not singularly dependent on incarceration. Were a state to amend its laws
to eliminate all other forms of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement but retain restrictions based
upon incarceration, it would raise the same concerns noted here. Similarly, the fifteen states and
the District of Columbia that only authorize wealth-based penal disenfranchisement through a
return to incarceration also may allow for early termination or extension of parole and probation
terms due to a failure to pay economic sanctions, but I do not include those processes in this
analysis because the length of the parole or probation term does not implicate eligibility to vote.
See, e.g., MONT. DEP'T OF CORR., PROB. & PAROLE DIV., OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE 1 III.A.2.a (2017)
(precluding conditional discharge from supervision until all economic sanctions are paid in full).
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sanctions could result in revocation or other intermediate sanctions
that involve short-term incarceration, voting eligibility may in fact turn
on one's ability to pay. 129 To be clear, this particular mechanism is less
likely to result in wealth-based penal disenfranchisement than the
other methods described above. Some jurisdictions favor intermediate
sanctions short of revocation-such as electronic monitoring or
increased reporting requirements-for technical violations of parole or
probation, including failure to pay.130 Those responses to nonpayment
would not result in renewed disenfranchisement. But intermediate
sanctions may also include the option to impose short periods of
incarceration, 13 1 which would trigger a loss of the vote for that period.
Further, even though some jurisdictions preclude revocation for failure
to pay if a person is financially incapable of doing so,132 if processes for
determining ability to pay fail to adequately capture a person's financial
circumstances, wealth-based penal disenfranchisement may occur.133
C. Requirements Related to Federal and Out-of-State Convictions
Another mechanism by which jurisdictions authorize wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement is through the disenfranchisement of
Such processes, however, may be separately unconstitutional. See infra note 337 and
accompanying text. Only one state fits into both camps. Louisiana allows for reenfranchisement
automatically upon termination of supervision (its courts may terminate probation early in
recognition of compliance with conditions or extend probation for violating a condition) and also
allows for provisional reenfranchisement while a person remains on parole or probation so long as
the person has not been incarcerated in the prior five years. See infra Appendices C-D (Louisiana).
129. See infra Appendices C-D. Although Ohio's Parole Board has the authority to revoke
probation for the failure to pay economic sanctions, I have excluded it because they may only do so
if there is another independent reason for revoking parole, and thus inability to pay alone could
not be the basis for revocation. Email from Ashley Parriman, Staff Counsel, Ohio Dep't of Rehab.
& Corr., to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Aug. 29, 2018) (on file with
author).
130. See, e.g., Email from Steven D. Hall, Dir. of Transitional Planning Servs., N.D. Dep't of
Corr. & Rehab., to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 19, 2018) (on file
with author) (noting that it would be "very rare" for parole to be revoked due to nonpayment of
economic sanctions); Or. Dep't of Corr., Administrative Structured Sanctions, DOC COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS, https://www.oregon.gov/doc/CC/pages/structured sanctions.aspx (last visited Sept.
17, 2018) [https://perma.cclRHD7-7FQU]; Administrative Sanctions Sanctioning Grid, CRIM. JUST.
COMM'N (Apr. 15, 2008), https://www.oregon.gov/doc/CC/docs/pdf/sanction-gridline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29SY-S4PH]. These additional requirements may independently violate
Bearden. See infra notes 336-342 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-13-21(2)(a)-(b), 77-27-10(6) (LexisNexis 2018).
132. See, e.g., Graduated Intervention and Sanctions Matrix, MD. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY & CORR.
SERVS., https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/parole and probation/Graduated Interventions and%20
SanctionsMatrix.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9LY3-5AWU].
133. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-2-3(g) (2018) (allowing revocation for failure to pay if a person
"recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay," which appears to allow revocation even where
the failure to pay was not willful).
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people upon conviction for a federal or out-of-state offense that
continues as the result of outstanding criminal debt.1 3 4
Reenfranchisement policies mirror the requirements for in-jurisdiction
convictions, thereby tying reenfranchisement for federal or out-of-state
convictions to independent payment requirements, parole or probation
status, or both. 135 Under federal law, fines, fees, surcharges, and
restitution are available and at times mandatory punishments for many
offenses. 136 In Fiscal Year 2016, for example, the federal courts
sentenced over fifteen thousand people to pay economic sanctions
totaling over $9 billion,1 37 adding to the $110 billion in outstanding
restitution alone, $100 billion of which the federal government deems
134. See infra Appendix E. Disenfranchisement for federal and out-of-state convictions for the
jurisdictions in which disenfranchisement only occurs during a period of incarceration requires
additional explanation. See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text. Each jurisdiction is a
member of the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision ("ICAOS"), and therefore a
person may be convicted in one jurisdiction but allowed to serve a term of parole or probation under
the supervision of corrections personnel in another member jurisdiction. See Regions/States,
ICAOS, https://www.interstatecompact.org/regions-states (last visited Sept. 17, 2018)
[https://perma.ccl7NQ7-G3GG]. Under the terms of the ICAOS, a person would be subject to the
same forms of discipline for violating conditions as people convicted in the supervising jurisdiction,
ICAOS Rules, ICAOS R. 4.101 (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.interstatecompact.org/sites/
interstatecompact.org/files/pdf/legal/ICAOS-2018-Rules-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV25-7VDLI,
and therefore could become disenfranchised by imposition of a period of short-term incarceration
where that intermediate sanction is available for nonpayment. Further, if parole or probation is
revoked, the person would be returned to the jurisdiction of conviction to serve the term of
incarceration. Id. R. 5.103. This would still result in wealth-based penal disenfranchisement if the
revocation was due to a failure to pay economic sanctions due to inability because the person would
not otherwise lose eligibility to vote under each of the jurisdictions' residency requirements due to
absence from the jurisdiction on the date of election. Cf. 52 U.S.C. § 10502(c) (2012) (prohibiting
the use of durational residency requirements for presidential elections); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414
U.S. 524, 530 (1974) (holding that because confinement constituted a physical disability preventing
a person from reaching the polls on election day, it was arbitrary to allow out-of-county defendants
to vote by absentee but not defendants confined in the county of conviction).
135. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-909, -910, -912 (2018). Though federal parole is
limited to people sentenced to less than thirty years for crimes committed before November 1,
1987, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, and therefore the
number of people that fall within this category as a result of a federal parole sentence may be
limited, I have included jurisdictions with parole-related payment requirements. Additionally,
when a question arose in Colorado as to whether the form of federal supervision known as
"supervised release" constitutes parole or probation, federal probation and court officials opined
that it constituted probation. See Email from Fred Bach, Chief U.S. Prob. Officer, Dist. of Colo., to
Denise Dohanic (Nov. 3, 2008) (forwarding opinion letter from Joe Gergits, Asst. Gen. Counsel,
Admin. Office for the U.S. Courts) (on file with author).
136. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3553(a), 3571(b), 3663A (2012); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5E1.1-.3, 5E1.5 (2016) [hereinafter GUIDELINES
MANUAL].
137. Offenders Receiving Fines and Restitution in Each Primary Offense Category: Fiscal Year
2016, FED. SENT. GUIDELINES COMM'N 1 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdfl
research-and-publicationsannual-reports-and-sourcebooks/ 2 016/Tablel5.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NSY2-GQB9].
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uncollectable because debtors lack the financial resources to pay. 138
Payment also may be a condition of federal probation or supervised
release, 139 and the sentencing court may set a longer term of supervision
in order to allow time for full payment. 140 Further, the failure to pay can
result in revocation of federal probation, though the federal court must
consider whether the failure was willful or as a result of a person's
financial condition. 141 With respect to out-of-state convictions, the use
of economic sanctions, including as conditions of parole or probation,
are ubiquitous across the country, 142 and therefore the application of
payment requirements would extend the term of disenfranchisement
for out-of-state convictions as well.
In each jurisdiction, for those who are disenfranchised due to a
federal or out-of-state conviction, opportunities for reenfranchisement
may be even more limited than for people whose convictions arose under
the laws of the disenfranchising jurisdiction. Nearly all of those
jurisdictions explicitly preclude restoration of the vote for people with
federal or out-of-state convictions through one or more of its restoration
procedures. 143 For example, in April 2018, after years of unsuccessful
attempts by Democrats in New York's legislature to pass reforms that
138. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-203, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION: MOST
DEBT IS OUTSTANDING AND OVERSIGHT OF COLLECTIONS COULD BE IMPROVED 25 (2018).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3603(7) (2012); GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 136, §§ 5B1.3(a)(2), (6), (8);
5D1.3(a)(5)-(6); 5E1.1(a)(2); U.S. DEP'T JUST., USPC RULES & PROCEDURES MANUAL § 2.33(d)
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2010/08/27/uspc-manua 1111507.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CLS-AQZC] [hereinafter U.S. PAROLE MANUAL].
140. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 136, § 511.3, Commentary:
[A] term of probation may also be used to enforce conditions such as a fine or restitution
payments ... . Often, it may not be possible to determine the amount of time required
for satisfaction of such payments ... in advance. This issue has been resolved by setting
forth two broad ranges for the duration of a term of probation depending upon offense
level.
141. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613A(a)(1)-(2), 3614 (2012); U.S. PAROLE MANUAL, supra note 139,§ 2.52(e).
142. See infra Appendices B-D.
143. See, e.g., Executive Clemency Packet, STATE ALASKA BD. PAROLE 6 (Jan. 20, 2018),
http://www.correct.state.ak.us/Parole/documents/Final%20Clemency%20Application.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VHG-G69L] (precluding people disenfranchised for federal convictions from
seeking clemency). Exceptions include Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Texas, and Wyoming. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 48.05(a) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-105 (2018); Ala. Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles, Rules, Regulations, and Procedures art. 8,
http://www.pardons.state.al.us/Rules.aspx#Article-Eight (last visited Sept. 15, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/GSH2-XE7V]; Ky. Div. of Prob. & Parole, Application for Restoration of Civil
Rights, https://corrections.ky.gov/depts/Probation%20and%2OParole/Documents/Restoration%20
of%20Civil%20Rights.pdf (last updated July 2012) [https://perma.cc/K2MT-VRCH]; Application
for Special Restoration of Citizenship Rights (Firearms) and Pardon, IOWA OFF. GOVERNOR 1,
https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Firearm%20and%2Pardon%2Applicatio
n_5.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cclWBL6-X8EB].
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would expand voting eligibility to people on parole, 14 4 Governor Andrew
Cuomo eased penal disenfranchisement via executive order. 145 Because
economic sanctions can be made a condition of parole in New York, 146
and because early discharge is available only upon a determination by
New York's Parole Board that a person has made a good faith effort to
pay economic sanctions and is "financially able to comply" with such
payments going forward, 147 people on parole in New York were at risk
of being subject to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. Governor
Cuomo's executive order affords him the authority to grant a
conditional pardon for people on parole to provisionally restore the right
to vote, 148 and he quickly did so for over twenty-four thousand of the
approximately thirty-five thousand New Yorkers serving parole terms,
with a promise to review additional cases. 149 The executive order,
however, does not apply to people with federal or out-of-state
convictions who are also disenfranchised under New York law.15 0 Such
people in New York, or in other jurisdictions that preclude relief for
those convicted under federal or out-of-state laws and who cannot afford
to complete payment of their economic sanctions, may be left with only
the slim chance of a presidential pardon or clemency from the
jurisdiction of conviction. And just as clemency is restricted in relation
to payment of economic sanctions in many states,15 1 the federal pardon
144. See Sasha Abramsky, At Long Last, Andrew Cuomo Restores the Vote for New York
Parolees, NATION (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/at-long-last-andrew-cuomo-
restores-the-vote-for-new-york-parolees/ [https://perma.cc/3AL3-SWB7]. ,
145. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.
ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_181.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVA9-W9VJ].
146. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 259-i(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2018); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 8003.4(a) (2018).
147. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-j(1), (3) (LexisNexis 2018).
148. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181, supra note 145.
149. More than 24,000 Individuals Included in First Group of Conditional Pardons, N.Y.
STATE (May 22, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-issues-first-group-
conditional-pardons-restoring-right-vote-new-yorkers-parole [https://perma.ccl7WND-9ACW].
The executive order is sufficiently vague that it leaves open the possibility for wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement for those serving parole for convictions under New York's laws. The review
process provided involves consideration of a "variety of factors, including if the person is living
successfully in the community." Id. Governor Cuomo could, for example, determine that the person
is not "living successfully" if she has not established an income sufficient to pay off her outstanding
criminal debt. See id. Further, in the 2018 midterm elections, the New York City Campaign
Finance Board, which publishes a voter guide booklet, failed to update the guide, and so it stated
that people on state parole could not vote, potentially causing confusion to even those who had
been awarded a conditional pardon. See Beth Vertig, City Voter Guide Mistakenly Tells Paroled
Felons They Can't Vote, WNYC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/city-voter-guide-
mistakenly-tells-paroled-felons-they-cant-vote/ [https://perma.cc/NP8Y-QS3J].
150. See infra Appendix E (New York); see also Apply for Clemency, N.Y. STATE,
https:/www.ny.gov/services/apply-clemency (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S7SS-
7DEJ] (noting that eligibility requires "[c]onvict[ion] of a New York State felony").
151. See supra notes 82-95, 107-110 and accompanying text.
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application mandates proof of payment or a written explanation as to
why fines and restitution remain unpaid. 152
The following table identifies the manner in which each
jurisdiction's laws and policies authorize wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement through independent payment requirements,
parole- and probation-based payment requirements, and requirements
related to federal or out-of-state convictions. The symbol "" indicates
where such practices are possible, the symbol "A" indicates a temporary
suspension of such practices by the current executive, and the symbol
"t" indicates a jurisdiction where the disenfranchisement or
reenfranchisement laws are indeterminate. A more detailed breakdown
of each jurisdiction's laws and policies is set out in Appendices A
through E. Maine and Vermont are not included in the table, as neither
state engages in penal disenfranchisement. 153
152. Petition for Pardon after Completion of Sentence, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 2 (July 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/pardonlfile/960581/download [https://perma.cclBLF8-EKLD].
Disenfranchisement for felony convictions and the link to federal clemency brings Oklahoma into
the group of jurisdictions that authorize wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. Oklahoma's laws
do not risk wealth-based penal disenfranchisement for people convicted of felonies under its own
statutes because reenfranchisement is automatic upon expiration of the original sentence, which
is not altered regardless of payment or nonpayment of economic sanctions. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-
101(1) (2018); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 230:15-5-3(b) (2018). Though clemency restores the vote in
Oklahoma, it is irrelevant for in-state convictions because a person convicted of a crime in
Oklahoma is ineligible for clemency until discharge of the sentence, at which point the person
would automatically be restored to the right to vote. See Pardon Information and Instructions,
OKLA. PARDON & PAROLE BD. 3 (2017), https://ok.gov/ppb/documents/Pardon%20
Application%202016.pdf [https://perma.ccfMIN55-VT8D]. Oklahoma does, however, disenfranchise
people for federal convictions. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-120.4(A) (2018) (describing the process
by which the State Election Board cancels the voter registration of people convicted of federal
felonies); Hughes v. Okla. State Election Bd., 413 P.2d 543, 548 (Okla. 1966) (holding that
Oklahoma's disenfranchisement law applies to a person convicted of a federal crime that would
constitute a felony in Oklahoma). Oklahoma's reenfranchisement law also allows restoration upon
a presidential pardon. See Voter Registration in Oklahoma, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (2018),
https://www.ok.gov/elections/VoterInfoRegistertovote/ [https://perma.cc/ZWY2-GSRJ] ("A
convicted felon may not register for a period equal to the time of the original sentence. A convicted
felon who has been pardoned may register."); Okla. Voter Registration Application, OKLA. STATE
ELECTION BD. 2, https://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/Oklahoma%2OVoter%20
Registration%20Application%20form%20v4-20%20SEB%20web.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/2QZJ-246U] (same). Presidential pardons are, of course, rare. See John Gramlich
& Kristen Bialik, Obama Used Clemency Power More Often Than Any President Since Truman,
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/20/obama-used-
more-clemency-power/# [https://perma.cc/AW8Z-JYBM] . Even so, wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement is effectively imported into Oklahoma because the federal clemency
application allows for consideration of one's payment history and requires an explanation of unpaid
criminal debt for the purposes of merits review.
153. See infra note 474 and accompanying text.
84
2019] WEALTH-BASED PENAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Payment
Required
as Parole
Condition
V/
V/
Payment
Required as
Probation
Condition
/
V/
/
Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Ilinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Independent
Requirement
of Payment
/
Vt
Vt
Payment Required
via Federal and/or
Out-of-State
Convictions
//
t
-1/IV/
Vt
Vt
Vt
Vt
V
Vt
Vt
Vt
Vt
Vt
V/
/
Kt
I/
Vt
Vt
I/
85
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Independent
Requirement
of Payment
I/
Vt
Payment
Required
as Parole
Condition
Vt
At
V', A
Jurisdiction
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Vt
V/
V/
V
V/
V
V/
A
V, A
Vt
Vt
V/
Vt
Vt
V/
V/
V/
V/
V
V/
Vt
Vt
Payment
Required as
Probation
Condition
V/
Vt
V/
/
V
Vt
/
V/
V/
Vt
Vt
Vt
Vt
/
/t
/
Payment Required
via Federal and/or
Out-of-State
Convictions
V/
VtVt
t
V
V/
V
v/
V
Vt
Vt
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT As A SAFEGUARD AGAINST
WEALTH-BASED PENAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Having shown that wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is
authorized in all but two jurisdictions in the United States, this Part
Vt
86 [Vol. 72:1:55
2019] WEALTH-BASED PENAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
turns to the question of whether there is a viable challenge to these
practices under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The black letter of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine provides a
hierarchy of review, commonly known as the tiers of scrutiny, in which
the level of protection afforded depends on the characteristics of the
person affected or the nature of the right implicated by the challenged
governmental action. While the Supreme Court has never had
unanimity on the validity of the tiers of scrutiny approach, 154 it remains
firmly entrenched in the doctrine. The most protective tier, strict
scrutiny, requires the government to have a compelling interest in the
challenged practice, and the practice must be narrowly tailored to
achieving that interest.15 5 The least protective tier, rational basis
review, requires courts to uphold actions that are rationally related to
any legitimate governmental interest. 156
One possible, though difficult, inroad to challenging wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement might be through a claim that such
practices invidiously discriminate on the basis of race, and therefore
must be subject to strict scrutiny. 157 What limited data exists on wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement does suggest significant racial
disparities. In studying disenfranchisement rates in Alabama before its
laws were clarified, Marc Meredith and Michael Morse found that
African Americans with felony convictions were 9.4 percentage points
more likely than people with felony convictions overall to be ineligible
to vote due to outstanding criminal debt.158 These results reflect racial
disparities in penal disenfranchisement as a whole. While overall penal
154. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985) (describing
the tiers of scrutiny approach); id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(agreeing with the tiers of scrutiny approach but critiquing the majority as stating it is using
rational basis review when actually employing heightened scrutiny); id. at 451-54 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (opining that the tiers of scrutiny do not "adequately explain the decisional process"
and favoring a single rational basis approach under which classifications based on race and other
protected classes are unlikely to be deemed rational); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ('I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases,
but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single
standard in a reasonably consistent fashion."); id. at 210 n.* (noting that "the Court has had
difficulty in agreeing" on the tiers of scrutiny approach but it has "substantial precedential
support"); id. at 217-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the tiers of scrutiny
approach); see also infra note 213 and accompanying text.
155. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
156. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988).
157. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995) (regarding the use
of strict scrutiny in challenges to congressional racial classifications).
158. See Meredith & Morse, supra note 3, at 311, 327-28. For an explanation of racial
disparities in penal disenfranchisement practices as reflective of the continuum of
disproportionate minority contact at each stage of criminal processes, arrest through sentencing,
see PETTUS, supra note 20, at 129, 148-51.
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disenfranchisement rates range from 0.21 to 10.43 percent of the
general voting population, the rate for African Americans ranges from
0.83 to 26.15 percent. 159 In Kansas, for example, the overall rate of
disenfranchisement affects 0.80 percent of the general voting
population but 4.29 percent of the African American voting population,
a disparity of over 88 percent. 160 Sustaining a race-based challenge to
penal disenfranchisement practices under the Fourteenth Amendment
is possible, particularly where penal disenfranchisement may be a
component of a larger project to restrict the ability of people of color to
vote. 161 But it is significantly limited by the requirement that
challengers prove the laws were adopted with a racially discriminatory
purpose. 162
Courts must also apply strict scrutiny in cases in which a
practice infringes upon a fundamental right, such as voting.163 This
would seem a good fit for a challenge to wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement in which people are ineligible to vote due to an
inability to pay fines, fees, restitution, and the like because-in striking
down poll taxes-the Supreme Court stated that "wealth or fee paying
has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is
too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned." 16 4
Yet if wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is assessed
through the lens of voting rights under the tiers of scrutiny approach,
159. See State-by-State Data, SENT'G PROJECT (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-
facts/#map?dataset-option=SIR [https://perma.cc/74Q3-LP2T] (providing an interactive map of
sentencing data). Data is not available for the District of Columbia. Id.
160. See id.
161. See Thompson v. Alabama, No. 2:16-CV-783-WKW, 2017 WL 6597511, at *1333 (M.D.
Ala. Dec. 26, 2017) (holding that plaintiffs' complaint stated an actionable claim that Alabama's
disenfranchisement laws involved intentional discrimination based on race).
162. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225 (1985) (stating that plaintiffs must show
that race was a substantial or motivating factor); see also infra note 217. In addition to challenging
penal disenfranchisement on racial discrimination grounds, the literature contains a handful of
interesting arguments that it is otherwise unconstitutional as a general matter. See, e.g., George
P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1904-06 (1999) (arguing that penal disenfranchisement constitutes a bill of
attainder); Katherine Shaw, Invoking the Penalty: How Florida's Felon Disenfranchisement Law
Violates the Constitutional Requirement of Population Equality in Congressional Representation,
and What to Do About It, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2006) (arguing that penal
disenfranchisement undermines the one-person, one-vote principle by distorting population counts
for the purposes of establishing congressional representation). This Article also does not address
the Twenty-fourth Amendment, which may provide separate grounds for challenging wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV ("The right of citizens of the United States
to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, or for electors of President
or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.").
163. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
164. Id. at 670.
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it will be subject only to rational basis review. In Richardson v.
Ramirez,165 the Court expressly held that the reference in Section Two
of the Fourteenth Amendment to "participation in rebellion, or other
crime,"166 exhibited congressional intent to leave to the states the power
to engage in penal disenfranchisement. 16 7 Thus, once lost upon
conviction, access to the franchise no longer constitutes a fundamental
right that triggers strict scrutiny. 168 Rational basis review, of course, is
not a death knell for all poverty penalties; 169 there has been recent
success, for example, in challenging driver's license restrictions
imposed for the failure to pay on the grounds that it is irrational, given
165. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
167. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54-55. Ramirez has been much maligned in the literature. See, e.g.,
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 32 ("The irony of the interpretation in Ramirez is remarkable.
The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to expand voting rights to previously excluded groups,
not to allow the states to add new restrictions."); Richard W. Bourne, Richardson v. Ramirez: A
Motion to Reconsider, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1, 29-30 (2007) (arguing that the references to "crime"
in Section Two were intended to allow only the disenfranchisement of whites who had participated
in treasonous acts on behalf of the Confederacy during the Civil War); Gabriel J. Chin,
Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment
Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260, 262-63, 272 (2004)
(asserting that the 1870 ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition on restrictions of
the franchise based on "race, color, or previous conditions of servitude" should be understood to
have overridden the prior ratification of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fletcher,
supra note 162, at 1904 (same); Re & Re, supra note 12, at 1584, 1648-51 (arguing that a broader
historical analysis would support the state's ability to disenfranchise for serious crimes beyond
treason, but not lower-level felonies as allowed under Ramirez); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 303 (1976) ("[T]here is not a word in the
fourteenth amendment suggesting that the exemptions in section two's formula are in any way a
barrier to the judicial application of section one in voting rights cases, whether or not they involve
the rights of ex-convicts."). An exception to the near universal criticism of Ramirez's interpretation
and breadth can be found in Roger Clegg et al., The Bullet and the Ballot? The Case for Felon
Disenfranchisement Statutes, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 5-8 (2006). In this Article, I
do not relitigate Ramirez's shortcomings, however, taking as a starting point the premise that
lawmakers can restrict the right to vote in response to a felony conviction and that, once such a
restriction occurs, the right to vote is no longer fundamental for people so convicted.
168. See Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining, in an opinion
authored by Justice O'Connor (retir.), that the right to vote is no longer fundamental postpenal
disenfranchisement, though perhaps not wealth-based penal disenfranchisement, and is thus
subject to rational basis review). For arguments that the strict scrutiny test should be employed
because voting remains a fundamental right despite conviction, see Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d
182, 207-09 (Iowa 2016) (Hecht, J., dissenting); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 778-80 (Wash.
2007) (Alexander, J., dissenting); Angela Behrens, Note, Voting-Not Quite a Fundamental Right?
A Look at Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV.
231, 259 (2004); Keller, supra note 20, at 212-16; and Simmons, supra note 20, at 318-20. Cf.
Sonia B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination,
66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 833-41 (2014) (arguing, based in part on Bearden, that risk-assessment tools
that predict recidivism based on demographics and socioeconomic status should be subject to
heightened scrutiny because they effectively turn poverty into an aggravating factor).
169. See generally Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1317, 1321 (2018) (discussing the underappreciated level of success social justice movements have
had under rational basis review).
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that one's ability to pay is actually hampered by an inability to drive to
one's place of employment. 170 But lower courts have also upheld wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement as rationally related to nonpenal
interests such as setting voter eligibility standards. 171
What this Article offers, therefore, is a distinct avenue of
constitutional attack, focusing not on the nature of the right at stake
but on restrictions the Fourteenth Amendment places on the
government's power to punish. This Article posits that the Court has
set aside the traditional tiers of scrutiny in a line of cases aimed at
protecting against the government's use of the prosecutorial power in
ways that price people out of fair treatment in criminal justice
systems.172
170. See Thomas v. Haslam, No. 3:17-cv-00005, 2018 WL 3301648, at *10-12 (M.D. Tenn. July
2, 2018) (holding that plaintiffs met the burden of showing that the use of driver's license
revocation for failure to pay economic sanctions failed rational basis review in light of census data
showing that at least ninety-two percent of workers in Tennessee's major metropolitan areas drive
to work); Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-cv-01263, 2018 WL 2862772, at *37-43 (M.D. Tenn. June
11, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss claim that driver's license suspension scheme violated due
process and equal protection as articulated in the Bearden line); Robinson, 2018 WL 2862772, at
*43 (determining that plaintiffs had stated a valid claim that suspension of driver's licenses for a
nonwillful failure to pay was irrational). But see Fowler v. Johnson, No. 17-11441, 2017 WL
6379676, at *8-9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2017) (determining that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed
on the merits of a challenge to a driver's license revocation policy under a rational basis review
standard).
171. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding a voter-eligibility
requirement that people with felony convictions must pay all restitution to be reenfranchised as
rational, pointing to justifications, including protection of "the ballot box from convicted felons who
continue to break the law by failing to comply with court orders"); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757,
769 (Wash. 2007) ("Additionally, even though low-income felons may not be accountable for their
wealth status, they have been adjudicated responsible for their status as felons, which is the
classification at issue. Therefore, we do not apply intermediate scrutiny, and we examine
Washington's disenfranchisement scheme using rational basis review."). For an argument that
wealth-based penal disenfranchisement fails under rational basis review, see Cammett, supra note
20.
172. The analysis in Part II relies primarily on the text of the relevant cases themselves. At
times, I also point to the oral arguments in the cases, the parties' briefings, and available files
from the Justices who participated in developing the doctrine. Despite the value of these additional
materials, I am sensitive to their potential for misuse or overstatement, so I offer this brief note to
establish the parameters of my reliance upon them in this Article. First, these sources underscore
the Court's statements within the cases regarding the risk of prosecutorial abuse in criminal
processes, particularly as it pertains to indigent defendants. See, e.g., infra notes 203-217 and
accompanying text. Second, the sources bolster the intentionality of the Court's decisions by
revealing awareness of the practical implications of the protections it afforded to indigent
defendants and by showing the contrast between the Court's analyses and holdings and those
championed by the litigants. See, e.g., infra notes 252-273 and accompanying text. It is also
important to note that the Justices' papers in particular are incomplete, as some are not yet
publicly available and others contain only a handful of documents related to a given case. See
Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Supreme Court Mysteries and the Justices' Papers,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 2, 2018, 1:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/scotus-for-law-
students-supreme-court-mysteries-and-the-justices-papers/ [https://perma.cc/JA6E-MH39).
Fortunately, numerous files relevant to this analysis were available at the following sources:
Department of Rare Books & Special Collections, Princeton University (John Marshall Harlan
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To that end, this Section begins by uncovering the constitutional
norms that animate the line of cases leading to the Court's decision in
Bearden v. Georgia,173 a case in which it limited the government's
ability to respond to nonpayment of economic sanctions due to an
inability to pay. These underlying principles are grounded in a concern
that the government could abuse its prosecutorial power by treating
people disparately because of their financial circumstances, 1 7 4 as well
as a recognition that, taken together, the due process and equal
protection clauses provide amplified protection in the criminal arena. 175
This Section then turns to the question of whether the Bearden
test, as contemplated by the Court in that case, would prohibit wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement. The constitutional norms that inform
the Bearden line might be extended to other arenas in which the
government subjects people to disparate treatment in the criminal
justice system, including, perhaps, the creation of a new test to respond
to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. 176 The goal of this Article,
Papers); Harvard Law School Library (Felix Frankfurter Papers); Hoover Institute, Stanford
University (William H. Rehnquist Papers); Library of Congress (Hugo Black Papers, Harry
Blackmun Papers, William Brennan Papers, Harold H. Burton Papers, William 0. Douglas
Papers, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Earl Warren Papers, Byron White Papers); Manuscripts and
Archives, Yale Law Library (Abe Fortas Papers, Potter Stewart Papers); Tarlton Law Library,
University of Texas (Thomas C. Clark Papers); Washington & Lee Law Library (Lewis F. Powell
Papers). All documents referenced throughout this Article are also on file with the author. I am
grateful to Michael Klarman, who has encouraged legal scholars to engage with the Justices'
papers. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 218-19 (1991).
173. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
174. See infra Section II.A.1.
175. See infra Section II.A.2.
176. To date the Bearden line has struck down practices in which a person's inability to pay
limited opportunities for criminal appeal, see, e.g., Griffin v. Ilinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality),
prohibited the direct imposition of incarceration as a substitute for unpayable economic sanctions
at sentencing, see, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and rejected the automatic
revocation of probation in response to nonpayment, see Bearden, 461 U.S. 660. The scope and
operation of criminal justice systems is vast, however, and there are many other circumstances in
which a person's financial condition may be implicated. It is unsurprising, for example, that some
lower courts have relied on the constitutional norms in the Bearden line to assess practices that
involve imposition of monetary requirements beyond a person's ability to pay in order to obtain
pretrial release. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2018);
ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 161-62 (5th Cir. 2018); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 102,
105-06 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Buffin v. City of San Francisco, Civ. No. 15-4959, 2018 WL
424362, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018). Were the Court to adopt a new test to attend to
circumstances not yet addressed in the Bearden line, it might consider factors such as "the nature
of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the
connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for
effectuating the purpose." Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666-67 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). As explained in Section JI.B, unlike a tiers of scrutiny
approach in which individual and governmental interests are weighed against each other in the
test's application, those considerations would instead be relevant to crafting the test to be
employed. This Article is not engaging in that exercise, however, assessing instead whether the
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however, is to determine whether that restriction on voting is
prohibited by Bearden itself.
The doctrinal intervention contemplated here is viable if three
things prove true. First, the Bearden line of cases must actually operate
outside of the traditional tiers of scrutiny. As described below, the
Bearden Court crafted a unique test under which, if the government
imposes economic sanctions as punishment for an offense and a person
does not pay due to inability, the government is flatly prohibited from
imposing additional punishment unless no alternative response could
ensure that the debtor does not escape punishment for the original
offense altogether.177 Second, because the Bearden test is triggered
when the government imposes additional punishment in response to a
failure to pay, penal disenfranchisement must constitute punishment.
Though some lower courts have suggested that the Bearden test only
applies if the additional punishment involves a deprivation of liberty,
the Court's repeated rejection of penalty-based distinctions appears to
belie that restriction.178 Third, even if it constitutes punishment,
continued penal disenfranchisement due to an inability to pay would
only be unconstitutional under the test if alternative responses that
meet the government's interest in punishing the disenfranchising
offense are feasible. Because several such alternatives are feasible, this
approach would render wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 79
A. The Underlying Constitutional Norms
Challenges to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement and other
poverty penalties have relied heavily on the 1983 case of Bearden v.
Georgia.180 To date, the lower courts have presumed that Bearden fits
within the traditional tiers of scrutiny approach. As noted above, the
first step for challenging wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
outside of that approach is discerning whether the lower courts'
Bearden test as articulated by the Court in that case would render wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement unconstitutional. There may be other practices that also fail the Bearden test
on its own terms. For example, in several jurisdictions courts issue warrants when people do not
pay economic sanctions and then hold the people subjected to those warrants in detention to await
a hearing to determine whether the nonpayment was willful or due to an inability to pay. Though
not directly addressed by the Court, incarcerating someone in order to determine whether
incarcerating them is constitutional violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Bearden.
177. See infra Section II.B.
178. See infra Section II.C.1.
179. See infra Section I.D.
180. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 661-62, 672-73.
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understanding is correct, or instead whether the Supreme Court has
adopted a distinct test that affords greater protection.
At its simplest reading, Bearden struck down the automatic
revocation of probation for failure to pay when a person had no
meaningful ability to do so.181 Upon conviction as a first-time offender
for entering a mobile home without permission and theft of a VCR, 182 a
Georgia trial court sentenced Danny Bearden to pay a fine and
restitution, making payment a condition of his probation. 183 Mr.
Bearden paid $200 he borrowed from his mother and father, who were
also of limited means. 184 Shortly thereafter, he was laid off from his job,
and when his efforts to find new employment proved unsuccessful, 185 he
had no capacity to pay the remaining $550 in criminal debt. 186 The trial
court revoked his probation, resulting in a sentence of two and a half
years in prison.187 Mr. Bearden successfully appealed his case to the
Supreme Court. In holding that automatic revocation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court expressed the test it applied as
follows: "If the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to
pay ... and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is
fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without
considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the
defendant are available."188
Read independently, Bearden or any other case in its line easily
could be misunderstood as existing wholly within the tiers of scrutiny
frame. The Court could be stating that the failure to attend to
181. Id. at 672-73.
182. Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 8 (May 3, 1982), Bearden, 461 U.S. 660
(No. 81-6633); Order of Court Under First Offender's Act, State v. Bearden (Catoosa Cty. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 8, 1980) (No. 8923).
183. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662-63.
184. Transcript of Proceedings at 21, Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (Nos. 8917 & 8923); Appendix to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 182.
185. At Mr. Bearden's probation revocation hearing, he testified regarding his attempts to find
employment. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 184, at 23-24, 28-29, 31 (stating he sought
work at the Georgia Unemployment Office, multiple businesses, and a local high school, and that
he attempted to apply at "Salem Carpet" but that "[t]hey wouldn't even let me in the gate over
there, just said they wasn't doing no hiring"). Mr. Bearden's wife also testified. Id. at 18 ("I have
took him to look for jobs myself. I took him to Dalton Unemployment Office, and they didn't have
nothing, and he went to look for different jobs. He has been everywhere in Ringgold to find a job,
and nobody's hiring."); id. at 20 ("He's looked in Dalton, all over Dalton carpet mills down there.
He went to Babb Lumber Company, Salem Carpet, Dixie Yarn, every place in Ringgold he could
think of to go to, but he still hasn't found one."). Mr. Bearden's attempts to find employment were
likely hampered by the fact that he had only a ninth-grade education and was unable to read. Id.
at 26, 31; Brief for Petitioner at 8, Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (No. 81-6633) (on file with author).
186. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662-63.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 668-69.
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alternative punishments falls short of the strict scrutiny test's
requirement that the government's action be narrowly tailored.189 Or
the Court could have held that revoking probation for an inability to
pay is simply irrational, thus failing under rational basis review. 190
Further, other cases in the Bearden line often confusingly employed
language associated with both tiers of scrutiny. 191 It is unsurprising
then that the lower courts and litigants-including the parties in
Beardenl92-have attempted to shoehorn Bearden into the traditional
tiers. 193
189. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
191. The Court has described the line as using a form of heightened scrutiny or used language
suggesting the use of strict scrutiny in the following cases: ML.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123-24
(1996); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102 (1973); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305, 309 (1966); and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-18 (1956). The Court has described
the challenged practice as "irrational" or otherwise suggested the use of rational basis review in
the following cases: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 n.11 (1969); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708, 710 (1961); and Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959). See also Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (Stephen, J., dissenting); Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 620-
21 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring); Klarman, supra note 172, at 234 ("[T]he last two decades of
equal protection development are replete with instances in which the Court mouthed rationality
language while surreptitiously substituting a heightened review standard.").
192. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 16, 25, Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (No. 81-6633)
[hereinafter Bearden, Transcript of Oral Argument] (discussing different outcomes that would
result if strict scrutiny or rational basis review were applied), audio recording with speaker
designation available at Bearden v. Georgia, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-6633 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/36QZ-5R4T]; id. at 34 (noting laughter from the audience
after Justice O'Connor stated, "It is not altogether clear what the basis of some of these prior
decisions, . . ."); see also Petitioner's Reply Brief, Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (No. 81-6633) (on file with
author) (focusing argument on appropriate tier of scrutiny and application thereof); Brief for
Respondent, Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (No. 81-6633) (on file with author) (same); Brief for Petitioner,
Bearden, supra note 185 (same); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bearden,
461 U.S. 660 (No. 81-6633) (same); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, (May 3, 1982), Bearden, 461 U.S.
660 (No. 81-6633) (same).
According to the Supreme Court's website, cases were not routinely transcribed until 1968.
Even once transcriptions became common practice, speakers-Justices and in some cases
counsel-were not clearly identified. Instead, the words "Question" and "Answer" (or "Q" and "A")
were used to designate a shift in speaker. All speakers were identified by name beginning in the
October 2004 Term. See Argument Transcripts, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument transcript (last visited Oct. 18, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/K7S2-UQNM]. To properly designate speakers for cases decided prior to 2004,
this Article relies on the Oyez.org database, which provides transcripts with speaker designations
beginning in the 1950s. See Cases, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases (last visited Oct. 18, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/T72G-RXJE].
193. Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2010) (describing
Bearden as employing strict scrutiny), with id. at 758, 756-57 (Nelson Moore, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Bearden employed rational basis review). Compare also Madison v. State, 163 P.3d
757, 768-69 (Wash. 2007) (applying rational basis review), with id. at 779-80 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that strict scrutiny applied). One lower court recently noted the distinction
between the Bearden line and the tiers of scrutiny approach, but stated that it was constrained by
a prior Sixth Circuit ruling which interpreted Bearden as applying strict scrutiny. See Robinson v.
Purkey, No. 3:17-cv-01263, slip op. at 37-38 (M.D. Tenn. June 11, 2018) (noting that "the simple
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Read collectively and in the context of the Court's treatment of
wealth-based distinctions under the Fourteenth Amendment writ large,
however, what emerges is a distinct form of protection driven by
constitutional norms against the government's use of its prosecutorial
power in ways that subject people to disparate treatment due to their
financial circumstances. Those norms are evident in both the Court's
efforts to carve out the prosecutorial power from other governmental
functions, as well as its use of both due process and equal protection to
protect against abuse. The excavation of these norms supports the
conclusion that in the Bearden line the Court is operating outside of the
tiers of scrutiny.
1. Recognition of the Unique Threat of the Prosecutorial Power
The origins of the distinct test for assessing the constitutionality
of poverty penalties such as wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
may be found in constitutional norms first espoused in the 1956 case of
Griffin v. Illinois, which struck down financial barriers to accessing
criminal appeals as of right.194 The Griffin plurality engaged in two key
moves, only one of which would survive: it treated wealth as a suspect
class on the same footing as race, 195 and it stated that while the
government need not devise a system for criminal appeals as of right,
once it chose to create that system, it could not deny access to it due to
an inability to pay. 196 Griffin continued to thrive during the Burger and
Rehnquist eras, in which the Court engaged in a marked shift away
from the idea of wealth as a suspect class, 197 because the Court recast
Griffin to be focused around its latter concern regarding the manner in
which the government treats people with limited means while
employing its prosecutorial power.1 98
tiers-of-scrutiny analysis that the Sixth Circuit considered adequate . . . cannot simply be
substituted for a consideration of the full line of Griffin cases without losing quite a bit in the
translation" and that "[i]gnoring those holdings in favor of a two-sizes-fit-all approach does not
afford the Supreme Court's cases the precedential weight to which they are entitled").
194. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12.
195. See, e.g., id. at 17-18 (plurality opinion) ("In criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.").
196. Id. at 18; id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
197. See Klarman, supra note 172, at 217 (calling "the rejection of suspect classification status
for wealth" one of the "principal equal protection developments of the [1970s and 1980s]").
198. Id. (describing distinctions drawn between entitlements and deliberate disadvantaging
in the context of wealth discrimination); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court
and the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 595-96 (2001)
(describing how, in striking down the poll tax in Harper, the Court originally pointed to both
wealth as a suspect class and voting as fundamental, but over time Harper came to stand for only
the latter proposition).
95
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As the early Griffin cases developed to protect indigent
defendants at the appellate stage, 199 the question of whether, at
sentencing, a trial court could convert economic sanctions to
incarceration began percolating up from the lower courts,200 finally
reaching the Supreme Court in 1970 with Williams v. lllinoiS201 and in
1971 with Tate v. Short.202 When people were too poor to pay in a lump
sum at sentencing,203 jurisdictions across the country were converting
economic sanctions to days of incarceration-at a rate of $5 per day in
Williams and Tate.204 In many jurisdictions the automatic conversion of
economic sanctions to incarceration was so commonplace that it
contributed significantly to incarceration rates; for example, by 1970,
sixty percent of jail inmates in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania were
incarcerated due to an inability to pay economic sanctions. 205 Relying
heavily on Griffin,206 the Court struck down the automatic conversion
of economic sanctions to incarceration in both cases. 207
At the same time that the Court expanded protections to
indigent defendants in Williams and Tate, concerns began to rise to the
fore that if taken to its logical extreme, the notion of wealth as a suspect
199. See infra notes 311-314 and accompanying text.
200. The Court learned of this practice as early as Griffin, as counsel for Illinois used its own
statutes allowing for incarceration as a substitute for economic sanctions to argue that people of
limited means were routinely treated unfairly in criminal processes and therefore its financial
barriers to criminal appeals should stand. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (No. 95) [hereinafter Griffin, Transcript of Oral Argument], reprinted in 50
LANDMARKS BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 851 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); Brief for Respondent
at 7, Griffin, 351 U.S. 12 (No. 95) (on file with author). In 1966, the Court was presented with a
case in which trial courts converted economic sanctions to incarceration, but it was styled as a
Sixth Amendment challenge to the denial of counsel who may have, among other things,
challenged the constitutionality of the conversion of debt rather than as a direct challenge to the
conversion itself. See Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907, 907-09 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
201. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). The Court also accepted review of a similar
statute in Maryland, but because the Maryland legislature amended the statute after oral
argument, it remanded it for further consideration in light of Williams. See Morris v. Schoonfield,
399 U.S. 508, 508 (1970) (per curiam).
202. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
203. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 240 ("[C]ommitment for failure to pay ... has been viewed as a
means of enabling the court to enforce collection of money that a convicted defendant was obligated
by the sentence to pay."); Brief for the Appellee at *3-5, *7, Williams, 399 U.S. 235 (No. 1089),
1970 WL 136557 (discussing historic and contemporary "work-off' laws and the frequency of
issuing fines during sentencing); Brief of National Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at *13-17, Williams, 399 U.S. 235 (No. 1089), 1970 WL 136555 [hereinafter
NLADA Amicus] (surveying different "work-off' statutes and their effects on indigent defendants).
204. Id. at 396-97; Williams, 399 U.S. at 236-37; see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 246-59
(surveying state statutes in which rates of credit for time served ranged from $1 to $10).
205. NLADA Amicus, supra note 203, at *16.
206. Williams, 399 U.S. at 241.
207. Id.; Tate, 401 U.S. at 397-99.
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class could lead to a determination that the government had an
affirmative obligation to eliminate wealth disparities. 208 These concerns
were no doubt heightened in 1971, when, in Boddie v. Connecticut, the
Court struck down mandatory filing fees in divorce actions on the
grounds that the marital relationship is fundamental, relying heavily
on the importance of court access recognized in Griffin.209
The question of how far the special treatment of wealth would
extend came to a head in 1973, when the Court decided San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.210 The case involved a
challenge to a public school financing scheme in which district funding
depended on local tax assessments, meaning that schools in tax-poor
neighborhoods received less funding than their wealthier
counterparts. 21 1 The notes of Justice Powell, who authored the
Rodriguez majority, indicate that he found the idea that wealth was a
suspect class anathema, considering it mere "communist
doctrine . . . not even accepted (except in a limited sense) in socialist
countries." 212 Yet in drafting the Rodriguez opinion, Justice Powell
labored to preserve the special treatment of wealth in prior cases,
including Griffin and its progeny, 213 distinguishing those cases in two
208. See Klarman, supra note 172, at 266-67, 285-91 (describing the pressure to reign in the
potential expansive effects of earlier wealth-based discrimination cases and the fear the doctrine
would lead to wealth redistribution).
209. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375, 382-83 (1971); see also Memorandum from
Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to File 2 (Nov. 17, 1970), Harry Blackmun
Papers, supra note 172, Boddie v. Connecticut file (noting concern that the application of equal
protection to questions of indigency might go beyond access to the courts and also "apply to the
denial of a fishing license, or any one of many other things"); Court Bids States Help the Poor Pay
Costs of Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1971, at 1, 28 (linking Boddie and Tate); Jack C. Landau,
High Court Cool to Idea, But Will Get Cases of Injustice Caused by Poverty, JERSEY J., Dec. 5, 1970,
at 7 (questioning whether the Court's cases would ultimately apply to driver's license fees, fishing
license fees, and electric bills).
210. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
211. Id. at 5-8.
212. Handwritten Notes, Lewis F. Powell Papers, supra note 172, San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez file.
213. After Justice Powell circulated a draft of his opinion in Rodriguez, Justice Stewart sent
him a memo stating, 'I have decided I cannot subscribe to an opinion that accepts the 'doctrine'
that there are two separate alternative tests under the Equal Protection Clause." Memorandum
from Potter Stewart, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court 1 (Feb. 8, 1973). He explained that he did not believe that the "so-called
'compelling state interest' test" was grounded in precedent and felt it risked "return[ing] this
Court, and all federal courts, to the heyday of the Nine Old Men, who felt that the Constitution
enabled them to invalidate almost any state laws they thought unwise." Id. at 2-3. Justices
Rehnquist (then-Associate) and Blackmun expressed agreement with Justice Stewart's concerns.
See Memorandum from William Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 8, 1973); Memorandum from Harry
Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court (Feb. 12, 1973). Justice Powell then requested his law clerk to draft a
memorandum listing each case in which the Court had previously employed strict scrutiny, see
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ways. First, the majority opinion described the Griffin cases as
involving a total deprivation of access to appellate processes and
Williams and Tate as total deprivations of liberty solely due to an
inability to pay, as opposed to the relative deprivation caused by
comparatively lesser funding of public schools to which access was not
barred. 214 Second, the Court distinguished the prosecutorial power and
other cases involving fundamental rights explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution from access to education. 215
The Rodriguez Court placed the early cases in the Bearden line
on special footing because it saw the unique nature of, and threat of
abuse inherent in, the government's prosecutorial power as subject to
broad constitutional protection. In doing so, the Court picked up on
Justice Black's dissent in Boddie, in which he argued that because the
"great governmental power" to hale people into court where "they may
be convicted, and condemned to lose their lives, their liberty, or their
property, as a penalty for their crimes" was so awesome, failing to guard
against wealth discrimination in that context "would have been
unfaithful to the explicit commands of the Bill of Rights, designed to
wrap the protections of the Constitution around all defendants upon
whom the mighty powers of government are hurled to punish for
crime." 2 16 Justice Powell's Rodriguez opinion took up this notion,
distinguishing its previous special treatment of wealth as limited to
cases in which the wealth-based deprivation related to a right explicitly
or implicitly protected by the Constitution-in the Griffin cases,
Williams, and Tate, the right to fair treatment in the criminal justice
system. 217
Memorandum from Larry Hammond, Law Clerk, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court (Feb. 13, 1973), which Justice Powell shared with his colleagues. See Memorandum
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Potter Stewart, Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court 2 (Feb. 14, 1973) ("1 agree that the historic origins of the two-level approach
to equal protection problems are at least dubious. But . .. I concluded that the considerable volume
of precedent in this area leaves little room for a de novo review unless the Court is willing to start
fresh."); see also Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Harry Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 13, 1973) ("Whatever I may have
thought of this [two-tier] approach as a de novo proposition, I thought it was too firmly rooted in
our past decisions for me to attempt a new basis of analysis."). Ultimately, Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Blackmun joined the Rodriguez majority, though Justice Rehnquist explained that
he regarded its discussion of strict scrutiny as dicta. See Memorandum from William Rehnquist to
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra. All sources referenced in this note are available in the Lewis F. Powell
Papers, supra note 172, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez file.
214. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-22.
215. Id. at 30-35; see also supra notes 23, 33 and accompanying text (regarding the
interrelationship between the Bearden line and other cases involving fundamental rights).
216. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 390-91 (Black, J., dissenting).
217. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-21. This distinction is emphasized in memos throughout
Justice Powell's Rodriguez file. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court, to Larry Hammond, Law Clerk 8, 11 (Oct. 12, 1972) (agreeing with the notion
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While the Rodriguez Court's recasting of Griffin and the other
early cases in the Bearden line as limiting the government's behavior
within criminal justice systems has an air of post-hoc rationalization, 218
it was plausible because the notion that the government's use of its
prosecutorial power was particularly fraught was already imbedded in
those cases. For example, in one early case the Court explained that
"[w]hen society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or
property, it takes its most awesome steps," and therefore "[t]he methods
we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called
the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged." 219
In light of the Court's ongoing concern that the government be
precluded from engaging in wealth-based discrimination in the criminal
realm, and prior limitations in Williams and Tate regarding sentencing,
it is unsurprising that the Bearden Court would extend constitutional
protections to restrict the manner in which the government enforced
financial punishment. Prior to Bearden, the Court had recognized that
punishment is unjustifiable if imposed on a person who did not willfully
that "[w]ealth alone [is] not suspect," so to receive heightened scrutiny it must be connected to
another fundamental interest and describing "fair criminal process" as a fundamental interest);
Bench Memorandum from Larry Hammond, Law Clerk 18-21 (Oct. 2, 1972) (discussing the Griffin
cases and Harper and noting that each involved wealth plus some other fundamental right); see
also Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Potter
Stewart, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 2 (Feb. 4, 1973) (explaining the approach of requiring
a connection to an explicitly or implicitly guaranteed right); Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Larry A. Hammond, Law Clerk 1-2 (Nov. 13, 1972)
(discussing the need to distinguish interests rooted in the Constitution); Memorandum from Larry
A. Hammond, Law Clerk, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 2 (Oct. 28,
1972) (discussing fundamental interests). All sources referenced in this note are available in Lewis
F. Powell Papers, supra note 172, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez file.
Justice Thomas has argued that the Griffin cases are no longer valid because the Court
subsequently held in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that a facially neutral statute with
a discriminatory impact was insufficient to establish an equal protection violation. See Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 373-75 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 242 (explaining that the statute allowing for automatic conversion of fines to incarceration
was neutral on its face but "in operative effect exposes only indigents to the risk of imprisonment
beyond the statutory maximum"). In making this argument, Justice Thomas pointed to Rodriguez
as evidence that the Court was rejecting Griffin's approach to wealth-based discrimination as part
of the trajectory toward upholding facially neutral statutes, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 374-75 & n.5,
and stated that "[t]he Davis Court was motivated in no small part by the potentially radical
implications of the GriffinlDouglas rationale," id. at 376. Rodriguez, however, distinguished the
Griffin cases from those that were not rooted in an explicit or implicit constitutional right. See
supra notes 210-217 and accompanying text. In addition, Davis does not mention Griffin, Douglas,
or any other related case. See Davis, 426 U.S. 229; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 125--27
(1996) (rejecting Justice Thomas's argument and explaining that sanctions based on ability to pay
"are not merely disproportionate in impact. Rather they are wholly contingent on one's ability to
pay" and thus necessarily discriminatory).
218. See Klarman, supra note 172, at 285-86 (explaining that the Burger Court's reticence to
the risk that equal protection may be used for "judicial wealth redistribution" led to an effort to
"reexplain Warren-era fundamental rights strand cases as something other than what they were").
219. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
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engage in wrongdoing.220 That theme emerged in Bearden as well.
Punishing a person for failure to pay when he, "through no fault of his
own," did not have the means to do so221-something Justice O'Connor
equated at oral argument in Bearden to revoking probation for the
offense of leaving the state when one had been kidnapped 222-does not
provide justification for the government to use its awesome power to
punish.
2. Amplification of Protections Through the Dual Use of Equal
Protection and Due Process
In addition to the distinction between the use of the
prosecutorial power and other governmental functions drawn by the
Court, the constitutional norm against punishing a person's financial
condition is also evident through its dual reliance on the due process
and equal protection clauses. The Griffin plurality's use of both
clauseS223 broke from a long line of cases in the criminal justice arena
in which the Court had exclusively employed due process. 224 While some
members of the Court have criticized the Griffin cases for their limited
220. See, e.g., Williams, 399 U.S. at 242 (describing payment as "an illusory choice for ... any
indigent who, by definition is without funds"); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)
(striking down a statute that criminalized the status of being an addict); Erik Luna, The Story of
Robinson: From Revolutionary Constitutional Doctrine to Modest Ban on Status Crimes, in
CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 47, 65-67 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013) (describing
Robinson as susceptible to numerous interpretations, including a restriction of the criminal law to
willful acts); see also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 181 (1968) ("[A] primary vindication of the principle of responsibility could rest on the
simple idea that unless a man has the capacity and fair opportunity or chance to adjust his
behavior to the law its penalties ought not be applied to him."); cf. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 800 (1982) ("American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention-and
therefore his moral guilt-to be critical to 'the degree of [his] criminal culpability' and the Court
has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional
wrongdoing." (citation omitted)); William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE
L.J. 1, 11 (1960) ("Criminal intent of some character, not mere idleness and destitution, must be
present."). For a discussion of how a focus on willfulness could lead to harsher punishments
because it allows for a narrative in which people who have engaged in criminal activity may be
cast as "incorrigible evildoers," see Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State,
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 264-65, 287-88 (2011).
221. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1982); see also Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606,
610-11, 614-15 (1985) (describing Bearden as "acknowledg[ing] this Court's sensitivity to the
treatment of indigents in our criminal justice system" and as emphasizing the distinction between
willful violations of probation and the unwillful violation that occurred given the inability to pay).
222. Bearden, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 192, at 26-27.
223. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956).
224. The early due process cases focused on access to counsel. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). The combination of the equal protection and due process clauses was foreshadowed
in a 1947 dissent in which Justice Rutledge suggested that equal protection might be relevant
when the ability to defend oneself depended on one's financial circumstances. Foster v. Illinois,
332 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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explanation of the relationship between the two clauses,225 the Griffin
plurality does provide some explanation. The plurality noted that the
American constitutional tradition required that the procedures used in
criminal matters-the province of due process-may not invidiously
discriminate based on wealth-the province of equal protection-so
that "all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned,
'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American
court.' "226
Though Griffin and the early cases in the line linked the two
clauses together, a position the Court would return to later in the
Burger Court era, the Court's decisions in Williams and Tate provide a
blip in which it relied only on the equal protection clause to prohibit the
automatic conversion of economic sanctions to incarceration. 2 2 7 There
are at least two plausible explanations for this shift, both of which may
be in play. First, it is possible that the dual use of the two clauses was
a rhetorical device employed in the early Griffin cases to bring Justices
into the tent in an area of disagreement and uncertainty. 228 The Warren
225. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) ('The precise rationale for the
Griffin and Douglas line of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause
of that Amendment."); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276 (2000) (quoting same language
from Ross); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the
Court's "inability ... to agree upon the constitutional source of the supposed right"); M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996) (noting the complaint in Ross, but quoting Bearden for the
proposition that "cases of this order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole
analysis' "). The lack of clarity has led to confusion among both members of the Court, its clerks,
and litigants. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360-61 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court appears to rely on both the Equal Protection Clause and on the guarantees of fair
procedure inherent in the Due Process Clause." (emphasis added)); "QUESTIONS," Harry
Blackmun Papers, supra note 172, Bearden v. Georgia file (listing prepared questions for both
petitioner and respondent asking them to identify the "standard of ... scrutiny . .. employed");
Bench Memorandum from "Rives" to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 8
(Jan. 10, 1983), Lewis F. Powell Papers, supra note 172, Bearden v. Georgia file ("A problem with
these opinions is that they do not make the proper level of scrutiny clear."); Bench Memorandum
from "Rives" to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra at 8-9 (describing the Griffin opinion as referencing
rationality but "disguis[ing] the application of a heightened level of scrutiny" and Williams as
doing the same); Memorandum from "ASM" to Harry Blackmun I, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court 11-12, 17 (Jan. 3, 1983), Harry Blackmun Papers, supra note 172, Bearden v. Georgia file
(explaining that the prior cases appear to be using "intermediate-level scrutiny" and noting
different outcomes if rational basis review was employed rather than any form of heightened
scrutiny); Memorandum from "SNS" (May 14, 1959), John Marshall Harlan Papers, supra note
172, Burns v. Ohio file (noting different outcomes in a case depending on the "extent to which"
prior cases relied on due process versus equal protection); Brief of Petitioner at 8, 11, Williams v.
Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969) (No. 841), 1969 WL 120009 (1969) (describing Griffin as
decided under equal protection and "probably" due process).
226. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16-17.
227. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
228. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
461-63 (2010) (positing that people may borrow concepts from one doctrine when arguing for the
development of another in order to bolster and persuade).
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Court arguably used the equal protection clause as a cloak for
substantive due process in order to make it more palatable to Justices
wary of a return to the abuses of the Lochner era, including Justice
Frankfurter, who served as the crucial fifth vote in concurrence in
support of the Griffin plurality. 229 Second, it is also possible that the
dual use is mere surplusage, with equal protection alone serving as
sufficient grounding for restricting wealth-based discrimination in the
criminal arena. This was, in fact, the position taken by Chief Justice
Burger in authoring the Williams opinion, in which he retroactively
recast Griffin as relying only on that clause. 230
Regardless, the Court quickly returned, begrudgingly at first, to
an understanding of the due process and equal protection clauses as
linked where a risk exists that a person would be excluded from fair
treatment in criminal proceedings due to her financial circumstances.
Three years after announcing Tate, the Court took up the question of
whether to expand access to counsel for criminal appeals in Ross v.
Moffitt. 2 3 1 The Court had previously relied on both clauses to afford
counsel in a first appeal as of right in Douglas v. California.232 In doing
so, the Douglas Court emphasized that during that first appeal, "only
the barren record speaks for the indigent," leaving the appellant to
ascertain meritorious arguments "without a champion," thus rendering
the direct appeal effectively meaningless, as if the appellant had no
access to an appeal at all. 2 3 3 In contrast, in Ross, the Court opined that
at the time of a later discretionary review the appellant would have the
benefit of the records compiled and arguments made by counsel during
the direct appeal process. 234 Therefore, no right to counsel need be
afforded because an appellant without the financial ability to retain a
lawyer would still have an adequate opportunity to obtain meaningful
229. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20-21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Klarman, supra note 172, at 219-24 ("While Lochner was laid to rest doctrinally ... its ghost has
lived on, haunting the Court's constitutional conscience for the next fifty years."). In
correspondence located in his files, Justice Frankfurter indicated that his concurring opinion in
Griffin, though emphasizing due process, relied on both clauses. See Letter from Justice
Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Bertram F. Wilcox, Prof. of Law, Cornell Law
Sch. (Dec. 11, 1957), Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 172, Griffin v. Illinois file ("[H]owever
serious the difficulties you may have found with what I wrote in Griffin, I did not find much to
quarrel with in what you wrote about it."); see also Bertram F. Wilcox & Edward J. Bloustein, The
Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 10-13 (1957) (arguing
that Justice Frankfurter's concurrence is properly read as employing both clauses).
230. Williams, 399 U.S. at 241; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 369-73 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (arguing that Griffin relies only on equal protection); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
407 (1985) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (same).
231. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
232. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
233. Id. at 356.
234. Ross, 417 U.S. at 614-15.
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discretionary review.235 In doing so, the Ross Court stated that it was
relying on an equal protection analysis. 236 Yet, it also affirmed that
Douglas-which it left untouched-was grounded in both due process
and equal protection.237 In other words, the Ross opinion is fairly read
as standing for the proposition that while equal protection alone does
not require intervention where a person of limited means has
meaningful, albeit imperfect, access to criminal processes, if instead a
person is priced out of fair treatment-either through total exclusion or
through a process that is effectively meaningless-the enhanced
protections afforded by both clauses are triggered.
The Bearden Court again embraced this understanding of the
combined force of the two clauses to protect against abuses of the
prosecutorial power by treating the clauses as providing greater
protection together than either may have done on its own. 238 The case
had been presented and argued solely under the equal protection
clause. 239 The Court described that clause as affording protection where
"the State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial
benefit available to another class of defendants" due to their wealth. 240
It then declined to proceed by using the traditional classification-based
approach to equal protection, explaining that "fitting the problem of this
case [revocation of probation for a failure to pay economic sanctions]
into an equal protection framework [was] a task too Procrustean to be
rationally accomplished"241 because a person's financial condition is a
"point on a spectrum rather than a classification." 242 In other words, the
need to protect against the abuses of the prosecutorial power did not
exist only for those below some specified economic threshold, but for
anyone priced out of fair treatment.243 Therefore, the Court also brought
due process principles to bear. As it explained, the due process clause is
concerned with "fairness of relations between the criminal defendant
and the State," in which punishment for something beyond a
235. Id. This move by the Ross Court mirrored the distinction drawn in Rodriguez between an
absolute deprivation of access to appellate processes and a relative deprivation caused by
comparatively lower funding of public schools. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
236. Ross, 417 U.S. at 609, 614-15.
237. Id. at 609, 611-12.
238. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1982); see also supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
239. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Bearden, supra note 185.
240. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665.
241. Id. at 666 n.8 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)).
242. Id.
243. See id. ("[Ilndigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification . . .
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defendant's control is arbitrary and thus prohibited. 24 The state, then,
would not act arbitrarily or undermine equality principles if it denied
people who are unable to pay-as well as those who can-an
opportunity for appellate revieW 245 or revoked probation on grounds
unrelated to payment. 246 So too, the state is not precluded from
imposing a penalty for nonpayment where a person had the means to
pay but chose not to do so. 24 7 Where the government's use of its
prosecutorial power crosses over and becomes arbitrary in violation of
due process because it creates a wealth-based inequality in
contradiction to the principles of equal protection, is where the manner
in which the prosecutorial power is employed depends on a person's
financial condition. 2 4 8
B. Application of the Constitutional Norms in Bearden
The norms embraced by the Court that the Constitution protects
people from unfair treatment in criminal justice systems due to their
244. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) ("The due
process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to
adverse state action."); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392, 404 (1985) ("[The disposition required
by the statute in Griffin] violated due process principles because it decided the appeal in a way
that was arbitrary with respect to the issues involved.").
245. See, e.g., supra note 196 and accompanying text.
246. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668 n.9.
247. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970); see also Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668, 672-
73 (distinguishing between willful and nonwillful failure to pay); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-
98 (1971) (explaining that the automatic conversion of fines to incarceration was not justified
where it was applied to "an indigent defendant without the means to pay his fine"); Morris v.
Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970) (White, J., concurring) (describing Williams as standing for
the proposition that a state maintains the power to punish willful nonpayment but cannot add
additional punishment in response to a failure to pay where a defendant is unable to secure the
necessary funds). The Court had held a case for consideration in which the petitioner's probation
had been revoked for failure to pay while Bearden was pending, but ultimately concluded that
Bearden would not be relevant because the lower court had found that the petitioner had the
means to pay. See Memorandum from Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
to the Conference 2, (June 1, 1983), Harry Blackmun Papers, supra note 172, Bearden v. Georgia
file.
248. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671; see also Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 614-15 (1985)
(distinguishing Bearden from voluntary violations of probation by explaining that it involved a
nonwillful failure to pay due to poverty); Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Black, 471 U.S. 606
(No. 84-465) [hereinafter Black, Transcript of Oral Argument] (Justice O'Connor correcting
counsel's assertion that Bearden required consideration of alternative punishments prior to
revocation of probation for willful noncompliance by stating, "[I]n Bearden, we had a situation of
a person who was unable to live up to the terms of probation through no fault of his own"), audio
recording with speaker designation available at Black v. Romano, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/
cases/1984/84-465 (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc47Z5-9Z4Y]; Oral Argument at
42:29 to 42:43, Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 381 U.S. 923 (1965) (No. 47), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/1965/47 (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) [https://perma.ccW6CA-AHUX] (Justice Brennan
distinguishing between people who have the ability to pay economic sanctions but do not from
those who cannot do so).
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financial condition is commensurate with the Bearden Court's crafting
of a distinct test that significantly cabins the prosecutorial power to
respond to nonpayment of economic sanctions. Under the tiers of
scrutiny approach, constitutionality is determined by weighing
individual and governmental interests.249 In contrast, the Court baked
into the Bearden test both strong protection of the individual interest
in avoiding unjustified punishment and the governmental interest in
punishing wrongful conduct. The resulting test does not engage in
further balancing but instead flatly prohibits the government from
imposing punishment for the failure to pay economic sanctions when a
person is unable to do so unless no alternative response could ensure
the debtor does not escape punishment from the original offense
altogether.
1. Protection of Individual Interests
The Bearden Court embraced the constitutional norms detailed
above, saw punishing a person's financial circumstances as
"fundamentally unfair," 250 and thus devised a test that provides
significant protection of the individual interest in avoiding unjustified
punishment. Had the Court followed the tiers of scrutiny, that
individual interest would be weighed against any related governmental
interests when assessing a practice's constitutionality. 2 5 1 Instead, when
crafting the Bearden test, the Court continued the approach of the
earlier cases in its line in which it rejected as irrelevant multiple
governmental interests-including interests that might be considered
in the application of either of the tiers of scrutiny-in order to protect
against fundamentally unfair treatment due to one's financial
condition.
The Court, for example, protected the individual interest in fair
treatment in the criminal justice system by disclaiming both the
government's economic and administrative interests. Regarding the
former, by the time that Williams reached the Court in 1970, parties'
briefs and oral arguments had made clear that many jurisdictions were
highly dependent on fines and fees, particularly for the financing of
court systems.252 The Court even expressly stated that it understood the
249. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
250. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-69; see also id. at 666-67 (noting the importance of considering
"the nature of the individual interest affected" and "the extent to which it is affected" in devising
the Bearden test (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
251. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
252. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Williams v. Illinois 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (No.
1089) [hereinafter Williams, Transcript of Oral Argument] (responding to a question by Justice
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state's interest in revenue collection to be "substantial and
legitimate." 253 But even so, the Court declared that such fiscal interests
were "irrelevant,"254 and that they could not justify the application of
additional punishment triggered by an inability to pay the economic
sanctions originally imposed as punishment for the crime of
conviction.255 Likewise, the Court deemed the administrative burden on
the government inapposite. For example, despite knowing that Griffin
led to voluminous requests for transcripts, 256 and despite arguments
that its extension would be administratively infeasible, 257 the Court
continued to expand Griffin in striking down other financial barriers to
appeal in opinions that neither discussed nor otherwise treated such
interests as relevant.258 Similarly, in the lead-up to both Williams and
Tate, the states vehemently protested that they must be allowed to
insist that economic sanctions be paid as a lump sum, because the use
White as to the amount of fines collected, counsel for Illinois stated: "I am sure it's in the high
millions and as a practical matter, offers the source of support for those Courts which enforce
misdemeanor and petty offenses and traffic offenses. Without the revenues derived from the
imposition of fines, especially in traffic cases, it would be extremely difficult for the State of Illinois,
on their present budget, to support those courts."), audio recording with speaker designations
available at Williams v. Illinois, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1969/1089 (last visited Oct. 11,
2018) [https://perma.cc/58UG-8MEN]; Brief for the Appellee, Williams, 399 U.S. 235, supra note
203, at *8 ("It's fair to say that many of the local courts across the country are supported almost
entirely by revenue derived from the imposition of fines and costs in misdemeanor cases, especially
traffic offenses.").
253. Williams, 399 U.S. at 238.
254. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974).
255. Id.; see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (discounting the interest in using
imprisonment to enforce fines and noting that "[i]t is imposed to augment the State's revenues but
obviously does not serve that purpose").
256. See Letter from Walter V. Schaffer, Justice, Supreme Court of Ill., to Felix Frankfurter,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 15, 1958), Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 172,
Griffin v. Illinois file (reporting that since Griffin they have had "1138 requests for records and
transcripts in the criminal court of Cook County alone" and that "[r]equests in new cases are
averaging something over 300 per month in that court"); Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justices of the United States Supreme Court (Apr. 17,
1958), Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 172, Griffin v. Illinois file (circulating same to all
Justices).
257. See Oral Argument at 16:47 to 17:16, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (No. 581),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1958/581 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3Z2A-E77J]
(arguing that the costs of transcripts and filing fees for "thousands" of appeals would be
burdensome); Brief of Respondents at 9-10, Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969) (No.
841), 1969 WL 120010, at *10 (noting that the court system was "already taxed" and that "the
application of the Griffin Rule will add additional burden to the Municipal Court System").
258. Infra notes 311-314 and accompanying text; see Memorandum from William Brennan,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Potter Stewart, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May
19, 1966), William Brennan Papers, supra note 172, Rinaldi v. Yeager file (stating that "state laws
burdening the critical right to appeal from a criminal conviction" are so important that they must
be struck down "when the burden has no better justification than administrative convenience").
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of installment planS 2 5 9 or any system requiring a determination of a
person's ability to pay2 60 would be unmanageable. Though the Court did
not mandate the use of those practices, in Williams and Tate-and later
in Bearden-it described them as viable remedies for the Fourteenth
Amendment violations at issue in each case. 26 1
The Court not only rejected from consideration nonpenal
interests but also penal interests that effectively equate poverty with a
proclivity to commit crime. The State of Georgia had argued that it had
a legitimate public safety interest served by revoking probation where
a person had no ability to pay previously imposed economic sanctions
because, while it was "not a pleasant conclusion for one to draw,"262
people living in poverty in general 263-and Mr. Bearden post-job loss in
particular 264-Would be "in the position of being easily led to commit
another crime." 2 65 Early review of this argument raised alarms. For
example, notes made by Justice Powell include his agreement with his
clerk's conclusion that "the indigent's failure to pay sheds no light on
259. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-35, Tate, 401 U.S. 395 (No. 324) (arguing, on
behalf of the State of Texas, that installment plans would be impossible to implement), audio
recording with speaker designations available at Tate v. Short, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/
cases/1970/324 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3GA8-F369]; id. at 33:
[Imt's going to take the wisdom of Solomon and the sophistication of a computer that hasn't
even been invented to correlate the mans [sic] family size, his personal sensitivity, his, the
value of his car which he has committed the crimes with and all of that into a jumble and
come out and say that all right, now, for you it's going to be $4.75 a week.
See also Brief for Respondent at 27-28, Tate, 401 U.S. 395 (No. 324), 1970 WL 122461, at *27-28
(arguing that payment in installments raises questions that are "insurmountable"); Brief of the
City of Chicago as Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance at 6, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)
(No. 1089), 1970 WL 136558, at *6 (arguing that installment plans were largely unrealistic").
260. See, e.g., Williams, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 252, at 36-37 (arguing that
it would be too difficult to determine whether people did or did not have the capacity to pay); Brief
for Respondent at 22-23, Tate, 401 U.S. 395 (No. 324), 1970 WL 122461, at *22-23 (stating that
separating people who are and are not indigent "would be insurmountable"). For a discussion of
how the Court treated these concerns as relevant for purposes of ensuring only people who were
actually unable to pay economic sanctions receive the benefit of Bearden's protections see infra
notes 442-448 and accompanying text.
261. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671-72 (1983); Tate, 401 U.S. at 400 n.5; Williams, 399
U.S. at 244-45, 245 n.21. For a discussion of limitations on the use of installment plans to ensure
that the total amount of economic sanctions imposed do not become constitutionally excessive in
violation of the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause, see Colgan, supra note 25, at 58-61.
262. Brief for Respondent, Bearden, supra note 192, at 19-20.
263. Id. at 20-22 (providing studies showing a correlation between poverty and crime).
264. Id. at 8 ("[P]etitioner's inability to pay the fine and restitution amounts made him a poorer
probation risk . . . the revocation promotes petitioner's rehabilitation by removing him from
circumstances in which the likelihood of his committing a crime had increased."); id. at 19-20
(repeating arguments that inability to pay made Mr. Bearden more likely to commit a crime); id.
at 22, 25-26 (same, linking the increased probation risk directly to his loss of employment).
265. Id. at 26; see also Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671 ("[T]he State asserts that its interest in
rehabilitating the probationer and protecting society requires it to remove him from the temptation
of committing other crimes.").
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the probationer's chances for rehabilitation." 266 At oral argument,
Justice Marshall pressed counsel for Georgia, and after confirming that
the state's position was that "a trial court could reasonably use a
person's financial resources" to determine the "[l]ikelihood that they
would commit a crime,"2 6 7 pointedly asked: "So a poor person is more
likely to commit a crime than a person with money? And you are
speaking as a state Attorney General?" 2 68 The Court saw instead that it
was the threat of the revocation of probation, and not poverty itself, that
might "have the perverse effect of inducing the probationer to use illegal
means to acquire funds to pay." 2 6 9 In the end, in rejecting Georgia's
contention, the Court did not mince words:
This is no more than a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty by itself indicates he
may commit crimes in the future and thus that society needs for him to be
incapacitated.. .. he State cannot justify incarcerating a probationer who has
demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt to society, solely by lumping
him together with other poor persons and thereby classifying him as dangerous. This
would be little more than punishing a person for his poverty. 2 70
Finally, in the Bearden line, the Court also declined to consider
governmental interests with both penal and remedial qualities, the
latter of which could only be satisfied through payment of economic
sanctions. The Bearden Court agreed that the government had a
legitimate interest in promoting payment of victim restitution, 271 which
the Court understands as serving both punitive and remedial aims. 2 7 2
266. See Bench Memorandum from "Rives" to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 225 (writing
"yes" and "I agree" in the margin); see also Memorandum from "NED" to William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 1 (Jan. 1983), William Brennan Papers, supra note 172,
Bearden v. Georgia file (arguing that Georgia's practices had "all the earmarks of a return to
debtor's prisons"); Memorandum from "Stuart" to Byron White, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
(Jan. 4, 1983), Byron White Papers, supra note 172, Bearden v. Georgia file (describing Georgia's
practices as "an openly-admitted additional punishment for the misfortune of being poor").
267. Bearden, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 192, at 27-28.
268. Id. at 28; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-25, Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S.
508 (1970) (No. 782) [hereinafter Morris, Transcript of Oral Argument] (questioning by Justice
Marshall) ("I would assume that the recidivist is a recidivist because he wants to be and did it
deliberately. I can't assume that for a pauper."), audio recording with speaker designations
available at Morris v. Schoonfield, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1969/782 (last visited Oct. 12,
2018) [https://perma.cc/JMV5-3XKN].
269. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670-71.
270. Id. at 671; see also id. at 665 (emphasizing the need to determine whether a defendant is
"somehow responsible" for the failure to pay); id. at 668 ("This distinction, based on the reasons
for non-payment, is of critical importance here.").
271. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670-71.
272. See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 456-58 (2014) (noting that restitution "serves
punitive purposes"); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005) (explaining that the
"purpose of awarding restitution" under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act "is not to collect a
foreign tax, but to mete out appropriate criminal punishment"); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53
(1986) (upholding a statute barring restitution from being subject to discharge in Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceedings due to its penal nature); see also Colgan, supra note 25, at 42-43 ("The
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The Court made clear, however, that when assessing the
constitutionality of imposing additional punishment for failure to pay,
it would not recognize that interest in collecting restitution because
inflicting a punishment for nonpayment on "someone who through no
fault of his own is unable to make restitution will not make restitution
suddenly forthcoming."273
In other words, the Court's desire to protect against the abuses
of the prosecutorial power led it to exclude from consideration all
nonpenal interests, as well as penal interests that equate being poor
with being criminally inclined or that are intertwined with remedial
interests that could be satisfied only through a payment a person has
no meaningful ability to make, even though such considerations would
be relevant under the tiers of scrutiny.
2. Protection of the State's Interest in Punishing Criminal Conduct
In devising the Bearden test, the Court did not just alter the tiers
of scrutiny approach to avoid the fundamental unfairness of punishing
financial condition but also to protect the government's
"fundamental"274 interest in ensuring that people found to have
engaged in illegal conduct are not "immunized" from being punished at
all.2 7 5 The Court addressed this interest in two ways: by limiting who
qualified as unable to pay, thus falling within Bearden's ambit, and by
leaving a narrow window open to incarceration for failure to pay even
for those without the means to do so.
Though concerns regarding inverse discrimination date back to
Justice Harlan's dissent in Griffin,276 they took on a new tone when the
Court precluded the government from automatically converting
economic sanctions to jail time in Williams and Tate,277 with states
arguing that people would make "spurious claims of indigency" to avoid
understanding of restitution as at least partially punitive is in keeping with the Supreme Court's
repeated statements that restitution serves a punitive function in response to prohibited
conduct.").
273. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670.
274. Id. at 669.
275. See id. ("A defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him from punishment.").
276. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34-35 (1956) (critiquing the decision to strike down
financial barriers to appeal as imposing "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from
differences in economic circumstances" and that "[i]t may as accurately be said that the real issue
in this case is not whether Illinois has discriminated but whether it has a duty to discriminate").
277. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243-44
(1970); see also Handwritten Notes on Bench Memorandum from "Rives" to Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
supra note 225 (writing and underlining "yes" next to statement mentioning "inverse
discrimination").
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punishment. 278 These arguments took up the rhetoric of personal
responsibility that was informing debates around poverty in other
contexts, such as in the public benefits arena. 279 During the litigation of
Williams, for example, the City of Chicago filed an amicus brief pitting
"the great working majority who must pay their fines with their own
hard-earned money" against those who would claim an inability to do
so. 2 8 0 To address these concerns, the Court repeatedly invoked the idea
that the debtor must make "bona fide efforts" to pay economic sanctions;
a person who had not done so would not qualify for Bearden's
protections.281
In addition to limiting Bearden's application to those who have
made bona fide efforts to pay, the Court also addressed the concern that
people who met that qualification would be able to violate the law with
impunity by creating a narrow space allowing for the use of
incarceration for even an unwilling failure to pay. Lawmakers urged
the Court to allow them to continue incarcerating people with no means
to pay, positing that any other result would lead to people of limited
means becoming scofflaws. For example, in Tate, the city of Houston,
Texas, claimed that if it were not allowed to incarcerate the poor for
failure to pay, "[a]n indigent would be licensed to tie up a parking space
in downtown Houston, free of charge, all day long; he could spit at will
on the sidewalks and in all public buildings; he could run all traffic
lights; drive his automobile without a license, ad infinitum."282 In
response, the Bearden Court permitted the imposition of incarceration
for the nonpayment of economic sanctions due to inability, though only
278. Williams, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 252, at 36-37; see also Brief of the
City of Chicago as Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance, supra note 259, at 3 ("[T]he plea of poverty
and inability to pay is the knee-jerk reaction to the overwhelming majority of debtors when asked
to pay.... How then, is the Court to separate the wheat from the chaff and determine who is the
real indigent?"); Tate, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 259, at 33 (on behalf of Houston,
Texas) ("When are we going to have a separate hearing on my guilt velle non, and then another
on whether I was telling the truth when I said I was too poor?").
279. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-25 (1968) (discussing the incorporation of
concepts of "worthiness" into the development of public welfare programs). See generally JOEL F.
HANDLER & ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, THE "DESERVING POOR": A STUDY OF WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION (1971) (documenting how public welfare legislation has sought to differentiate
between those deserving of aid and those who are not through the use of eligibility requirements,
including efforts to find employment).
280. Brief of the City of Chicago as Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance, supra note 259, at 3.
281. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668, 670-73 (1983). For a brief discussion of the
application of the concept of bona fide efforts to pay, see infra notes 442-448 and accompanying
text.
282. Brief for Respondent, Tate, supra note 260, at 22-23; see also Morris, Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 268, at 25 (on behalf of the State of Maryland) ("A man is poor through no
fault of his own, but I must assume that he willfully violated the law ... and assuming that he
willfully violated the law, he then should not be able to escape or be able to dictate the kind of
punishment he is to incur.").
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if the government meets the burden of showing that no alternative
response could satisfy its interest in punishing the underlying offense
of conviction. 283
3. The Resulting Test
Rather than a simple recasting of the tiers of scrutiny tests, in
which individual and governmental interests are weighed to assess a
practice's constitutionality, 28 4 the fundamental individual interest in
avoiding unfair treatment in criminal matters due to one's financial
283. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73; see also id. at 666-67 (noting the relevance to its assessment
in crafting the Bearden test "the rationality of the connection between legislative means and
purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose" (quoting Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))). In his concurrence, Justice White
expressed concern that this caveat effectively allowed additional punishment of a person's
financial condition because the Court suggested no upper limit on the substituted term of
imprisonment at stake if Mr. Bearden's probation were revoked should no alternatives suffice. Id.
at 676 (White, J., concurring). As he noted, however, the length of any substituted incarceration
would still be restricted by the Eighth Amendment. Id. In his concurrence, Justice White would
have allowed the state to impose incarceration as a substitute for economic sanctions, though only
where the length of the substituted term was "roughly equivalent" to the economic sanctions in
severity. Id. at 675 (White, J., concurring); see also Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron White, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 12, 1983),
Lewis F. Powell Papers, supra note 172, Bearden v. Georgia file (noting his joinder in Justice
White's concurring opinion and stating that he "would be willing to add ... that the prison term
imposed in this case appears on its face to be disproportionate as a sentence when compared with
the fine"); Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Sandra
Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 2, 1983), Lewis F. Powell Papers, supra
note 172, Bearden v. Georgia file ("In my view [the substitution of a jail term of two-and-a-half
years for a $550 fine] was a denial of equal protection. There is not even a rough equivalence
between the fine and jail sentence."). Justice White saw rough equivalency as more protective of
people of limited means than the majority's solution, because it was expressly cabined to reach
equality in treatment. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 675-76 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 675
(White, J., concurring) (agreeing that a jail term roughly equivalent to the value of the economic
sanctions would be permissible); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 285-87 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have resolved the question of whether probation
revocation for failure to pay violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it would be appropriate
to substitute a term of incarceration for economic sanctions so long as it was properly calibrated
so as not to be more punitive). There is some evidence that then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, who
signed onto the concurrence, did not believe that there was a need for even rough equivalence
between the economic sanctions and the substituted term of incarceration. He was the lone Justice
to vote to affirm the lower court opinion upholding probation revocation at conference.
Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Sandra Day
O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 12, 1983), Lewis F. Powell Papers, supra note
172, Bearden v. Georgia file. He also stated at oral argument that he believed "it would be quite
difficult" to value a day of incarceration in order to do an equivalents calculation. Bearden,
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 192, at 14. Similarly, Chief Justice Burger had previously
stated that he had "some difficulty seeing how you put a rate on [a person's] liberty by the hour."
Williams, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 252, at 18-19 ("How do you measure the value
of a man's freedom?"). Both Justices did, however, join Justice White's concurrence. See
Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Sandra Day O'Connor, supra (noting that Justice
Rehnquist preferred Justice White's approach to the majority's).
284. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
condition, and the government's fundamental interest in punishing
wrongdoing for which a person is culpable, are incorporated into the
structure of the test that emerges in Bearden. As the Court explained
in describing the early Bearden cases, the line "does not represent a
balance between the needs of the accused and the interests of society;
its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out
of" 2 8 5 fair treatment in the criminal justice system. Therefore, rather
than weighing a litany of governmental interests against the individual
interest at stake, the Bearden test calls for answers to two questions of
fact: Has the person made a bona fide effort to pay, and if so, are
alternative responses that would satisfy the government's interest in
punishing only the underlying offense feasible? 286
The importance of the Bearden test's structure is evident
through its application to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. Two
of the primary justifications for penal disenfranchisement generally
focus solely on the regulation of elections, and thus are entirely
nonpenal in nature. Supporters of penal disenfranchisement have
argued that it is necessary to preserve the "purity of the ballot box"
against tarnishing of the integrity of elected officials or of other voters
due to the tainted votes of those who have not abided by social norms. 28 7
In addition, supporters have attempted to justify penal
disenfranchisement on the grounds that if people convicted of crimes
were allowed to vote, they might form a voting block that disrupts
285. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974).
286. See infra Section II.D.
287. See Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) ("A state has an interest
in preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons
with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims.");
Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970) (recognizing that "the intended state
purpose for the disenfranchisement has something to do with the purity of the electoral process");
Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1966) ("The manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of
the ballot box, which is the only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs protection
against the invasion of corruption."); State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 175 S.W.2d 787, 788, 790
(Mo. 1943) (en banc) (recognizing the state interest in protecting the "purity of the ballot box");
State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377, 386 (N.D. 1934) (describing preservation of the "purity
of the ballot box" as the "manifest purpose" of penal disenfranchisement); In re Application of
Palmer, 61 A.2d 922, 925 (Essex Cty. Ct. N.J. 1948) (stating that the framers of New Jersey's
constitution sought to maintain the purity of elections); In re Application of Marino, 42 A.2d 469,
470 (N.J. Ct. of Common Pleas 1945) ("Clearly, the purpose ... was ... to maintain the purity of
our elections by excluding those would-be voters whose status was deemed to be inimical thereto.");
see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 12-13 (describing the concern that felons might
"corrupt the ballot box or use their votes illegitimately"); Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death'" The
Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIs. L. REV.
1045, 1083-84 (citing Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884), for the idea of preserving "the
purity of the ballot box").
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preexisting law enforcement priorities.288 As discussed further below,
these justifications have been subject to significant criticism.2 8 9 Several
lower courts, however, have treated these considerations as
legitimate,290 and thus they serve as a basis for upholding wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement under a tiers of scrutiny approach. 291 In
contrast, these nonpenal interests would never come into consideration
in a challenge to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement under the
Bearden test.2 9 2
As with nonpenal interests, the importance of the Bearden
Court's rejection of penal interests that equate poverty and criminality
is also evident through application to wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement. A standard rationale for penal disenfranchisement
as a whole is that people convicted of crimes are more likely to commit
voter fraud in the future.293 Once lawmakers choose to reenfranchise
people, they disclaim the notion that those who qualify for
reenfranchisement are inherently likely to engage in voter fraud.
Continuing to exclude people who cannot pay from the franchise
suggests that they remain more likely to commit voter fraud, thereby
equating poverty and criminality.294
288. See Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967) ("A contention that the
equal protection clause requires New York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys
or judges would not only be without merit but as obviously so as anything can be."); see also
Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 Fed. App'x 199, 203 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Green, 380 F.2d 445, for the
proposition that it is "unreasonable" for felons to vote in elections for legislators, prosecutors, or
judges); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (citing same); Madison v. State,
163 P.3d 757, 771 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (citing same); Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 159, 177 (2001) ("If these laws did not exist there would be a real danger of creating
an anti-law enforcement voting bloc in municipal elections .... ); Alec C. Ewald, An 'Agenda for
Demolition": The Fallacy and the Danger of the "Subversive Voting" Argument for Felony
Disenfranchisement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 109, 115-16 (2004) (describing conservative
commentators arguing that eliminating penal disenfranchisement would result in "politicians
pandering for the vote of felons"); Ashley Killough & Karl de Vries, Trump Slams Voting Rights
for Felons, Wants GOP To Court Black Voters, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/20/politics/
donald-trump-african-american-voters-virginia-voting-rights/index.html (last updated Aug. 22,
2016) [https://perma.cc/KK3F-QU8A] (quoting then-candidate Donald Trump as describing penal
disenfranchisement reform as an "effort to cancel out the votes of both law enforcement and crime
victims").
289. See infra notes 411-418 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
291. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010); Madison, 163 P.3d 757.
292. See supra notes 252-261 and accompanying text.
293. See Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1966) (describing the risk that people with
criminal convictions may engage in voter fraud as "not fanciful fears"); Washington v. State, 75
Ala. 582, 585 (1884) (stating that a person who committed a crime may be "morally corrupt" and
therefore may engage in "selling or bartering his vote or otherwise engaging in election fraud").
For a discussion of the lack of evidence linking disenfranchising offenses and voter fraud, see infra
notes 407-408 and accompanying text.
294. Cf. Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Review-and Criminal Disenfranchisement in the
United States and Canada, 60 REV. POL. 277, 303 (1998) (providing justifications for penal
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Likewise, the social contract theory of disenfranchisement,
when applied to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement, effectively
casts people who are unable to pay as criminals and is thus irrelevant
to assessing the government's interest in punishing the
disenfranchising offense as well. Proponents of the theory posit that by
breaking the law and violating the social contract, "the criminal forfeits
the right to participate" in the development of the law. 2 95 In other
words, social contract theory permanently casts a person who has
committed a crime as a rule violator regardless of evidence of reform.296
Again, once lawmakers choose to reenfranchise citizens convicted of an
offense, they repudiate the idea that people who have committed that
crime have irreparably violated the social contract. While it is true that
a person who completes payment has satisfied the terms of his sentence,
and the person who is unable to pay has not-and thus literally has not
reenfranchisement but stating that those practices are only valid so long as they depend solely
upon prohibited conduct and not upon a person's characteristics).
295. Ewald, supra note 287, at 1072-73, 1079-81; see Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,
451 (2d Cir. 1967) ("A man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his own
governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further
administering the compact."); State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377, 388-39 (N.D. 1934)
("[H]e who sets himself above the law and does an act ... of so serious a nature as to
be. . . penalized as a felony, may well be held in this state to be unfit to participate in
governmental affairs."); see also Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(citing the proposition in Green, 380 F.2d at 451); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 813 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985) (citing same); Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 195-96 (Iowa 2016) ("Under [the social
contract] theory, those who harm others or society through criminal action would exercise the right
to vote in a way to harm society."); State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 175 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Mo.
1943) (citing the proposition from Langer, 256 N.W. at 388-39); Fisher v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321,
329-30 (N.H. 2000) ("We cannot say that it is unreasonable for the legislature to conclude that a
citizen who commits a felony and is incarcerated also abandons the right to participate in voting
for those who create and enforce the laws."); Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 449 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000) ("The Court has also acknowledged that a state has a valid interest in ensuring
that the rules of its society are made by those who have not shown an unwillingness to abide by
those rules."); Ewald, supra note 288, at 112 ("[C]riminals violate the most basic agreement
making rights possible. How can they claim the right to make the polity's laws?"); Manfredi, supra
note 294, at 299 ("[C]riminal disenfranchisement reinforces the general moral signals ... by
further indicating the degree to which these offenders have broken their obligation to obey the
rules of the political community of which they claim to be members.").
296. See, e.g., PETTUS, supra note 20, at 127 ("[B]oth judicial and political justifications for
felon disenfranchisement hinge on the presumption of unworthiness, conferring brands of status
that constitute a caste distance . . . ."); Atiba R. Ellis, Tiered Personhood and the Excluded Voter,
90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 478 (2015) ("[O]ne's view about felon disenfranchisement ultimately
depends on ... whether one sees a felon through the lens of full equality or assumes that by virtue
of committing a crime, the felon belongs, permanently, in a different class of citizens."). This
conception of a person as forever tainted by a criminal act is not unique to penal
disenfranchisement but may instead inform punishment in the United States writ large. See
Dolovich, supra note 220, at 295-310 (positing that the government incarcerates people for
nonviolent offenses, as well as those who have been rehabilitated, because of a conception that
"everything there is to know about a given offender can be found in the mere fact of his criminal
history").
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paid his debt to society297-the Bearden Court addressed and dismissed
the idea that those unable to pay remained in violation of the social
contract. As the Court explained, when a person can pay but chooses
not to do so, it "may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt
he owes to society for his crime."298 But a person who has made bona
fide efforts to pay but fallen short, and who has otherwise completed
the terms of his sentence, "has demonstrated a willingness to pay his
debt to society and an ability to conform his conduct to social norms." 299
Finally, the use of poverty penalties such as wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement as a cudgel for promoting payment of economic
sanctions also falls out of consideration under Bearden. Lawmakers at
times justify these practices as necessary to ensure restitution is paid
to victims and other economic sanctions paid to the state. 300 But the
Bearden Court explicitly rejected the relevance of that exact argument
because that interest could only be satisfied by payment the debtor has
no meaningful ability to make.301
Instead, rather than assessing the validity and weighing the
importance of the various justifications for penal disenfranchisement,
once triggered by a failure to pay economic sanctions due to inability,
the government is flatly prohibited from imposing any additional
punishment, unless there could be no workable alternative that meets
the government's interest in punishing the disenfranchising offense. In
other words, as articulated in Bearden, when a person, through no fault
of her own, has no meaningful ability to pay economic sanctions, the
government "must consider alternate measures of punishment" for the
underlying offense, and may only impose an additional punishment in
response to the failure to pay "if alternate measures are not adequate
to meet the state's interest in punishment and deterrence" of that
offense alone. 302
297. See Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2002), rev'd, 353 F.3d 1287
(11th Cir. 2003) (arguing that completion of one's sentence, including full payment of restitution,
"is directly related to the question of the applicant's rehabilitation and readiness to return to the
electorate"); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 772 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) ("The State clearly has an
interest in ensuring that felons complete all terms of their sentence .... ); see also Harvey v.
Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that lawmakers "might ... rationally
conclude that only those who have satisfied their debts to society through fulfilling the terms of a
criminal sentence are entitled to restoration of their voting rights," but specifically excluding from
its consideration wealth-based penal disenfranchisement).
298. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983).
299. Id. at 670.
300. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the state's
interests in ensuring restitution payments are made satisfies the rational basis requirement).
301. See supra notes 271-273 and accompanying text.
302. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
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C. Applying the Test Upon Imposition of Any Form of Punishment for
Nonpayment
As detailed above, there is significant evidence that the first step
in raising a challenge to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
outside of the traditional tiers of scrutiny approach-the creation of a
distinct test-is satisfied by Bearden. Though the constitutional norms
that provide a foundation for the Bearden test likely would allow for its
extension, 303 the test as is would only be triggered if the government
imposes additional punishment for a nonwillful failure to pay.
Therefore, the question arises as to whether continued penal
disenfranchisement constitutes punishment as that term is understood
in Bearden. Using the tiers of scrutiny, lower courts have focused on the
nature of the deprivation at stake, reasoning that because Mr. Bearden
would have been incarcerated had his probation been revoked, the
Bearden line's heightened protections are only available if the risk to
the individual is a deprivation of liberty or an equally fundamental
harm, and therefore once access to the franchise is stripped of its
fundamental nature due to a conviction, limitations on it would only be
eligible for rational basis review. 304 Reading the Bearden line in
conjunction with the contemporaneous development of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, however, makes clear that from the line's
inception the Court unflaggingly rejected penalty-based distinctions,
suggesting that the Bearden test applies any time the government
imposes punishment for failing to pay economic sanctions upon a person
who cannot do so.305 Though the Court has not assessed whether penal
disenfranchisement constitutes punishment as contemplated in
Bearden, as detailed below, treatment of penal disenfranchisement as
punishment would be commensurate with the Court's inquiries into the
meaning of punishment broadly.306
303. See supra notes 176 and accompanying text.
304. See Johnson, 624 F.3d at 746-49 ("The revocation of probation at issue in Bearden
implicated physical liberty . .. Tennessee's re-enfranchisement conditions, by contrast, merely
relate to the restoration of a civil right to which Plaintiffs have no legal claim, and invoke only
rational basis review."); see also Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 768-69 (Wash. 2007) (en banc)
(distinguishing the right to vote from the right to be free from incarceration based on limiting
language in Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment suggesting that the right to vote is not
fundamental for people convicted of felonies).
305. See infra Section II.C.1.
306. See infra Section II.C.2.
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1. Rejection of Penalty-Based Line Drawing
From the inception of the Bearden line, the Court rejected
arguments that its protections should be limited by the nature of the
punishment at stake. In the 1950s, Illinois provided criminal
defendants a statutory right to appeal their convictions, but appellants
were required to furnish a bill of exceptions or report of proceedings,
which would be impossible to create without a trial transcript. 307 While
the state provided free transcripts to people sentenced to death, all
other defendants were required to purchase transcripts. 308 Counsel for
Illinois pointed to the Fourteenth Amendment's right to counsel
doctrine-which at the time mandated counsel in death penalty cases
but required representation under only limited circumstances in
noncapital cases-to argue that the penalty-based distinction in
Illinois's law should be affirmed. 309 By striking down the law, the
Griffin plurality rejected that distinction, emphasizing that though the
Constitution did not mandate the provision of appellate review in the
first instance, once lawmakers provided a system for review, they were
strictly prohibited from erecting financial barriers to accessing the
system even in a noncapital case. 310
The Court's rejection of penalty-based distinctions would
continue as the Bearden line developed, despite the further
entrenchment of such distinctions in the right to counsel context. Over
the next decade and a half, the Court would extend Griffin, striking
down the use of transcript feeS 311 as well as docket and filing fees, 312
assessing the constitutionality of in pauperis application procedures, 313
and requiring appointment of counsel in first appeals as of right.314 And
though the Court did at times emphasize the loss of liberty as a
307. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13-14 (1956) (plurality).
308. Id. at 14-15.
309. Griffin, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 200, at 24-25; Brief for Respondent,
Griffin, supra note 200, at 4-5.
310. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
311. Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 459-60 (1969) (per curiam); Gardner v.
California, 393 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 41-42 (1967) (per
curiam); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (per curiam); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477, 483-85 (1963); Eskridge v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms & Parolees, 357 U.S. 214,
216 (1958) (per curiam); see also Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970); Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S.
420, 423-24 (1963); McCrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277, 277 (1960) (per curiam); Ross v.
Schneckloth, 357 U.S. 575, 575 (1958) (per curiam).
312. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961); Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192, 192-93 (1960)
(per curiam); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959).
313. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 448 (1962).
314. Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1967) (per curiam); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
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rationale for the protection granted,315 it explicitly referenced
deprivations of life, liberty, or property in Griffin itself.3 1 6
It was unsurprising that advocates relied on these cases in
seeking to extend the guaranteed right to counsel beyond the capital
context when Gideon v. Wainwright317 reached the Court.318 In arguing
in favor of retaining the capital-noncapital distinction, the states
posited that distinguishing between imprisonment and
nonincarcerative punishments was untenable. For example, J. Lee
Rankin, arguing on behalf of the State of Alabama, remarked:
[I]t's been mentioned about the police courts now in Alabama, I know we have people who
get a certain number of traffic violations or certain type of traffic violations have their
driver's license taken away from them. Well, that's a very-if a man's a salesman, loss of
his driving license is a very vital thing to him .. .319
Ultimately, the Gideon Court avoided the arguably open-ended
application of a right based on the Fourteenth Amendment in favor of
adopting a blanket rule requiring the provision of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, drawing the line for its rule at felony cases.320 As the
Gideon line developed alongside the Griffin cases, the Court continued
its line-drawing exercise, first extending Gideon to any case-serious or
petty-in which incarceration was imposed as punishment,321 and
ultimately denying a blanket rule that would have required counsel in
fine-only cases. 322
That the Court would not bend the Bearden line toward Gideon's
penalty-based disposition of rights was immediately evident. On the
same day the Court announced its decision in Gideon, it also struck
315. See Smith, 365 U.S. at 712-13 (emphasizing the loss of liberty at stake in habeas
proceedings).
316. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion) ("[To deny adequate review
to the poor means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust
convictions which appellate courts would set aside.").
317. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
318. Brief for the Petitioner at 21-26, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962 WL 115120, at
*21-26; Oral Argument Part H at 7:18 to 8:24, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155) [hereinafter Gideon,
Oral Argument Part II], https://www.oyez.org/cases/1962/155 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018)
[https://perma.cclNP7F-9R6J].
319. Gideon, Oral Argument Part II, supra note 318, at 1:51:15 to 1:51:42; see also Brief for
Respondent at 44-45, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1963 WL 105476, at *44-45 (arguing that
the precedent articulates a "clear, consistent and operable" standard for evaluation).
320. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45. For a critique of the Court's decision to move to the Sixth
Amendment and away from the focus on fundamental fairness in the due processes doctrine, see
Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215 (2003).
321. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
322. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,
674 (2002) (leaving open the question of whether a right to counsel would apply if a state imposes
economic sanctions at sentencing, the nonpayment of which would result in incarceration).
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down financial barriers related to transcripts on appeal 323 and issued
its opinion in Douglas v. California, in which it extended Griffin to
afford a blanket right to counsel on first appeal as of right. 324 Unlike
Gideon, those cases made no reference to the nature of the penalty
involved.325
Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment cases may be explained
away because in each the penalty at stake was life or liberty, rather
than property, 326 but the Court would come to explicitly reject offense
and penalty-based distinctions in that realm. After the Gideon opinion
was announced, some lower courts began to allow financial barriers to
appellate processes using offense- or penalty-based line drawing that
mimicked Gideon. The first such case to reach the Supreme Court-the
1969 case of Williams v. Oklahoma City-involved a statute that
required transcripts in order to perfect appeals stemming from
misdemeanor convictions, without providing free transcripts for the
indigent.327 Counsel for Mr. Williams even suggested that the Court
could engage in Gideon-like line drawing between petty and serious
offenses-with his client's offense of driving while intoxicated falling on
the serious and thus protected side of the line328-but the Court did not
bite. It instead adhered to Griffin, holding again that once lawmakers
choose to provide a process for appeal, they cannot limit the ability of
indigent appellants to access that system by devising financial
barriers. 329 Two years later, the Court again declined to set penalty-
323. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 (1963) (holding that the state could not deny
free transcripts to indigent defendants for the purpose of appeal through a process in which a trial
judge had authority to deem the appeal frivolous, but also through which people who could pay for
transcripts were given full appellate review); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1963) (holding
that indigents cannot be foreclosed from appellate review as a result of their inability to afford a
transcript).
324. 372 U.S. 353, 354-56 (1963).
325. See id.; Draper, 372 U.S. 487; Lane, 372 U.S. 477. The same is true of other post-Gideon
cases. See Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969) (holding that a transcript must be
provided for indigent defendants for preparation in habeas proceedings without reference to the
nature of the punishment at stake); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (per curiam)
(striking down a fee requirement pursuant to Griffin, also without comment regarding the degree
of the punishment).
326. See Draper, 372 U.S. at 510 (addressing a penalty of twenty years of incarceration); Lane,
372 U.S. at 478 (involving a capital sentence); Douglas, 372 U.S. at 354 (involving a penalty of
imprisonment).
327. 395 U.S. 458, 458-59 (1969) (per curiam).
328. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Williams, 395 U.S. 458 (No. 841) ("[A]1 we are asking
this Court to get to is that that goes for all serious criminal convictions .... ), audio recording
with speaker designation available at Williams v. Oklahoma City, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/
cases/1968/841 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/BR5W-34KN]; id. at 17 ("[W]e concede
the fact that there is at some place a petty offense. But this Court need not re-examine the roots
of the peety-serious [sic] offense distinction because in this case, it is a serious crime.").
329. Williams, 395 U.S. at 459-60.
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based restrictions in Mayer v. Chicago.330 The City of Chicago argued
that a felony-nonfelony line for providing free transcripts was
justifiable because nonfelony offenses were only subject to fines, and
therefore the potential harm for the defendant was outweighed by the
"State's fiscal and other interests in not burdening the appellate
process." 331 This reflected the same argument that pushed the Court to
the actual-imprisonment limitation in the Gideon line. 3 3 2 The Mayer
Court, however, explained in no uncertain terms that it would not
import penalty-based distinctions into the Griffin cases, stating: "The
invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal
procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased
by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed." 333
In other words, though Bearden involved a deprivation of liberty,
it is part of a line of cases in which the Court rejected penalty-based
distinctions at its inception, never rested its analysis on the degree of
punishment involved, and repeatedly rejected the incorporation of such
distinctions while simultaneously engaging in that type of line drawing
in a related area. To remain in keeping with this unflagging approach,
therefore, the protections afforded in the Bearden line have applied
regardless of whether the punishment triggered by an inability to pay
involves liberty or some other deprivation.
2. Evidence that Penal Disenfranchisement Constitutes Punishment
The Fourteenth Amendment protections afforded through the
Bearden test are implicated when the government imposes an economic
sanction as punishment for an offense and then, when a person fails to
pay due to inability, inflicts an additional punishment.334 Though penal
330. 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971).
331. Id. at 196.
332. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (adopting "actual imprisonment as the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel"); see also Transcript of Oral Argument
at 22-23, Mayer, 404 U.S. 189 (No. 70-5040) (regarding Justice Blackmun's line of inquiry into
whether the Griffin cases apply to traffic offenses or nominal fines and stating, "[T]his is what we
have to struggle with"), audio recording with speaker designation available at Mayer v. City of
Chicago, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5040 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018)
[https://perma.cclL2JV-8ZPE].
333. Mayer, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111-12, 121
(1996) (describing Mayer as "declin[ing] to limit Griffin to cases in which the defendant faced
incarceration" in part due to recognition of the potential "collateral consequences" of fine-only
punishments). In later years, the Court also refused to distinguish between capital and noncapital
punishment when declining to require counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking
postconviction relief under due process, relying in part on the Griffin cases. See Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1989) (holding that the "rule ... should apply no differently in
capital cases than in noncapital cases").
334. See supra Section II.B.
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disenfranchisement is imposed at conviction,335 because the person
would otherwise have regained the right to vote, its continuation or
reimposition due to an inability to pay would serve as an additional
punishment subject to Bearden so long as penal disenfranchisement
constitutes punishment in the first instance.
Before addressing whether penal disenfranchisement
constitutes punishment, however, it is important to note that
mechanisms that relate to revocation or extension of parole or probation
easily fit within the Bearden test on their own right. Bearden itself
involved the revocation of probation for the failure to pay economic
sanctions. 336 Jurisdictions that revoke parole or probation for the
nonwillful failure to pay would, even without a link to wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement, trigger the Bearden test's examination of the
availability of alternative sanctions. 337 Similarly, jurisdictions that
335. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Though no lower court has stated outright that
the automatic nature of a penalty renders it nonpunitive, the Washington Supreme Court hinted
at that notion. See Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 768-70 (Wash. 2007) (stating that Bearden and
Williams involved additional punishment whereas disenfranchisement merely required a person
to complete her original sentence); see also State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377, 387 (N.D.
1934) ("This disqualification is not a penalty. It is merely a consequence attendant on, and
incidental to, the doing of the felonious act.").
336. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
337. See supra Section I.B; infra Appendices C-D. In addition to parole and probation status
constituting a constitutional violation distinct from violations related to wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement, financial impediments to executive clemency or other restoration processes
due to ongoing criminal debt may separately violate the due process clause. See Ohio Adult Parole
Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1998) (plurality opinion) (holding that due process did
not require a more generous process in capital cases); id. at 288-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(adding a fifth vote and explaining that an executive clemency system must provide due process
and cannot grant or deny relief on arbitrary grounds); Conn. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Absolute
Pardon Application 1 (Nov. 2017), https://www.ct.govbopp/lib/bopp/2018_CTPardon
application.pdf [https://perma.cclVEW2-NPYA] (listing resolution of outstanding court fees and
fines as eligibility requirement for a pardon application); Haw. Paroling Auth., Pardon
Information & Instructions, HAW. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY 1 (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Pardon-application 2 .pdf [https://perma.cc/
EG99-HANL] (requiring "[fjines, fees, restitution, etc. [to be] paid off'); Telephone Interview with
Katie McLoughlin, Deputy Legal Counsel, Office of the Governor John W. Hickenlooper (Dec. 18,
2017) ("When we receive an application, we are always looking to see if they're completely paid up
and we would expect that to be completed."). Likewise, procedures in a handful of states that
require payment of a fee, filing of documents that are only obtainable upon paying a fee, or
placement of an advertisement in the newspaper at the applicant's expense to apply for clemency-
and therefore may preclude indigent applicants from obtaining relief-are also constitutionally
deficient. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.073(2) (West 2018) (mandating payment of application
fee); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-960 (imposing a $100 fee on clemency application); Ariz. Bd. of Exec.
Clemency, Pardon Application, supra note 75, at 11 (requiring newspaper advertisement); Conn.
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Pardon Application Process and Instructions, STATE CONN.,
http://www.ct.govfbopp/cwp/view.asp?a=4331&q=50 8 2 04 (last modified Aug. 31, 2018 2:42 PM)
[https://perma.cc/5HJY-QDQ3] (requiring submission of a criminal history report at a cost of $75);
Ga. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, Application for Pardon/Restoration of Rights 13,
https://pap.georgia.gov/sites/pap.georgia.gov/files/ParoleConsideration/Pardon% 2 0Application%
2
ORevised%2OJuly%202018.pdf (last updated July 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/HW69-PTFZ]
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extend the length of a parole or probation term impose an additional
punishment. There is no doubt in Bearden regarding, nor could there
be any reasonable debate about, the fact that parole and probation
constitute punishment. In addition to continued disenfranchisement,
being on parole or probation often means that a person is subject to an
array of supervision conditions that infringe on one's privacy, time, and
financial well-being. People on parole or probation have reduced Fourth
Amendment rights, opening them up to searches of their home and
person under conditions that would be unconstitutional if applied to
other people. 338 In addition, supervision conditions may affect private
relations, often precluding people from spending time with family
members or neighbors. 339 Conditions of supervision typically require
people to report to a government office for meetings, drug testing, and
the like, depriving them of both privacy and the time it takes to
complete such activities. 340 As Fiona Doherty has documented in the
context of probation, conditions of supervision are often so vague that
they give enormous power to probation officials to control nearly every
aspect of a person's life. 3 4 1 To add insult to injury, the government
routinely requires people to pay periodic supervision fees. 3 4 2 Therefore,
though a fraction of a step removed from the probation revocation at
issue in Bearden, the extension of a parole or probation term certainly
constitutes additional punishment.
(requiring submission of criminal history check, which requires a fee to procure); Ky. Court of
Justice, Application to Vacate and Expunge Felony Conviction 2, https://courts.ky.gov/
resources/1egalforms/LegalForms/4963.pdf (last updated July 2016) [https://perma.ccIMBZ4-
QX8U] (setting fee at $500); La. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, Application for Pardon Consideration
1 (July 6, 2017), http://www.doc.1a.gov/media/l/PardonParole%20Policies/7.6.17.application.
for.pardon.consideration.out.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3W5-LSF6] (requiring payment of a
$150 fee for any applicant who passes initial eligibility review); Pa. Bd. of Pardons, Process,
COMMONWEALTH PA. http://www.bop.pa.gov/application-process/Pages/Process.aspx (last visited
Nov. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cclX8BA-9Q9J] (requiring a $25 filing fee); S.C. Dep't of Probation,
Parole & Pardon Servs., Pardon Application, https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/138528/
3154712/file/1118+Pardon+Application+Rsvd+12-19-17+Fillable.pdf (last updated Dec. 19, 2017)
[https://perma.cclQ7RR-6JYH] (requiring filing fee).
338. See Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (allowing suspicionless searches of a
parolee where law enforcement would otherwise need reasonable suspicion that a crime was
occurring or about to occur or probable cause); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)
(allowing warrantless searches of probationers' homes based only on reasonable suspicion where
the police would otherwise need a warrant based on probable cause); see also Fiona Doherty, Obey
All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning ofRecidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 317-22 (2016)
(exploring the spectrum of ways different courts have expanded the "investigative and surveillance
powers of probation officers").
339. Doherty, supra note 338, at 307-09.
340. Id. at 316-17.
341. Id. at 300-12, 316-17.
342. Statement on the Future of Community Corrections, supra note 17.
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Wealth-based penal disenfranchisement is not always linked to
parole and probation conditions, however, 343 and the Court has yet to
assess whether poverty penalties, standing on their own, constitute
punishment as contemplated in Bearden.344 The Court has, however,
considered whether to treat penalties with remedial or regulatory
qualities as punishment in numerous other settings. A preliminary
question involves what degree of punitive intent is required to trigger
the constitutional protection at issue. Take, for example, civil forfeiture.
When challenged under the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines
clause, the Court held that a forfeiture need only be partially punitive
to constitute a fine for two reasons. 345 First, it understood the clause as
serving as a bulwark at the moment of sentencing against the risk that
the government would abuse its prosecutorial power as a mechanism
for revenue generation targeted at people who are politically
vulnerable. 346 Second, treating a forfeiture as a fine merely allowed an
opportunity to consider whether the civil forfeiture was, or was not,
constitutionally excessive.3 47 In contrast, when challenged under the
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause, the Court held that the
appropriate test was whether the forfeiture was so punitive as to
outweigh other evidence of nonpunitive intent. It did so because, unlike
the two-part inquiry in the excessive fines context, the determination of
the forfeiture's punitiveness resolved the ultimate question of whether
the property owner had been twice subjected to punishment for the
same offense. 348 Challenges to poverty penalties fit best under the
343. See supra Section I.B; infra Appendix B.
344. The Bearden Court had an opportunity to resolve this question, but did not reach it.
Counsel for Bearden included in its opening brief the fact that one consequence of revoking Mr.
Bearden's probation for the failure to pay was that the revocation would trigger Georgia's penal
disenfranchisement laws. See Brief for Petitioner, Bearden, supra note 185, at 7, 19-20. Counsel
for Mr. Bearden included the discussion of disenfranchisement to bolster the position that the
Court should employ strict scrutiny. Id. Counsel for Georgia gave a rather tepid response to this
position, arguing it was the underlying crime that resulted in the loss of voting rights, rather than
the revocation, see Brief for Respondent, Bearden, supra note 192, at 13, and the issue was barely
mentioned in Mr. Bearden's reply brief. See Petitioner's Reply Brief, Bearden, supra note 192, at
7. While Justice Powell's clerk noted the issue in an internal memo, prompting Justice Powell to
underline the notation and write "!!" in the margin, see Bench Memorandum from "Rives" to Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., supra note 225, at 3-4, it did not come up at oral argument or in the Bearden opinion.
See Bearden, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 192; Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660
(1983). Of course, the outcome of the case, which reinstated Mr. Bearden's probation, meant that
he did not, in fact, become disenfranchised, therefore making the point moot.
345. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271-76 (1989).
346. Id.; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9 (1991) (Scalia, J.) ("There is good
reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out
of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence . . . [because] fines are a source of
revenue."); Colgan, supra note 25, at 21-22.
347. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 & n.14 (1993).
348. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 287 (1996).
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former treatment. Treating penal disenfranchisement as punishment
ensures broad protection against the risk that the government will use
its prosecutorial power in a way that subjects a person to unfair
treatment due to her financial circumstances in violation of the
constitutional norms detailed above,349 merely providing an opportunity
to assess the secondary question of whether additional punishment is,
or is not, constitutional under the Bearden test.350 But regardless of
whether the Court adopts a partially punitive test or the more exacting
test requiring that punitive intent outweigh other interests, as detailed
below, the evidence of punitive intent in relation to penal
disenfranchisement is sufficiently expansive that it should satisfy
either examination.
In assessing whether a practice evinces punitive intent, the
Court has looked at a variety of factors. It often begins by considering
the government's own categorization of or explanation for the
practice. 351 Though some aspects of penal disenfranchisement laws are
found in election provisions or other parts of a jurisdiction's code, they
are frequently incorporated into the criminal code or policies related to
clemency, parole, or probation. 352 This is unsurprising, as even staunch
proponents of penal disenfranchisement describe the practice as a form
of punishment. 353 Though in most jurisdictions the categorization of
penal disenfranchisement would lean toward a finding of punitive
intent, the mixed signals sent in some jurisdictions means that
categorization alone is unlikely to resolve the question. In such
circumstances, the Court has also looked to other evidence, 354 including
349. See supra Section II.A.
350. See supra Section II.B.3; infra Section II.D.2.
351. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958) (plurality).
352. See infra Appendices A-E; see also Ewald, supra note 287, at 1057-59 (describing Trop
but noting that some jurisdictions describe disenfranchisement in penal terms); Harold Itzkowitz
& Lauren Oldak, Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 721, 730 (1973) (providing examples of state constitutions and penal codes that
categorize penal disenfranchise as a component of criminal punishment).
353. See, e.g., Clegg et al., supra note 167, at 23 (arguing in favor of penal disenfranchisement
on the grounds that it has traditionally been understood to constitute punishment and thus is in
the purview of the state's power to enforce its criminal laws); Civic Participation and
Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 41 (Oct. 21, 1999) [hereinafter Civic Participation and
Rehabilitation Act Hearing] (statement of Todd F. Gaziano, Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation)
(arguing that Congress could not pass a law guaranteeing a right to vote in federal elections
because it would "lessen the sanction for State crime"); Should Felons Have to Pay All Fines, Fees,
and Restitutions Related to Their Conviction Before Regaining Their Vote?, PROCON.ORG,
https://felonvoting.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionlD=000670 (last updated Jan. 19, 2010)
[https://perma.cc/F83E-8B3Q].
354. This list of factors is generally derived from a list provided in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 168 (1963), and in subsequent cases. What is offered here is not a checklist
but rather explicates the continuity between treating penal disenfranchisement as punishment
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the historical use of the practice as punishment, 355 the link between the
practice and the necessity of a conviction, 356 the relationship between
the penalty and a finding of scienter, 357 whether the severity of the
deprivation signals a desire to meet the utilitarian or retributive aims
of punishment, 358 the nexus-or lack thereof-between the stated
regulatory goals and the underlying criminal conduct, 359 whether those
stated goals are irrational or otherwise improper, 360 whether the
practice operates as an affirmative disability or restraint,361 and
whether it conveys blame for wrongdoing. 362
A jurisdiction seeking to preserve its use of wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement has in its corner Trop v. Dulles, in which a plurality
of the Court stated that penal disenfranchisement was historically
understood to be nonpunitive. 363 Trop addressed the question of
whether the loss of citizenship constituted cruel and unusual
and existing doctrine. Further, the Court has not presented these considerations as a well-
articulated theoretical account of what constitutes punishment. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, The Ex
Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1998)
(critiquing the doctrine as lacking coherence). These concepts do, however, bear the hallmarks of
certain aspects of punishment theory. For example, H.L.A. Hart posited that to be considered
punishment, a sanction must be in response to a violation of the laws of the state. See HART, supra
note 220, at 4-5. This is similar to the Court's understanding that punitive intent may be visible
through a practice's close connection to convictions for criminal offenses. See infra notes 384-389
and accompanying text. Hart also proposed that punishment must "involve pain or other
consequences normally considered unpleasant," HART, supra note 220, at 4-5, similar to the
Court's considerations of the severity of the deprivation as evidence of utilitarian or retributive
aims and the extent to which the practice conveys blameworthiness that stigmatizes the person to
whom it is applied, see infra notes 394-399, 427-440 and accompanying text. Carol Steiker also
has suggested a positive and normative frame for defining punishment for the purposes of
assessing when constitutional protections should attach in which she advances an understanding
of punishment as an act of blaming by the state, in which evidence of the state's desire to blame
and the effect on the individual in receiving that blame are relevant to understanding a practice
as punishment. See Steicker, supra note 29, at 810-11. Finally, it should also be noted that these
factors bear some similarities with the factors that the Bearden Court noted as relevant to its
considerations as it crafted the Bearden test. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1983)
("[T]he nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality
of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means
for effectuating the purpose ..... (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring)); see also supra note 176. This overlap provides additional continuity between the
Court's goals in devising the Bearden test and its application to responses to nonpayment that
constitute punishment.
355. See infra notes 363-382 and accompanying text.
356. See infra notes 384-389 and accompanying text.
357. See infra notes 390-393 and accompanying text.
358. See infra notes 394-399 and accompanying text.
359. See infra notes 400-404 and accompanying text.
360. See infra notes 405-421 and accompanying text.
361. See infra notes 422-426 and accompanying text.
362. See infra notes 427-440 and accompanying text.
363. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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punishment for the offense of wartime desertion.364 Because the penalty
could be construed as a regulation of nationality, rather than a
punishment, the Trop plurality undertook an examination of whether
the law was, in substance, penal. 36 5 The plurality described the relevant
inquiry for ascertaining whether a government act constituted
punishment as whether the legislature appears to have intended the
statute to "reprimand the wrongdoer" or to "deter," as opposed to some
other legitimate purpose."366 It then provided as an example penal
disenfranchisement for the crime of bank robbery, which it deemed to
"designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting" and thus was a
"nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise." 367 Though a
few lower courts have noted this conclusion in support of penal
disenfranchisement generally, 368 there are significant reasons to
disregard it.
First, the Trop plurality's statement may be rejected as
ahistorical. Prior to Trop, the Court itself treated penal
disenfranchisement as punitive 369 and the State of Illinois had
described it as a form of punishment when litigating Griffin.370 Further,
as the Court later recognized in Ramirez, states seeking admission for
representation in Congress were restricted from limiting the franchise,
unless the limitation was employed "as a punishment." 371 Therefore,
when the Ramirez Court interpreted Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment-which prohibits abridging the right to vote "except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime"372-as allowing a state to strip
the vote from its mooring as a fundamental right due to a felony
conviction, 373 it did so with the understanding that states used penal
364. Id. at 86.
365. Id. at 95.
366. Id. at 96.
367. Id. at 96-97.
368. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 449-51 (2d Cir. 1967); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327
F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971); In re Marino, 42 A.2d 469, 470-71 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1945);
Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 448-49 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Fernandez v. Kiner, 673
P.2d 191, 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). But see Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 120 (M.D.N.C.
1972), affd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973) (citing Trop for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment
analysis requires assessment of evolving standards of decency but treating penal
disenfranchisement as punishment in assessing whether it could be considered cruel and unusual).
369. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 364-65, 381 (1910) (describing the loss of the
franchise as one aspect of the punishment cadena temporal in finding that it constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
370. See Brief for Respondent, Griffin, supra note 200, at 9.
371. E.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 51 (1974) (quoting the enabling acts for
Arkansas's admission to representation in Congress).
372. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
373. See supra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
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disenfranchisement to punish.374 That conception was consistent with
evidence that civil disabilities, including the loss of the right to vote,
were historically understood to serve both deterrent and retributive
purposes of punishment. 375
Second, the cases upon which the Trop plurality relied do not
support the conclusion that penal disenfranchisement is nonpunitive.
The two cases, both from the 1800s, involved statutes that precluded
people who engaged in bigamy or polygamy from registering to vote. 37 6
In one case, the Court did not address whether penal
disenfranchisement was or was not a form of punishment but instead
described the state of Idaho's voter qualifications-which included
penal disenfranchisement, a prohibition on plural marriage, and other
limitations-and stated that these qualifications were "not open to any
valid legal objection to which [our] attention has been called." 37 7 The
legal objection that had been raised involved a challenge to the
criminalization of plural marriage in light of the religious liberty
protections of the First Amendment. 378 The other case actually did
address the question of whether denying the vote to people in plural
marriages involved punishment and thus operated as an ex post facto
374. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 52 (discussing how Congress considered equally applicable laws
to be paramount when readmitting southern states to the Union, in order to keep southern states
from "misus[ing] the exception for felons to disenfranchise Negros").
375. Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 448 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) ("Most ancient,
medieval, and early modern societies conceived of disenfranchisement as a form of punishment.");
Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753, 765-66 (2000) (discussing retributive
and deterrence rationales for felon disenfranchisement under English common law); Itkowitz &
Oldak, supra note 352, at 725-27 (discussing historical use of civil disabilities as punishment);
Sigler, supra note 20, at 1726 (analyzing historical felon disenfranchisement among different
nations and stating the "explicitly punitive nature" of the disenfranchisement was one of the
consistent "salient features"); Christopher Uggen et al., Criminal Disenfranchisement, 1 ANN. REV.
L. & Soc. SCl. 307, 310 (2005) ("Disenfranchisement appears to have been initially premised upon
both retributive and deterrence theories."). But see Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 193 (Iowa
2016) (stating that a 2014 Iowa Supreme Court decision determined that Iowa's founders rejected
the notion of infamy as a criminal punishment and viewed the concept more as a regulatory
measure); State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 175 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Mo. 1943) (acknowledging that
penal disenfranchisement laws were seen as "a part of the punishment" for particular crimes, but
dismissing that evidence in favor of the notion that disenfranchisement was intended to keep the
ballot box "pur[e]").
376. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 38 (1885).
More than a decade after these two cases were decided, the Court favorably referenced an Alabama
Supreme Court case that had upheld penal disenfranchisement against claims that it constituted
a bill of attainder and ex post facto law. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 197 (1898) (citing
Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884)). It did so, however, for the proposition that the
government may impose a rule of general application in which a conviction is evidence of a
disqualifying condition, rather than positing that penal disenfranchisement is nonpunitive. Id.
377. Davis, 133 U.S. at 347.
378. Id. at 341-43.
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law. 379 The Court pointed to the fact that the relevant criminal statute
limited the offenses of bigamy and polygamy to the moment at which
the plural marriage occurred.380 In contrast, the voter eligibility statute
applied to the continuing status of plural marriage, which was not a
criminal offense. 381 The Court reasoned, therefore, that the intent
behind the statute was not punitive, given that it did not relate to any
criminal act, and therefore the sole purpose was to ascertain who should
be qualified to vote. 38 2
Even if historical evidence did not point to the conclusion that
penal disenfranchisement was seen as punitive,383 evidence of such
intent can also be discerned from the government's decision to require
a link between the practice and a conviction for a crime. In ascertaining
whether a purportedly "collateral" consequence constitutes punishment
in other contexts, the Court has considered whether its imposition is
dependent on a conviction-suggesting it is punitive-or simply on a
particular type of conduct that can be proved up by a conviction as well
as other forms of evidence-suggesting the consequence is merely
regulatory.384 A broad reading of the voter eligibility statutes in some
jurisdictions could suggest that conviction is but one form of evidence-
along with youth or mental incapacity, for example-showing that a
would-be voter is not fit to vote. 3 8 5 The relevant question, however, is
not whether other characteristics may disqualify a person from voting
but whether specific conduct can be proven in more than one way. For
example, Alabama's law does not allow other forms of evidence that a
person committed a burglary to result in a loss of voter eligibility, but a
379. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 42-44.
380. Id. at 43.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Cf. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION'S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 23-38 (2017) (arguing that historical arguments may be inapposite due to intervening
cultural changes).
384. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) ("The vital matter is not the conviction,
but the violation of the law."); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997) (holding that
indefinite civil commitment for sex offenders was not sufficiently punitive to trigger the double
jeopardy or ex post facto clauses because the fact of a conviction was unnecessary to make the
requisite showing of mental abnormality); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)
(considering whether "the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"); Gabriel J. Chin, Are
Collateral Sanctions Premised on Conduct or Conviction?: The Case of Abortion Doctors, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1685, 1686 (2003) ("[Tihe single most important piece of evidence in the
determination of whether a sanction is criminal or civil is whether the sanction is imposed based
on conviction or conduct.").
385. See Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 584-85 (1884) (casting a conviction as one of several
potential qualifiers along with mental conditions and gender); see, e.g., KY. CONST. § 145
(disqualifying people upon conviction of certain crimes as well as denying eligibility to vote to
"idiots and insane persons").
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conviction for burglary necessarily and automatically triggers penal
disenfranchisement. 38 6 Thus it is so "enmeshed" with the government's
punitive response as to signify its use as punishment. 387 That the
government in each jurisdiction subjects people to disenfranchisement
only upon conviction of a disenfranchising offense-and not while
awaiting trial-further cements its status as punitive. Even while
subject to pretrial detention, people charged with but not yet convicted
of a disenfranchising crime cannot be subject to disenfranchisement 388
consistent with the fact that they are not yet eligible for punishment.
To be sure, wealth-based penal disenfranchisement makes for an
uneasy fit into this consideration, because it is imposed in response to
nonpayment. Yet, it can only occur if penal disenfranchisement was
imposed in the first instance, which necessitates a conviction. 38 9
Relatedly, the Court has considered the relationship between
the penalty and a finding of scienter. 390 At first glance, a nonwillful
failure to pay would not fit the bill. The Court, however, appears to
consider this factor as weighing in support of punitive intent where the
same type of penalty is imposed for both willful and nonwillful behavior.
386. ALA. CODE § 17.3-30.1(c)(41) (2018).
387. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010) (declining to answer the question of
whether, to be effective, counsel must advise clients of collateral consequences by determining that
deportation-the consequence at issue-constituted a direct punishment because immigration was
"enmeshed" with the criminal justice system and deportation was "nearly ... automatic" upon
conviction); see also Carafas v. LaValle, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968) (noting that penal
disenfranchisement "flow[s] from" a conviction in determining that the case was not moot despite
satisfaction of the term of imprisonment); Chin, supra note 29, at 1828 (regarding the automatic
nature of deportation).
388. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974) (holding that denying absentee ballots
for voting to pretrial detainees in jails within their counties of residence, but not those in jails
located outside of their residences, violated equal protection); Mays v. Husted, No. 2:18-cv-01376-
MHW-CMV, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2018) (granting temporary restraining order requiring
Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted to provide absentee ballots to the named plaintiffs at the jail
in which they were detained, but denying the motion as it applied to all others similarly situated
only because it would be "impractical, if not logistically impossible" to grant class-wide relief on
election day); Murphree v. Winter, 589 F. Supp. 374 (1984) (S.D. Miss. 1984) (certifying a class of
pretrial detainees and postconviction detainees convicted of nondisenfranchising crimes but
denied an opportunity to vote during incarceration); Arlee v. Lucas, 222 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1974) (holding that statute restricting people incarcerated pretrial from voting violated equal
protection); Emery v. State, 580 P.2d 445, 448 (Mont. 1978) (distinguishing between the state's
restriction on voting for those convicted of disenfranchising offenses and those in pretrial
detention). Though people in pretrial detention, as well as those incarcerated for
nondisenfranchising crimes, retain the right to vote, the ability to register and vote during a period
of incarceration may be stymied by jailers who refuse to allow access to organizations assisting
with registration or at jails that do not have mechanisms in place to allow for registration or voting.
See Mays, slip op. at 1-2; Margaret Barthel, Getting Out the Vote From the County Jail, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/organizers-fight-turn-out-
vote-county-jails/574783/ [https://perma.cc/PXU4-68WR].
389. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
390. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
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In one of the two cases the Court has pointed to for the relevance of this
consideration, the behavior at issue was misstating the value of
imported goods. 391 Even though it had been determined that the
importer's misstatement was not willful, the significant financial
penalty imposed upon him was akin to the financial penalties imposed
for a fraudulent misstatement, and so constituted punishment.392 Here,
the penalties are identical; whether a person has the means to pay but
chooses not to, or does not pay due to inability, he remains
disenfranchised regardless. Further, expanding the scope of this
consideration beyond wealth-based penal disenfranchisement to penal
disenfranchisement generally, one finds a direct scienter requirement,
as the imposition of penal disenfranchisement is limited to felonies and,
in some jurisdictions, a subset of misdemeanors, many of which require
a finding of scienter. 393 For those disenfranchising offenses that do not
require scienter, the penalty imposed is identical to those that do: a loss
of the vote.
The severity of the deprivation at issue is also indicative of
punitive intent as it suggests a desire to meet either the utilitarian or
retributive aims of punishment, another of the Court's
considerations. 3 9 4 As noted above, penal disenfranchisement has
historically been understood to satisfy both utilitarian and retributive
goals.3 95 This is not to say that penal disenfranchisement actually
serves the goals of punishment well. Pamela Karlan has convincingly
argued that penal disenfranchisement fails to meet the utilitarian aims
of deterrence because it is not clear that voters are aware that they will
lose the right to vote prior to committing a crime, of incapacitation
because at best it only incapacitates the very rare offense of voting
fraud, or of rehabilitation because penal disenfranchisement can
undermine the goal of restoring a person with a conviction to the
community. 396 Similarly, several scholars have noted that penal
disenfranchisement is-in at least the vast majority of cases involving
low-level felonies, misdemeanors, and crimes unrelated to voting-
391. Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 606-08 (1903); see also Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 168 n.24 (relying on Helwig as establishing the scienter factor).
392. Helwig, 188 U.S. at 611-13.
393. See supra note 12.
394. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168; see also United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287,
295 (1935) (considering whether a liquor assessment constituted a tax or punishment and holding
that the fact that the assessment was significantly greater than other taxes and that it was
conditioned on the commission of a crime was evidence of a desire to deter).
395. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
396. Karlan, supra note 20, at 1166-67; see also infra note 480 and accompanying text
(regarding evidence that restoring the right to vote is rehabilitative).
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unduly retributive 397 because it constitutes a significant loss in which
the person is "severed from the body politic and condemned to the
lowest form of citizenship." 398 It is not, however, the effectiveness of the
sanction, but instead the severity of the loss of the right to vote that
suggests a desire to punish. 399
Further, the fact that penal disenfranchisement is applied
without requiring a nexus between the underlying offense and the risk
of a specific, future public harm also evinces punitive intent. 400 For
397. For arguments that penal disenfranchisement undermines retributive aims of
punishment because states lump all felonies together regardless of seriousness, see, for example,
Ewald, supra note 287, at 1103-04 (positing that the application of disenfranchisement for a drug
offense and for a homicide suggests that its use as to the former would be disproportionate);
Fletcher, supra note 56, at 1896 ("These measures could hardly be retributive, for they stand in
clear disproportion to the gravity of the offenses that trigger their application . . . ."); Amy Heath,
Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Denying Ex-Felons the Right to Vote After Serving Their
Sentences, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 327, 350-51 (2017) ("While crimes like murder or
rape seem to justify a complete denial of voting rights, crimes like possession of controlled
substances or other drug related felonies are small in comparison and disproportionate to the
punishment of disenfranchisement."); Karlan, supra note 20, at 1167 ("When retribution is the
sole function of a criminal punishment, proportionality analysis necessarily focuses on the gravity
of Defendant's conduct .... A categorical disenfranchisement of all ex-offenders convicted of a
felony lumps together crimes of vastly different gravity."); Susan E. Marquardt, Deprivation of a
Felon's Right to Vote: Constitutional Concerns, Policy Issues, and Suggested Reform for Felony
Disenfranchisement Law, 82 U. DET. MERcY L. REV. 279, 296-301 (2005) ("That there may be a
lack of proportionality in punishment when felony disenfranchisement has been treated as a
collateral consequence of incarceration is a concern echoed by adversaries of felony
disenfranchisement."); and Uggen et al., supra note 375, at 310 ("Felon disenfranchisement is
retributive because the denial of voting rights exacts some degree of vengeance from felons. The
blanket disenfranchisement of all people convicted of felonies, however, calls into question the
proportionality of the punishment."). See also Clegg, supra note 288, at 174-75 (arguing in favor
of penal disenfranchisement but conceding that policies should reflect offense seriousness).
398. McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
399. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
400. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985) (treating generally applied
collateral consequences without a nexus to the offense of conviction as "impermissible punishment"
stemming from a conviction obtained in violation of double jeopardy even if the underlying term
of imprisonment was completely overlapped by a concurrent sentence on a separate, valid
conviction); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a
firearm restriction for people convicted of violent felonies); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 159
(1960) (plurality opinion) (upholding occupational licensing restrictions where the underlying
offense was related to the relevant profession); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69-70
& n.8 (1970) (plurality opinion) (relying solely on length of term of incarceration to establish jury
trial rights but describing generally applied collateral consequences, including penal
disenfranchisement, as a component of sentence severity that makes felony convictions more
punitive than misdemeanor convictions). In Lewis, the Court noted that penal disenfranchisement
was a constitutional punishment per Ramirez. 445 U.S. at 66. In doing so, however, it did not
suggest that penal disenfranchisement was nonpunitive but rather that it was a comparatively
more fundamental interest than firearm ownership. Id. For an argument that the Court has
responded to the collective nature of a wide array of collateral sanctions in concluding that they
are punitive, see Chin, supra note 29. See also Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil
Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
599, 601, 605-11 (1997) (arguing that collateral consequences of conviction do not constitute
punishment if they amount to targeted risk prevention, but that voter disenfranchisement should
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example, the Court has considered whether completion of a term of
incarceration renders a habeas petition moot, repeatedly finding that
generally applicable collateral consequences, 4 0 1 including penal
disenfranchisement, 402 are sufficiently punitive to constitute a case and
controversy. The crimes that trigger disenfranchisement in the
jurisdictions at issue are vast, covering all felonies (and in some cases
misdemeanors) or a specific subset of offenses that may include, but are
in no way limited to, election law violations.403 Likewise, wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement is in response to nonpayment, which has no
connection to a future risk of voting fraud. In either case, the failure to
target penal disenfranchisement to a future risk with a close nexus to
the triggering offense 404 suggests that it operates as a general
condemnation of and punishment for the underlying crime.
Another consideration weighing in favor of understanding penal
disenfranchisement as a form of punishment is that the alternative
explanations offered for the practice lack rationality or are otherwise
improper, 4 0 5 leaving punishment as the only viable justification. 406 The
typical arguments in support of penal disenfranchisement have been
widely discredited as irrational or improper. The argument that people
convicted of crimes are also likely to commit voter fraud may have more
purchase if a nexus existed with the crime of conviction. But beyond
evidence suggesting that people may accidentally vote when
disenfranchised due to confusion about a jurisdiction's laws, 4 0 7 there is
otherwise a dearth of evidence suggesting that a person convicted of a
crime unrelated to elections is more likely than anyone else to engage
in fraudulent voting. 408 Similarly, the social contract theory, which
be eliminated because it is "not apparent how or why permitting prisoners to vote would
undermine the democratic process").
401. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 379-80 (2001); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 108 n.3 (1977); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 579 n.3 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 54-58 (1968).
402. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1998); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 247 &
n.1 (1971); Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38; Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 & n.10 (1946).
403. See supra note 12.
404. For critiques of the lack of nexus between disenfranchising crimes and the likelihood of
future election offenses, see supra notes 407-410 and accompanying text.
405. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (considering "whether
an alternative that may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose").
406. See generally Karlan, supra note 20.
407. See supra notes 17, 64, 89 and accompanying text.
408. See Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1972) ("Few decisions have
penetrated the disenfranchisement classification to ascertain whether the offenses that restrict or
destroy voting rights have anything to do with the integrity of the electoral process .... );
Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 352, at 739 (stating that even if there was a correlation between
nonelection offenses and voter fraud, the criminal justice system is premised on proving new guilt
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posits that a person who breaks the law forfeits the right to vote, may
be on firmer footing if penal disenfranchisement applied to a narrow set
of particularly serious crimes for a limited time, 409 but becomes harder
to justify when people are excluded from democratic participation for a
wide range of felonies or even, in some states, misdemeanors. 4 10
Another justification for penal disenfranchisement-that it preserves
the purity of the ballot box by preventing the votes of people with felony
convictions from tainting the votes of others or the integrity of those
elected-has been subject to heavy criticism and described as at best
"mystical."4 1 1 Likewise, the idea that penal disenfranchisement aids in
the regulation of elections by preventing people convicted of crimes from
creating a voting block to eliminate the criminal law is also irrational. 4 1 2
It is factually problematic given evidence that many people with past
convictions may actually support tough criminal laws. 4 1 3 Further,
voters in such a block would have difficulty differentiating between
Republican and Democratic candidates, given that both parties have a
history of touting "tough on crime" rhetoric 414 and that members of both
have begun pushing for criminal justice reforms in recent years. 4 15 A
felon voting block is also implausible given how unlikely it is that any
group of people could convince a majority of the electorate to vote for
beyond a reasonable doubt rather than imposing a punishment "in advance on a basis of
probability").
409. Sigler, supra note 20, at 1740-44; see also Demleitner, supra note 375, at 759, 797-804
(arguing that the United States should adopt the German model of penal disenfranchisement,
which applies only to a limited number of offenses, is time limited and must be imposed at
sentencing at the discretion of the court, which rarely occurs).
410. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
411. Fletcher, supra note 56, at 1899; see Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (9th
Cir. 1972) (describing the purity argument as "quasi-metaphysical"); Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d
182, 208 (Iowa 2016) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (describing the purity argument as "fanciful at best");
Arlee v. Lucas, 222 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Mich. App. 1974) (remarking that the purity argument is "a
bit disturbing" because "[i]t is hard to conceive how the State can possibly justify denying any
person his right to vote on the ground that his vote might afford a state official the opportunity to
abuse his position of authority"); Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 352, at 737 (remarking that it is
"absurd to suggest that, like the proverbial bad apple, contamination flowing from [the vote of a
person who committed a crime] can literally seep throughout the ballot box").
412. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
413. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 143-44 (documenting political beliefs of people
with criminal convictions, including support for tougher drug and child pornography laws and the
need for prisons); cf. James M. Binnall, Convicts in Court: Felonious Lawyers Make a Case for
Including Convicted Felons in the Jury Pool, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 1403 (2010) (documenting cases
in which people with felony convictions returned guilty verdicts during jury service).
414. Ewald, supra note 288, at 140.
415. See, e.g., Alex Swoyer, Bipartisan Support for Criminal Justice Reform Builds in Senate,
WASH. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.comlnews/2018/jun/26/bipartisan-
support-criminal-justice-reform-builds/ [https://perma.cclCLD4-ANXS].
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candidates willing to fundamentally disrupt the criminal law. 4 16 And
finally, limiting the vote based on a possible policy choice constitutes
impermissible viewpoint discrimination,41 7 which is antithetical to the
notion that democracy is best served when policy choices are subject to
a plurality of ideas. 418
Though not typically presented as a justification for penal
disenfranchisement, perhaps the strongest potential argument that the
practice is rational is that lawmakers may favor it because of the
administrative complications and expense of allowing people to vote
while incarcerated. In particular, administrative difficulties may arise
in facilities in which the population includes both people who have and
who have not been disenfranchised. There are three reasons, however,
why penal disenfranchisement may actually be more administratively
and fiscally burdensome than its elimination. First, jail and prison
facilities across the country already provide opportunities to vote for
people awaiting trial or convicted of nondisenfranchising crimes,
suggesting that doing so is administratively feasible. 419 Second, many
people subject to penal disenfranchisement are not incarcerated and so
such concerns are irrelevant as to that population. 420 Third, the use of
penal disenfranchisement carries with it significant administrative
burdens and expenses caused by confusion among elections and
corrections officials regarding reenfranchisement rules and by the sheer
number of governmental actors needed to maintain systems for
determining whether any would-be voter does or does not remain
disenfranchised.4 21
416. See Ewald, supra note 288, at 115-16, 124-26 (explaining the argument that felons will
vote together to weaken criminal law, then countering with an explanation of why that would be
"wholly unimaginable"); Mauer, supra note 64, at 249-50 (demonstrating the unlikelihood that a
group of ex-felons could not only elect a pro-felon candidate but also get the candidate to convince
the legislature to pass less punitive criminal laws).
417. See Karlan, supra note 20, at 1152-53 (linking penal disenfranchisement to the Court's
rejection of restrictions based on the potential content of one's vote); see also Adam Winkler,
Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 355-58 (1993) (describing Ramirez as breaking from the
Court's professed preclusion against content-based restrictions on voting).
418. See Ewald, supra note 288, at 131 ("It would be a sick and stagnant democracy in which
the majority simply disenfranchised those who preferred different policies."); see also Richard A.
Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1437, 1438-39, 1442, 1444 (2017) (regarding the particular need to ensure that a wide
range of stakeholders with varying opinions about criminal justice are necessary for a vibrant
democratic process); Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project,
111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1597, 1601-02 (2017) (regarding the diluting effect that penal
disenfranchisement has on the power of African American communities to participate in elections).
See also supra notes 287-299 and accompanying text (regarding the ways in which these
considerations fail when applied to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement).
419. See infra note 476 and accompanying text.
420. See, e.g., infra Appendices B-E.
421. See supra notes 17, 64, 89 and accompanying text
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A separate question the Court has considered is whether penal
disenfranchisement constitutes an "affirmative disability or
restraint."422 The Court has, for example, treated exclusion from a
profession triggered by past wrongful conduct to constitute an
affirmative disability, and thus punishment, 423 as contrasted with a
denial of a noncontractual government benefit for which a person does
not qualify for reasons unrelated to past wrongdoing. 424 Penal
disenfranchisement can occur only upon conviction for an offense, the
quintessential example of wrongdoing.425 Further, wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement is tied to nonpayment, which the government
treats as wrongdoing. The Court has made clear that for purposes of
this consideration, wrongdoing need not involve a conviction, but is
satisfied if the government is responding to a perceived wrongful act.4 2 6
Therefore, both penal disenfranchisement generally and wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement specifically are tied to perceived wrongdoing
and, in either case, the practice precludes a person from the vote; it thus
constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint.
A final factor the Court has looked to in assessing punitive intent
is whether there is evidence that the practice involves an expression of
422. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
423. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (holding that precluding a person from
government employment due to a congressional committee finding that the person was "guilty" of
subversive activity and thus "unfit" for employment constituted punishment); Ex Parte Garland,
71 U.S. 333, 377 (1866) ("And exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary
avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light than as punishment for such
conduct.").
424. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (stating that a denial of old-age benefits to
people who were no longer eligible as the result of deportation, where the deportation law was not
adopted in response to a concern regarding wrongdoing, did not constitute an affirmative disability
or restraint).
425. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
426. Garland, 71 U.S. at 334-37 (holding that an oath stating that a person had not engaged
in hostilities against the United States during the Civil War constituted punishment because it
was a response to behavior Congress treated as wrongful, even though the person in question had
not been convicted of any offense); see also Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, n.22 (citing
Garland as an example of a case employing the affirmative disability or restraint consideration).
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blame for wrongdoing427 that stigmatizes the would-be voter.428 This
factor is perhaps the most ambiguous of the Court's considerations, as
it has not clarified how to reconcile the inquiry with the fact that
legislative bodies are made up of multiple actors who may have
competing aims for supporting a particular practice and involve a
membership that changes over time. For example, as a theoretical
matter, blame suggests a self-consciousness on the part of a
lawmaker,429 and though the intent to blame is evident for some
lawmakers, 430 for at least some others, support for penal
disenfranchisement may stem not from a desire to blame but from an
unfamiliarity with the interplay between the various laws identified in
Part I.431 The Court does appear, however, to be concerned with the
stigmatizing effect of the punishment, 432 which could exist even if a
427. The Court has focused on the link to wrongdoing, for example, in distinguishing between
punishment and taxes. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 564-68 (2012)
(holding that the Affordable Care Act penalties constituted taxes rather than punishments because
they were not linked to unlawful acts); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950) (holding
that a tax was not a penalty because it was not conditioned on the commission of a crime); United
States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (holding that a tax constituted a punishment in
part because it was triggered by criminal conduct); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572
(1931) ("[A] 'penalty,' as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment
for an unlawful act."); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (noting that the mere use of
the word "tax" in a criminal statute is not conclusive); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)
("Where comes a time ... [when a] so-called tax ... loses its character as such and becomes a
mere penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punishment."); see also Joel Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 190
(Jules Coleman ed. 1994) (positing that to constitute punishment the penalty must indicate
"disapproval and reprobation"); Steiker, supra note 29, at 807 (defining punishment for the
purposes of assessing constitutional protection as involving blaming by the state and noting that
such moral condemnation can cause harm to a person's self-conception).
428. See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985) (noting that a second conviction
"certainly carries the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction"); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (describing a set of postincarceration punishments, including loss
of the vote, as "circumstance[s] of degradation"); see also Dan Markel et al., Beyond Experience:
Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 619-21 (2011) (arguing that collateral
consequences like penal disenfranchisement, which are "the product of lawful and intended
authorized state action," constitute state-authorized punishment because they convey a
"continuing ... message of condemnation" and are distinguished from regulations that are directly
linked to public safety such as firearm restrictions for violent felons or occupational licensing
stemming from convictions relating directly to the nature of the employment).
429. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 29, at 802 (explaining that "[t]he idea of 'punishment for an
offense' implies that" an authority has not only established what constitutes a crime but also how
a person who violates that law should be treated).
430. See, e.g., Jerry Mitchell, Lawsuit: Mississippi Constitution Still Disenfranchising
Thousands, CLARION LEDGER (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2018/
03/27/mississippi-still-disenfranchising-thousands/458068002/ [https://perma.cc/EAU5-7J5J]
("There is a price to pay for violating the laws of the state of Mississippi, particularly a felony ....
And one of them is that you lose your right to vote unless it is restored by the Mississippi
Legislature.. . . I wouldn't want to change it." (quoting Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant)).
431. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
432. See supra note 428 and accompanying text.
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given lawmaker did not intend penal disenfranchisement generally or
wealth-based penal disenfranchisement specifically to operate as an
expression of blame.
That stigmatization is reflected in the experiences of people who
continue to be disenfranchised as contrasted against those who have
been restored to the vote. Once seen as a privilege that the government
could restrict to a limited few, voting is now understood as a
fundamental right central to democratic participation. 4 3 3
Unsurprisingly then, for those disenfranchised due to criminal debt, the
sense of social exclusion and stigmatization 434 is pronounced. They
report feeling detached from the broader community, 435 like "less of an
American," 436 and that penal disenfranchisement "is one piece of a much
larger feeling of not being permitted to participate in society that [one
is] supposed to be adjusting to again." 43 7 In sharp contrast, people who
have been reenfranchised report that the opportunity to vote made
them feel linked to and invested in the community 4 3 8 and hopeful about
433. See John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the Eighth
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 776-77 (2013) (critiquing the Trop plurality for relying
on Davis and Murphy because they were decided when suffrage was seen as subject to unlimited
government regulation rather than a practically universal right of adults, and thus were
anachronistic); Karlan, supra note 20, at 1150-55 (documenting the shift to understanding voting
as a fundamental right); Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the
Constitutional No Man's Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 103-06 (2005) (same).
434. See Ewald, supra note 287, at 1113-14 (regarding the stigmatizing effect of penal
disenfranchisement); Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 352, at 732 (same); see also Griffin v. Pate,
884 N.W.2d 182, 209 (Iowa 2016) (Hecht, J., dissenting) ("Disqualification . .. stigmatizes .... ).
435. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S NEW DEBTORS' PRISONS 78 (Oct.
2010), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny web.pdf [https://perma.ccYU7J-2J4M].
436. KATHERINE A. BECKETT ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM'N, THE
ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 61
(Aug. 2008), http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdfl2008LFO-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DU8R-EZXP].
437. Id.; see also, e.g., Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act Hearing, supra note 353, at
41 (statement of Hilary 0. Shelton, Dir. to the Wash. Bureau of the NAACP) (quoting Joe Loya, a
person disenfranchised as a result of a conviction: "[W]ithout a vote, a voice, I am a ghost
inhabiting a citizen's space."); Daniel A. Gross, What It Felt Like for a Florida Man with a Felony
to Regain His Voting Rights, NEW YORKER (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/as-
told-to/what-it-felt-like-for-a-florida-man-with-a-felony-to-regain-his-voting-rights
[https://perma.cc/2ZL2-YNZW] (quoting Steve Phalen, whose right to vote was restored due to the
passage of an amendment altering Florida's reenfranchisement laws: "Not being able to cast a vote
is something that feels like my civic identity, my identity as a citizen, is just completely erased.
Made irrelevant. It's like, you're never going to fully be a part of this country anymore.").
438. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., MY FIRST VOTE 6 (2009) [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR., MY FIRST
VOTE], http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/DemocracyMyFirst%20Vote.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ5P-PAAF] (quoting Deirdre Wilson, Santa Cruz, CA:
As I ran my pen back and forth over the small square space for the candidates I chose
to vote for, I felt responsible and powerful; responsible as a member of our society and
powerful to have a say in the process. ... My vote is equal to everyone else's and it
connected me to the rest of the United States . .. );
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their ability to be productive and law-abiding members of society.439 As
one woman explained:
I've been battling substance abuse for thirty years and have been in and out of prison all
my life. But I've been out, and clean, for more than four years. My life has completely
changed. And on [Election Day], with millions of Americans, I had a say about what
happens in our country. There were tears in my eyes as I waited to vote. I felt like I was
finally a productive member of society. I've never before felt like I could make a difference
in terms of what happens around me. But I walked out of the polling place on Election
Day feeling like I mattered, that I made a difference. I realized how far I've come.440
In short, evidence of the government's punitive intent in
employing penal disenfranchisement can be found in the manner in
which it is categorized, its historical link to punishment, its necessary
connection to a conviction, its identical application to those who
willfully fail to pay and those who are unable to do so, the severity of
the deprivation, the lack of nexus between it and a specific risk of public
harm, the absence of a rational and proper justification for the practice,
its operation as an affirmative disability or restraint, and its
stigmatizing effect. A finding of punitive intent on these grounds would
mean that wealth-based. penal disenfranchisement falls within the
Bearden line's ambit.
id. at 19 (quoting Leroy Clark, Fort Lauderdale, Florida: "When you can't [vote], you create a
person who doesn't have a character anymore. But once you vote, you change that. I have a voice
again."); id. at 20 (quoting Maurice Pinkston, Brooklyn, New York: "I was overjoyed when I got my
voter registration card. I was a real citizen! [Election Day] felt like my birthday.").
439. Id. at 5 (quoting Terry Sallis, Newton, Iowa:
The sense of hopelessness and questioning of your self-worth, which goes hand in hand
with the loss of citizenship, seemed to vanish once I had voted. . . . It instills a sense of
hope and belief that if you do the right thing, society is forgiving and there will be
opportunities to succeed.);
id. at 10 (quoting Koren Carbuccia, Pawtucket, Rhode Island: "Voting is a way of being a
responsible, law abiding citizen.").
440. Id. at 2 (quoting Linda Steele, New York, New York); see also ERIKA WOOD, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTORING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 8-9 (2009),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy[Democracy/Restoring%20the%2Right%
20to%20Vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVB6-JXD6] (quoting David Waller, Maryland:
According to the state of Maryland I was not a full citizen. In my eyes, I was not a full
citizen.... Today all that changes. When I walk into the Board of Elections and hand
in my signed voter registration, I will no longer be fragmented from society. I'll be a
father, grandfather, uncle, and friend who is able to give more of a hand in creating a
better place to live, work, and go to school.);
id. at 11-12 (quoting law enforcement officials arguing that restoration of voting rights promotes
successful reentry and rehabilitation).
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D. Imposing a Flat Ban on Punishment of Financial Condition Where
Alternatives Exist
With the creation of a distinctive test that applies if penal
disenfranchisement constitutes punishment, the constitutionality of
continued reenfranchisement or the reapplication of
disenfranchisement for a person in relation to the nonpayment of
economic sanctions would depend on the two questions of fact called for
by the Bearden test: whether the person who would be subject to penal
disenfranchisement has made bona fide efforts to pay, and if so,
whether alternative responses to the nonpayment could satisfy the
government's penal interest in punishing the underlying offense. 4 4 1
Though both questions are rightly the subject of a deeper inquiry, the
following provides a first cut at understanding how the Bearden test, as
explicated above, would apply to a challenge arguing that a person has
been subject to wealth-based penal disenfranchisement.
1. Assessment of Financial Condition
The first question-whether the would-be voter has made bona
fide efforts to pay but remains unable to do so-is critical because the
constitutional norms against unfair treatment in criminal justice
systems due to a person's financial condition, which underly the
Bearden line, cannot be realized if the determination of one's ability to
pay is too narrowly circumscribed. Despite its importance, the Bearden
Court gave little insight into what should constitute evidence of bona
fide efforts to pay, other than to reference the two ways in which Mr.
Bearden had sought the means to pay-seeking employment and
borrowing money from his parents. 4 4 2 The Court also suggested that
unsupported conclusions about job availability would be an insufficient
basis to sidestep the Bearden test, rejecting the trial court's vague
statement at the probation revocation hearing regarding "the
availability of odd-jobs such as lawn-mowing."44 3 In light of Mr.
Bearden's testimony and that of his wife regarding his unsuccessful
attempts to find employment, the Court explained that the record
441. See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
442. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662-63 (1983) (describing Mr. Bearden's inability to
find work and that he had borrowed money from his parents); id. at 668 (noting Mr. Bearden's
"bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money"); id. at 671 (noting Mr. Bearden's "bona
fide efforts to find a job").
443. Id. at 673.
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"would not justify" a determination that he had not made bona fide
efforts to pay.4 4 4
To ensure that the constitutional norms espoused by the Court
are meaningful, any system that requires an ability-to-pay
determination must be carefully designed. In addition to disallowing
determinations that a person failed to take advantage of employment
opportunities without evidence in the record that such opportunities
were, in fact, available," 5 a system for assessing financial capacity must
preclude wide-ranging, subjective determinations that would allow
decisionmakers to rely on personal preferences about such things as
attire or even racial bias when making the determination, because it
presents a significant risk that a person with no meaningful ability to
pay will be deemed to have willfully refused to do so. 4 4 6 As I have
examined in previous work, however, it is possible to design systems
focused on objective criteria such as income from employment or public
benefits or the lack thereof, living expenses relating to housing and
other needs for the individual and her dependents, and other
identifiable expenses such as medical costs or student debt.4 47 In short,
systems can be designed to fairly and accurately determine a person's
financial condition. 448
2. Identification of Alternatives to Wealth-Based Penal
Disenfranchisement
Once a determination is made that a person's failure to pay was
due to inability, the question of the constitutionality of wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement will depend on whether an alternative
response could address the government's interest in imposing
punishment for the disenfranchising offense. In Williams, Tate, and
Bearden, the Court provided a nonexhaustive list of possible alternative
sanctions-the use of reasonable installment plans, reduction of the
economic sanctions in recognition of their regressive qualities, and
substitution of community service-which suggest that the government
would be hard pressed to show that no suitable alternative was feasible
444. Id. at 673-74; see also supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
445. See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
446. Andrea Marsh & Emily Gerrick, Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective Policy
Responses to Modern Debtors'Prisons, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 102, 117-19 (2015).
447. See Colgan, supra note 62, at 103.
448. See id. For an argument that states may be required to adopt ability-to-pay mechanisms
to assess the constitutionality of an economic sanction under the excessive fines clause, see Colgan,
supra note 25, at Part II.
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for most, if not all, offenses. 449 The following considers those suggestions
as they relate to the feasibility of alternatives in the context of both
independent payment requirements and requirements related to parole
or probation conditions.
As detailed in Part I, one form of wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement arises from an independent payment
requirement. 450 Whether that requirement be for full or partial
payment, the most straightforward way of ensuring wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement does not occur is by disentangling payment of
economic sanctions from reenfranchisement entirely by eliminating the
requirement. Doing so still allows courts to impose punishments
deemed suitable by the legislature. Not only may lawmakers continue
to impose economic sanctions in the first instance, they may also impose
penal disenfranchisement. In doing so they may require the completion
of conditions other than payment of economic sanctions, such as
fulfilment of a term of incarceration or a delay of a set period of time
thereafter. In either case, the government can satisfy its interest in
imposing punishment for the underlying offense while eliminating the
risk that an independent payment requirement will result in the
additional punishment of continued disenfranchisement due only to an
inability to pay.
In addition to removing independent payment requirements
entirely, lawmakers can employ the alternatives suggested by the
Court,45 1 which would allow for independent payment requirements
combined with a robust system for determining a person's financial
capacity. First, the government could reduce outstanding criminal debt
to a payable amount so that the person may complete payment and
become eligible to vote. 4 52 The debtor would still feel the "pinch on the
purse" that the Bearden Court saw as responsive to the person's
culpability as well as serving as a deterrent for further criminal activity
and thus meeting the government's penal interests while also
addressing the regressive qualities of economic sanctionS 453 and
avoiding the risk of wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. Second, if
a reduction of criminal debt to an immediately payable amount could
not satisfy the government's penal interests given the seriousness of the
449. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671-72; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
450. See supra Section I.A.
451. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
452. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983); ABA, TEN GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 1,
3, 7, 10 (Guidelines 1, 2, 4, & 6).
453. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 265 (1983) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
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underlying offense, the jurisdiction could allow for the use of reasonable
payment plans combined with a system for provisional
reenfranchisement. 454 These systems would need to be designed to
avoid the types of problems seen in lowa's, and potentially
Washington's, provisional reenfranchisement systems.455 For example,
in designing the system, lawmakers should avoid requirements that
mandate that a person be current on all payments to be eligible for
provisional reenfranchisement because it may preclude people from
voting eligibility due to an improperly high periodic-payment
requirement or an unexpected change in circumstances resulting in an
unavoidable missed payment. 456 It is important to note, however, that
these approaches are unavailable to address wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement stemming from federal or out-of-state convictions
because the disenfranchising jurisdiction would have no ability to alter
the sentence imposed.
Along with independent payment requirements, wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement may occur as a result of parole and probation
conditions requiring payment of economic sanctions. 457 As noted above,
even if reenfranchisement did not require completion of parole or
probation, and thus wealth-based penal disenfranchisement were not
at stake, revocation or extension of such supervision for a nonwillful
failure to pay economic sanctions would independently violate the
Bearden test.45 8 As a result, unlike independent payment requirements,
disentangling reenfranchisement entirely from parole and probation
would only solve a portion of the problem. As with independent payment
requirements, however, parole- and probation-related payment
requirements could be cured through the options of reducing economic
sanctions to a payable amount or creating a system by which no
additional punishment-including penal disenfranchisement-can be
imposed for the nonwillful violation of a condition mandating payment.
Of course, for such reforms to eliminate wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement, a properly designed method of determining a
person's financial condition is of central importance.
454. Id.; ABA, TEN GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 1, 3, 7, 10 (Guidelines 1, 2, 4, & 6).
455. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
456. Id.
457. See supra Section I.B.
458. See supra notes 336-342 and accompanying text (discussing the direct application of the
Bearden test to extensions or revocations of parole or probation).
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In short, the three steps required to effectively challenge wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement under the test as articulated in
Bearden appear to be met. In light of constitutional norms against the
use of the government's prosecutorial power to price people out of fair
treatment in criminal justice systems due to their financial condition,
the Bearden line may be properly read as separate and distinct from the
tiers of scrutiny. The Bearden test flatly prohibits the imposition of
additional punishment unless no alternative could satisfy the
government's interest in punishing the original offense. The history of
the Bearden line's development further supports the conclusion that
those norms, and thus that test, apply not only to deprivations of liberty
but to any form of punishment, including a continuation or reimposition
of penal disefranchisement. Because alternatives to these practices that
would satisfy the government's penal aims exist, wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that the authorization of wealth-
based penal disenfranchisement is far more widespread than
commentators have assumed. A review of statutes, rules, procedures,
and policies across the country make clear that people convicted of
disenfranchising crimes in forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia may be prohibited from regaining their right to vote until
they can afford to pay the economic sanctions imposed against them.
This Article also argues that Bearden provides a doctrinal intervention
for eliminating systems that block people from reenfranchisement due
solely to an inability to pay economic sanctions. In short, what this
Article provides is a tool for promoting change through either legislative
advocacy directed at dismantling the tangle of laws that result in
wealth-based penal disenfranchisement or, where such advocacy is
stymied, an argument for constitutionally mandated change.
Jurisdictions found to be engaging in wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement could, however, simply eliminate opportunities for
reenfranchisement altogether given that the constitutional claims
investigated in this Article are available only because lawmakers have
chosen to create a system for reenfranchisement that discriminates
between people of means and those without. 459 There is some risk that
lawmakers might take this option. While many states have seen a
459. See supra notes 238-248 and accompanying text.
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relaxing of penal disenfranchisement laws in recent years,460
lawmakers in other states have made reenfranchisement processes
more onerous 461 and have even engaged in efforts to restrict access to
voting overall. 462 Further, while some Republican candidates and
pundits are finding it increasingly difficult to justify penal
disenfranchisement, 4 6 3 others continue to support the practice upon the
presumption, valid or not, 4 6 4 that reenfranchisement will favor
460. See, e.g., MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 85 (listing Virginia as a state that "now
routinely restores voting rights for increasing numbers of former felons" as well as Alabama as
one that "recently streamlined its restoration process"); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights Public Briefing: Collateral Consequences: The Crossroads of
Punishment, Redemption and the Effects on Communities, YOUTUBE 1:51:57 (May 19, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-MHveFxX9qek [https://perma.cc/GHQ9-GBSV] (testimony of
Marc Mauer, Exec. Dir., The Sentencing Project) (noting that, over the last twenty years, a number
of states have enacted reforms to penal disenfranchisement laws).
461. Cammett, supra note 20, at 376 (explaining that, in 2011, Governor Rick Scott repealed
Florida's voting restoration procedure to require that even nonviolent offenders wait five years
after serving their sentences to apply for the opportunity to restore their civil rights); Ghaelian,
supra note 433, at 760 n.21 (identifying Iowa as a state whose governor rescinded an executive
order easing requirements for reenfranchisement); Behrens, supra note 168, at 254-55 (observing
that "a handful of states have adopted, or attempted to adopt, more restrictive felon
disfranchisement laws in recent years"); Chung, supra note 95, at 2 (identifying Florida and Iowa
as states involved in repealing decisions and orders restoring voting rights); see also Clegg et al.,
supra note 167, at 3-4 (regarding a voter initiative that amended the Massachusetts constitution
to disenfranchise people who are currently incarcerated). For a discussion of the ebb and flow of
disenfranchisement laws, see Uggen et al., supra note 375, at 309. See also supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
462. See New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-america (last visited Sept. 10, 2018)
[https://perma.ccl5V9G-4NJG] (describing how "state lawmakers nationwide started introducing
hundreds of harsh measures making it harder to vote" after the 2010 election).
463. Compare, e.g., MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 14-15 (quoting conservative
commentator George Will in 2005 as expressing concern that people convicted of crimes would vote
for Democratic candidates), with George F. Will, There's No Good Reason to Stop Felons From
Voting, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/theres-no-good-
reason-to-stop-felons-from-voting/2018/04/06/88484076-390 5-1 1e8-8fd2-49fe3c675a89
story.html?utm-term=.262567050191 [https://perma.cc/T3E9-MT62] (expressing support for
eliminating penal disenfranchisement); see also Matt Ford, The Strangest Political Attack Ad of
2017, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.compolitics/archive/2017/10/gillespie-
criminal-justice-ad/543762/ [https://perma.cc/9AL8-FAFK] (describing an ad by Republican
gubernatorial candidate Ed Gillespie that simultaneously attacked and supported penal
reenfranchisement).
464. Studies have shown that penal disenfranchisement made a difference in a very small,
albeit consequential, number of close races that favored Republican candidates, such as the Bush-
Gore presidential election in 2000 and Mitch McConnell's senatorial win in 1984, but also that
absent penal disenfranchisement, Richard Nixon may have prevailed over John F. Kennedy in
1960. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 182-83, 192-93. Further, investigations of the political
views of people who are currently or were formerly incarcerated also suggest that these potential
voters have nuanced political opinions that do not necessarily sway left. Id. at 114-21, 137-80;
Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Why Letting Ex-Felons Vote Probably Won't Swing Florida, VOX
(Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/112/18049510/felon-voting-rights-
amendment-4-florida [https://perma.cc/QM7R-QK3X]. The presumption that people who are
reenfranchised will favor Democratic candidates is based largely on the fact that the criminal
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Democratic candidates. 465
Elimination of reenfranchisement opportunities, however, may
have the unintended effect of reducing lawmakers' power in this arena
as a constitutional matter. This Article began with the premise that the
Court's decision to uphold penal disenfranchisement in Richardson v.
Ramirez remains good law.4 6 6 A decision by lawmakers seeking to
entrench their own political power by entirely eliminating
reenfranchisement in order to sidestep the Court's interest in cabining
its use of the prosecutorial power may provide fodder for reexamining
Ramirez. Such partisanship runs afoul of the Court's general
prohibitions against viewpoint discrimination in voting,467 cuts against
the democratic principle that voting "is the most important legal right
in a society philosophically devoted to liberty and self-governance," 4 6 8
and implicates concerns the Court has expressed in the context of the
excessive fines clause that the Constitution must guard against the use
of economic sanctions in a manner that particularly targets politically
vulnerable citizens. 469 The violation of so many constitutional norms
may simply be a bridge too far.
There are reasons to believe that lawmakers will not head down
this path, and may instead embrace the expansion of voting rights for
people with criminal convictions. Even in historically conservative
states, voters have signaled an interest in alleviating the harshness of
justice system disproportionately ensnares people of color. IANZA& UGGEN, supra note 20, at 183;
see also Ewald, supra note 287, at 1135 & n.363; Karlan, supra note 20, at 1708. Even if it were
true that all or most people of color restored to the vote would vote Democratic, the demographics
of those who are disenfranchised may be changing, particularly with the rise of opioid abuse among
white adults of voting age in Republican strongholds. See Paul Chisholm, Analysis Finds
Geographic Overlap in Opioid Use and Trump Support in 2016, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (June 23, 2018,
8:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/06/23/622692550/analysis-finds-
geographic-overlap-in-opioid-use-and-trump-support-in- 2 0 1 6  [https://perma.cc/NG6K-2DE8];
Scott Simon, Study: Communities Most Affected by Opioid Epidemic Also Voted for Trump, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (Dec. 17, 2016, 9:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/12/17/5059654 2 0/study-
communities-most-affected-by-opioid-epidemic-also-voted-for-trump [https://perma.cc/9VBV-
43MH].
465. See, e.g., Laura Vozzella, McAuliffe Restores Voting Rights to 13,000 Felons, WASH. POST
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/mcauliffe-restores-voting-
rights-to-13000-felons/2016/08/22/2372bb72-6878- 1 1e6-99bf-f0cf3a6449a6_story.html?utmterm=
.457ff30b23b6 [https://perma.cclUP8K-NLTV] (describing complaints by Republican legislators in
Virginia that Democratic Governor Terry McAullife restored voting rights to ensure more
Democratic Party voters would be eligible to vote); Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson), TWITTER
(Dec. 19, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/9 4 3 2 8 3 4 2 5 6 5 7 6 7 5 7 7 6
[https://perma.cc/EBH7-6N84] ("Giving the vote to felons almost certainly flipped Virginia's House
of Delegates. To paraphrase a Florida senator, the Democrats knew exactly what they were
doing.").
466. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
467. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 20, at 1152.
468. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 417, at 330.
469. See supra notes 345-346 and accompanying text.
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economic sanctions as a general matter 4 7 0 and in easing penal
disenfranchisement specifically, with public opinion polls showing that
two-thirds of respondents support reenfranchisement even for people
who are still serving terms of parole or probation. 471 Legal and law
enforcement groups such as the American Bar Association, the
American Law Institute, the American Probation and Parole
Association, and the National Black Police Association, as well as
organizations within the religious community, also support increased
opportunities for reenfranchisement. 472 At the time of publication,
Iowa's Public Safety Advisory Board unanimously recommended the
legislature pass reforms that would automatically restore voting rights,
and Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds indicated she would support such
reforms.473 Further, a bill was pending in New Jersey's legislature that
would make it the third state-along with Maine and Vermont474 -to
reject penal disenfranchisement entirely.475 While that reform would
increase the administrative costs associated with providing access to
the ballot to people who are incarcerated, doing so for people
incarcerated in Maine, Vermont, and pretrial detention facilities
around the country has proven manageable. 476 Further, it would
eliminate the confusion among both administrative staff and would-be
voters about voter eligibility,4 7 7 as well as the expense created by
maintaining a system in which governmental employees in elections
470. See Colgan, supra note 62, at 103 (identifying Arizona, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Texas
as states among those engaged in reform).
471. Chung, supra note 95, at 4; see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 218 (suggesting
that "[t]he public endorses disenfranchisement for current prisoners, but 'draws the line' at the
prison gates" and concluding that "there is little public support for stripping the right to vote from
all people convicted of felonies").
472. WOOD, supra note 440, at 11, 17; ABA, TEN GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 8 (Guideline
5) ("Failure to pay court fines and fees should never result in the deprivation of fundamental rights,
including the right to vote.").
473. Barbara Rodriguez, Gov. Kim Reynolds Says She's Open to Automatically Restoring
Voting Rights in Iowa, DES MOINES REGISTER (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/politics/2018/11/20/iowa-governor-kim-reynolds-automatically-restoring-voting-rights-
felons-ia-legislature/2065872002/ [https://perma.cc/N62L-X244]; Jason Clayworth, Should Iowa
Restore Voting Rights to 52,000 Felons? Advisory Board Says Yes, DES MOINES REGISTER (Nov. 14,
2018), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/14/iowa-felon-voters-
rights-restored-advisory-group-says/2003546002/ [https://perma.cc/2PKT-2KY6].
474. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 111 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2121 (2018).
475. Kate King, New Jersey Bill Proposes to Give State's Prisoners Right to Vote, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 26, 2018, 7:09 PM), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/new-jersey-bill-proposes-to-give-states-
prisoners-right-to-vote- 1519690171 [https://perma.cc/AUS3-A3WZ].
476. See, e.g., Patsy R. Brunsfield, Jails Plan for Inmates Locked Up But Not Locked Out of
Voting, MISS. TODAY, Sept. 28, 2016; Jessica Sarhan, 2016 Election: America's Prison Voters, AL
JAZEERA (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/09/2016-election-
america-prison-voters-160906085936094.html [https://perma.cc/RND9-8H37].
477. See supra notes 17, 64, 89 and accompanying text (providing examples of confusion to
election officials and would-be voters regarding penal reenfranchisement laws).
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offices, corrections departments, and courts are involved in case-by-case
determinations of who is eligible to vote.4 78
Perhaps most importantly, at a time when the criminal justice
system has become one of the few arenas in which there is bipartisan
support for reform based on the increasingly accepted premise that
helping people rehabilitate and successfully return to their
communities is good policy,47 9 voter restoration provides particular
promise. Empirical analyses have shown both a negative correlation
between restoration and a likelihood of future arrest, incarceration, and
self-reported criminal activity, 480 as well as an increase in
prodemocratic attitudes predictive of reduced recidivism among people
restored to the vote.481 These results are, perhaps, unsurprising.
Allowing people to vote provides them with agency, 482 a meaningful
478. See supra Part I.
479. See, e.g., supra note 415 and accompanying text.
480. MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 20, at 33; see Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and
Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
193, 214 (2004) (concluding that "[vioting appears to be part of a package of pro-social behavior
that is linked to desistence from crime"); see also Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00 Civ. 8586(LMM), 2004
WL 1335921, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (explaining that New York's state legislature justified
relaxing its disenfranchisement laws on the grounds that it would have rehabilitative effects); Ky.
Exec. Order 2015-871 (Nov. 24, 2015), https://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/kentucky-
executive-order-felon-voting.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBG4-FD2J] (noting the rehabilitative aspects
of reenfranchisement); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 130-33 (2003) (discussing potential rehabilitative effects of voting); Guy Padraic
Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407, 414-16 (2012) (positing that
the theories of reintegrative shaming and classical labeling could explain a link between recidivism
and disenfranchisement); Sarhan, supra note 476 ("Michael Tausek, deputy warden at Maine
State Prison, says that whereas prisons have traditionally been about punishment, his facility is
trying to 'embed' what he calls 'a culture of transformation and change,' and having the ability to
vote is part of that transformation."); Will, supra note 463 (noting that in Florida, from 2011 to
2015, the overall recidivism rate among people with felony convictions post-incarceration was
thirty percent as compared to 0.4 percent of those whose rights had been restored and, though the
latter group would have an "overrepresentation of those who had the financial resources and
tenacity to navigate the complex restoration process . . . the recidivism numbers are suggestive").
481. Victoria Shineman, Restoring Rights, Restoring Trust: Evidence that Reversing Felon
Disenfranchisement Penalties Increases Both Trust and Cooperation with Government (Oct. 25,
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 3 2 7 2 6 9 4
[https://perma.cc/2T8D-Z723].
482. See Frank I. Michelman, Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law, Conceptions of
Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 451 (1989)
("Through political engagement, persons or communities (or both, reciprocally) forge identities,
and persons assume freedom in the 'positive' sense of social and moral agency.").
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connqction to their community 483 and its laws, 4 8 4 and confirmation that
society values their membership and participation in the democratic
enterprise.485
483. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1705, 1710 (1993) (describing voting as providing "civic inclusion: 'a sense of connectedness
to the community and of equal political dignity' ").
484. See Winkler, supra note 417, at 368-70, 387-88 ("Allowing ex-felons to vote under an
expressive voting approach may be the quintessential example of using law as a positive force in
the lives of members of the community.").
485. Id. at 367-68 (positing that through voting, "the voter's identity may be shaped as the
voter is given a sense of belonging, transcendence, and dignity that comes from being a valued
member of society").
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APPENDIX A: RESTORATION MECHANISMS
This Appendix documents jurisdictions in which mechanisms for
allowing restoration of the vote may result in wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement. There are four options. First, a person may become
automatically eligible to register to vote upon, or after the expiration of
a time period triggered by, completion of one or more terms of her
sentence beyond any period of incarceration (the "Automatic-Final"
category). Second, a person may automatically obtain provisional
eligibility to register to vote dependent on ongoing payment of economic
sanctions or on release from incarceration where a return to
incarceration for a failure to pay economic sanctions would result in
renewed disenfranchisement (the "Automatic-Provisional" category).
Third, a person may be required to apply for restoration of eligibility for
either full or provisional restoration of the vote, the outcome of which is
discretionary. This review process may be akin to, or even conducted
via, the jurisdiction's general clemency process (the "Discretionary-
Restoration Application" category). Fourth, a person may regain
eligibility to vote through a jurisdiction's general clemency process even
though that process is not explicitly identified as a mechanism for
restoration in its primary restoration laws, rules, or policies. Though all
jurisdictions have a general clemency process, information is only
included as a unique avenue for restoration here if that process allows
for wealth-based penal disenfranchisement and would not be
duplicative of a standard restoration application process (the
"Discretionary-General Clemency" category). As indicated below, a
jurisdiction may have more than one restoration mechanism available.
Finally, as with each of the following appendices, Maine and Vermont
are not included because they do not engage in penal
disenfranchisement at all.
Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Alabama ALA. CONST. art. V, § 124ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1 (2018)
ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 2
ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.05.030(a), 33.20.070,
Alaska V 33.30,241(a) (2018)
Executive Clemency Packet, STATE
ALASKA BD. PAROLE 1 (Jan. 20, 2018)
Arizona / V/ / ARiZ. CONST. art. V, § 5
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Am. REV. STAT. ANNJ. §§ 13.905(A)-B),
13-906(A)-(B), 13-908, 13-912(A)(2), 31-
443 (2018)
AmI. ADMIN. CODE §§ R5-4-101(6), R5-
4-201(F) (2018)
Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Pardon
Application (ast updated Jan 9, 2015)
Judicial Restoration Application
Materials (see Appendix F)
Superior Court of Ariz. Greenlee Cty.,
Restoration of Civil Rights Application
(Aug. 2017) (on file with author)
ARK. CONST. art. V, § 18
ARK. CONST. amend. LI, § 11(a)(4),
Arkansas 17$(d)(2)(A)-D)
004.00.2 ARK. CODE R. § 1305 (Lexis
Nexis 2018)
California CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2101(a) (West 2018)
Colorado V/ V/ COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 10
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-103(4) (2018)
Connecticut 1 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46(a) (2018)
Delaware 17 V DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4364 (2018)
D.C. CODE § 1-1001.02(2)(D) (2018)
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 3, § 500.2(c) (2018)
District of Letter from Margret Nedelkoff Kellems,
Columbia Deputy Mayor for Pub. Safety & Justice,
Gov't of D.C. Exec. Office of the Mayor, to
David. A. Guard, Project Manager (Sept.
7, 2001)
Florida FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4
FLA. STAT. § 940.05 (2018)
GA. CONST. art. , § 1, ¶ 111(a)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-216(b), 42-9-54(a)
(2018)
Georgia Effect of New Georgia Constitution of
1983 on the Loss and Restoration of Civil
Rights, Op. Att'y Gen. Ga. 69 (1983) (on
file with author)
Hawaii HAW. RE. STAT. § 831-2(a)(1) (2018)
IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 7
Idaho 117IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 50.01.01.010(35)
(2018)
ILL. CONST. art. III, § 2
Illinois 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-5 (West
2018)
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
V/
V/
V/
V/ /
V
V
V
9,
V/
V,
V/
V/
9,
V
/Vt
New Mexico /
V
151
IND. CODE. §§ 3-7-13-4(a)--(b), 3-7-13-5
(2018)
IOWA CODE §§ 48A.6, 907.9(4)(a) (2018)
lowA ADMIN. CODE r. 205-14.3(3)(914)
(2018)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6613(a)-(b) (2018)
KY. CONST. §§ 77, 145
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 116.025;
196.045(1)(c), (2)(c); 431.073(6) (West
2018)
LA. CONST. art. I, § 20
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:102(A)(1),
18:104(C)(1)(b), 18:177(A)(1) (2018)
Frequently Asked Questions, LA. DEP'T
CORR.
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102(b)(1)
(West 2018)
MASS. CONST. amend. art. III
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2018)
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.758b (2018)
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.165(1)-(2), 638.02
(2018)
MISS. CONST. art, 12, § 253
MIss. CODE ANN, § 47-7-41 (2018)
201-2 MISS. CODER. § 6(A)-(B)
(LexisNexis 2018)
Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.133.2 (2018)
MONT. CONST. art. I § 28; id. art. IV, § 2
NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13; id. art. VI, § 2
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-112 to -113;
/ 29-2264(2), (4), (4)(b); 32-313 (2018)
Frequently Asked Questions, NEB. BD.
PARDONS
NEV. CONST. art. 11, § I
NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.090(1) (2018)
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 213.155(1)(a)(1), (2);
213.157(1)(a)(1), (2) (effective Jan. 1,
2019)
Restoration of Voting Rights in Nevada,
NEV. SEc'Y STATE
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2(I)(a)
(2018)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1(6)-(8) (West
2018)
N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1(A)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-4-27.1(B), 31-13-1
(2018)
V/
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New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia /
I,,
/
V
Vt-
v/
V/
// 9,
I/
/
V/
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 700-701, 703, 706
(McKinney 2018)
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2) (McKinney
2018)
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2018)
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018)
N.Y. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,
Parole Handbook § 8.8 (Nov. 2010)
N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2(3)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2018)
N.D. CENT. CODE. §§ 12.1-33-01(1)(a),
12.1-33-03(1), 12-55.1.01(4), 12-55.1-04
(2018)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2961.01(A)(1)-
(2), 2967.04(A) (LexisNexis 2018)
Voter Registration in Oklahoma, OKLA.
V/ STATE ELECTION BD. (2018)
Okla. Voter Registration Application,
OKLA. STATE ELECTION BOARD 2
OR. CONST. art. V, § 14
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.281(1)-(2), (3)(d),
(7); 144.649 (2018)
PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9
/ 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301(a) (2018)
71 PA. CODE § 299 (2018)
R.I. CONST. art. II, § 1
100-20 R.I. CODE R. § 2 (LexisNexis 2018)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-5-120(B)(3), 24-21-
930, 24-21-990(1)-(2) (2018)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-14-11 (2018)
S.D. ADMIN. R. 5:02:05:02, 5:02:05:02.01
(2018)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-29-202(a)(1), (3);
40-29-203 (2018)
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002(A)(4)(A)-
(B) (West 2018)
37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 143.3, 143.9
(2018)
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 48.01(a)
(West 2018)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-2-101(2), 20A-
2-101.3(2), 20A-2-101.5(2) (West 2018)
VA. CONST. art. II, § 1
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (2018)
/ WASH. CONST. art. III, §§ 9, 11
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520(1) (2018)
W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1
152
Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
/
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
W. VA. CODE §§ 3-1-3, 3-2-2(b) (2018)
Osborne v. Kanawha Cty. Court, 69 S.E.
470, 470-471 (W. Va. 1910)
Wisconsin WIS. CONST. art. V, § 6
Wis. STAT. §§ 6.03(1)(b), 304.078 (2018)
WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 5
Wyoming V/ / WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-10-106(a)(ii); 7-13-
105(a), (b)(ii), (c)(i) (2018)
154 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1:55
APPENDIX B: INDEPENDENT PAYMENT REQUIREMENT
This Appendix documents jurisdictions that require payment of
economic sanctions to be eligible for reenfranchisement independent of
parole and probation systems. Wealth-based penal disenfranchisement
can occur because payment relates to eligibility for reenfranchisement
("E") or merits consideration for discretionary forms of
reenfranchisement ("M"). Further detail of these mechanisms are
designated as follows:
71 Explicit mandate of payment of economic sanctions
( Requirement that all terms of sentence be "completed" or
"discharged" and those terms have been interpreted to
include payment of economic sanctions
W Authority is sufficiently expansive (e.g., requiring
provision of information about outstanding economic
sanctions for merits review) so as to allow for the
existence of ongoing criminal debt to be the determining
factor for reenfranchisement
(I Reenfranchisement eligibility decision includes a
determination of whether a person makes a good faith or
reasonable effort to pay
A Law or policy would normally require payment, but is
currently suspended by executive order or policy
t Law or policy indeterminate
Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Alabama E ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(a)(3) (2018)
Alaska M Executive Clemency Packet, STATE
ip AIASKA BD. PAROLE 2,6, 16,22 (Jan. 20,
2018)
Arizona E M ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-912(A)(2)
tp (2018)
Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Patdon
Application 1, 10 (last revised Jan. 9,
2015) (on file with author)
Judicial Restoration Application
Materials (see Appendix F)
Superior Court of Ariz. Greenlee Cty.,
Restoration of Civil Rights Application
(Aug. 2017) (on file with author)
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Jurisdiction
Arkansas
Automatic Discretionary
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Ip
Connecticut E
71
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
M
wp
M
Tp
t
E
Rt
Idaho
Iowa
E
nt
E
M
Kansas
E
T1
Kentucky
Minnesota M
qr
Authority
ARK. CONST. amend. LI, § 11(d)(2)(A),
(C)-(D)
Ark. Parole Bd., Executive Clemency
Application 2 (May 4, 2015)
See, e.g., Press Release, Ark. Governor's
Office, Governor Asa Hutchinson
Announces Intent to Grant Executive
Clemency (Sept. 5, 2018) ('The applicants
intended for pardons have .. . paid all
fines related to their sentences.")
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46a(a) (2018)
Del, Bd. of Pardons, Board of Pardons
Application Packet 2
U.S. Dep't of Just., Petition for
Commutation of Sentence 2 (May 2,
2014)
FLA. CONST. art, VI, § 4
Fla. Office of Exec, Clemency, Application
for Clemency (Aug. 18, 2017)
Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Rules of
Executive Clemency 4-5, 8-10, 12-13
(Mar. 9, 2011)
GA. JUST. PROJECT, 2014 FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT STUDY REPORT
(2014)
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE
r. 50.01.01.550.02(b)(v) (2018)
Pardon Application Information, IDAHO
COMM'N PARDONS & PAROLE
IOWA CODE § 907.9(4)(a) (2018)
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)--
Restoration of Citizenship Rights-Right
to Vote and Hold Public Office, OFFICE
GOVERNOR IOWA (Sept. 1, 2016)
Streamlined Application for Restoration
of Citizenship Rights, OFFICE GOVERNOR
IOWA (last updated Apr. 20, 2018)
Telephone Interview with Jameson
Beckner, Asst. Dir. of Elections, Kan.
Sec'y of State (June 6, 2018) (on file with
author)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.045(1)(c), (2)(c)
(West 2018)
Ky. Div. of Prob. & Parole, Application
for Restoration of Civil Rights (last
updated July 2012)
Minn. Bd. of Pardons, Application for
Pardon or Commutation (2016)
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Jurisdiction
Nebraska
Automatic Discretionary
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
E E
i It
Nevada M
1P, *
New York E
nt
M
q,
Ohio M
nt
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
M
p
M
7T
E
7t
E
Rt
E
it, <D
E
it
M
W7
Authority
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2264(2), (4), (4)(b)
(2018)
Instructions for Filing an Application,
NEB. BD. PARDONS (2013)
Neb. Bd. of Pardons, Pardon Board
Application (2013)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.155(2) (effective
Jan, 1. 2019)
Criteria and Application Instructions-
Community Cases, NEv, BD. PARDONS 1
(Apr. 25, 2017)
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018)
N.Y. State Dep't of Corrs. & Cmty
Supervision, Certificate of Relief from
Disabilities-Certificate of Good Conduct
Application and Instructions 3
More than 24,000 Individuals Included in
First Group of Conditional Pardons, N.Y.
STATE (May 22, 2018)
Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., Policy 105-
PBD-05, Clemency Procedures: Non-
Death Penalty Cases VI.C(4)(c) (July
17, 2017)
Email from Ashley Parriman, Staff
Counsel, Ohio Dept of Rehab. & Corr., to
Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA
Sch. of Law (Aug. 29, 2018) (on file with
author)
Or. Governor's Office, Information on
Applications for Executive Clemency
(Pardons, Commutations, Etc.) 10, 14 (on
file with author)
Factors Considered by the Board, PA. BD.
PARDONS (Aug. 16, 2012)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-25-322(E), 24-21-
950(A), 24-21-970 (2018)
How to Apply for a Pardon, S.C. DEP'T
PROB., PAROLE & PARDON SERV. (last
updated Dec. 19, 2017)
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About
Expungements and Pardons in South
Carolina Courts, S.C. JUD. DEP'T 8 (2011)
S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Executive
Clemency Application (last updated June
2009)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202(b)(1)-(2)
(2018)
TEX. CRIM. PRO,. ANN. CODE art. 43.01(a)
(West 2018)
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Full Pardon Application-Instructions,
TEX. BD. PARDONS & PAROLES 1, 3 (last
updated Feb. 17, 2012)
Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, FP-10
Criminal History Information (Feb, 17,
2012)
Virginia E VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-231.2 (2018)
A Restoration of Rights, SEC'Y
COMMONWEALTH VA.
Press Release, Office of the Governor of
Va., Governor McAuliffe Announces New
Reforms to Restoration of Rights Process
(June 23, 2015)
Washington M M WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.82.090;
(P A 29A.O8.520(2)(a)-(b), (3) (2018)
Governor of the State of Wash., Petition
for Reprieve, Commutation, or Pardon 3
(last updated Jan. 2, 2013)
Email from Taylor Wonhoff, Deputy Gen.
Counsel, Office of Governor Jay Inslee, to
Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA
Sch. of Law (Dec. 11, 2017) (on file with
author)
Wisconsin M Office of the Governor of State of Wisc.,
Application for Executive Clemency (last
updated Mar. 11, 2009)
Wyoming M Office of the Governor of State of Wyo.,
I p Application for a Pardon or Restoration of
Rights (last updated July 2016) (on file
with author)
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APPENDIX C: PAROLE
This Appendix documents jurisdictions in which
reenfranchisement is dependent on completion of parole in ways that
allow for wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. Wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement can occur because payment relates to eligibility for
reenfranchisement ("E") or consideration of the merits for discretionary
forms of reenfranchisement ("M"), or may serve as a basis for revocation
of parole or other return to incarceration for nonpayment ("R"). A
would-be voter may be subject to wealth-based penal
disenfranchisement through the loss of early discharge from parole
("Early") or an extension of the parole term ("Extend") due to an
inability to pay economic sanctions. Further detail of these mechanisms
are designated as follows:
It
(
Explicit mandate of payment of economic sanctions
Requirement of adherence to all parole conditions
Authority is sufficiently expansive (e.g., satisfactory
completion or violation of parole conditions, or no
limitations on discretion) so as to allow for the existence
of ongoing criminal debt to be the determining factor for
reenfranchisement
D Parole decision includes a determination of whether a
person makes a good faith or reasonable effort to pay
Parole requirement is waivable
A Law or policy would normally require payment, but is
currently suspended by executive order or policy
Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Automatic Discretionary
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
E E
Early
WP
E M
Early Early (, W
7t,
Authority
ALA. CODE §§ 15-22-29, 15-22-33, 15-
22-36.1(a)(4)(a)-(c) (2018)
Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Rules,
Regulations, and Procedures art. 8, 1 7
Telephone Interview with Sarah
Stillman, Asst. Exec. Dir., Ala. Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles (June 14, 2018)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.185(18),
33.16.150(b)(6), 33.16.210(a)-(c)(3) (2018)
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22,
§ 20.200(a)(4) (2018)
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Arizona
California
Colorado
E
Extend
Rt
E
Extend n
M
qW
E
Early
E
Early
Connecticut E
Early
WP
Delaware E
Early
W
159
Executive Clemency Packet, STATE
ALASKA BD. PAROLE 6, 8, 13 (Jan. 20,
2018)
St. of Alaska Dep't of Corr., Policy
910.04: Fines, Court Costs And
Restitution (Dec. 29, 2016)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-906; 13-908;
13-912(A); 31-411(A), (D), (E), (J); 31-
412(A)-(B); 31-418(A), (D) (2018)
Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency,
Application for Absolute Discharge from
Parole (June 30, 2017)
Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Pardon
Application 10 (last revised Jan. 9, 2015)
(on file with author)
Judicial Restoration Application
Materials (see Appendix F)
Superior Court of Ariz. Greenlee Cty.,
Restoration of Civil Rights Application
(Aug. 2017) (on file with author)
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4
CAL. ELEC. CODE 2101(a) (West 2018)
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(a)(3), (b)(67)
(West 2018)
Frequently Asked Questions: Offender
Restitution Information, CAL. DEP'T
CORR. & REHAB.
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-2-103(4), 17-2-
103(9)(a), 17-22.5-403(6)-(8)(a), 17-22.5-
405(1)(e) (2018)
8 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1511-1 (2018)
Colo. Dep't of Corr., Community
Return to Custody Standards J¶ 6-
010(g), 6-180, 6-190 (2014)
Div. of Adult Parole, Adult Parole: Adult
Parole Offender Resources, Restitution,
COLO. DEP'T CORR.
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-46a(b), 53a-30, 54-
125e(b), 54-129 (2018)
State of Conn. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles,
Statement of Understanding and
Agreement (onditions of Parole (on file
with author)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4104, 4321,
4347(i)-() (2018)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 6102(a)(4);
6104(a), (c) (West 2018)
State of Del. Dep't of Corr., Procedure
Number 7.5: The Collection of Monies
(Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with author)
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
District of R U.S. DEP'T JUST., USPC RULES &
Columbia PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 2.105(a)(2), (f);
E 2.7(a)-(b) (2010)Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. PAROLE
COMM'N (last updated Sept. 29, 2015)
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Change Notice to
Program Statement 5882.03 (Feb. 4,
1998)
Florida E E FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4
Early Early it, W, FLA. STAT. §§ 947.18; 947.24(2);
It, W, c 947.141(6); 947.147; 947.181(1)-(4);
948.06(5), (7) (2018)
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 23-21.020(1);
23-21.022(23)-(24) (2018)
Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Application
for Clemency (Aug. 18, 2017)
Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Rules of
Executive Clemency 4-5, 8-10, 12-13
(Mar. 9, 2011)
Georgia E GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, 1 111(a)
Early GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-216(b), 42-9-
X, W42(d)(2), 42-9-44(a) (2018)
GA. COMp. R. & REGS. §§ 125-2-4-
.04(2)(a), 475-3-.08(8), 475-3-.10(7) (2018)
Effect of New Georgia Constitution of
1983 on the Loss and Restoration of Civil
Rights, Op. Att'y Gen. Ga. 69 (1983) (on
file with author)
Frequently Asked Questions, GA. SECY
STATE
Hawaii R HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 353-66(b), (d)-(e);
706-624(1)(g), (2)(d) (2018)
HAW. CODER. § 23-700-44 (2018)
HAW. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, HAW.
PAROLING AUTH., PAROLE HANDBOOK 4,
11 (1991)
Idaho E E IDAHO CODE §§ 18-310(2), 20-225,
Early Early T 20-233(1) (2018)
XP Extend T IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 50.01.01.400(04),
Extend (11) (2018)
TF Collections Bureau, Inc. v. Dorsey, 249
P.3d 1150, 1155 (Idaho 2011)
Idaho Comm'n of Pardons & Parole,
Notice of Action on Public Records
Request (Dec. 8, 2017) (on file with
author)
Pardon Application Information, IDAHO
COMM'N PARDONS & PAROLE
Indiana R IND. CODE §§ 11-13-3-4(b), (0, (n); 35-50-
6-1(c) (2018)
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Iowa E
Early W
Extend P
Kansas E
Early
it, (, (D
Kentucky I ,
Extend n, IV
Iow CobE 905.14 (2018)
IOWA ADMIN CODE r. 201-45.2(906), 201-
45.3(910), 201-45.6(1)-(3)(906), 205-
11.4(908), 205-11.7(10)(d)(908),
205-13.1(2)(906), 205-14.8(3)(914) (2018)
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs-
Restoration of Citizenship Rights-Right
to Vote and Hold Public Office, OFFICE
GOVERNOR IOWA (Sept. 1, 2016)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3717(d)(1)(E),
(d)(2), (m)-(n); 22-3722 (2018)
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 44-6-101(a)(1); 44-
6-108; 44-6-115b(c), (d)(4), (h)(1), (1); 44-
6-125(a), (g); 44-9-503(a)(2)-(3); 44-9-
503(b); 45-800-1(a)(2); 45-1000-1; 45-
1000-3 (2018)
State v. Anthony, 45 P.3d 852 (2002)
Voter Registration Instructions, KAN.
SEC'Y STATE
Prisoner Review Bd., Conditions, KAN.
DEP'T CORR.
Kan. Dep't of Corr., IMPP 14-107A:
Offender Fees Payment Procedures (May
27, 2015)
Kan. Dep't of Corr., IMIPP 14-120A:
Good Time During Post-Release
Supervision 7 (May 27, 2015)
Kan. Dep't of Corr., IiMiPP 14-133A,
Parole Services: Discharge from
Supervision 2 (July 25, 2017)
Kan. Dep't of Corr., Policy
Memorandum #17-12-003 to IMPP 14-
120A (Nov. 27, 2017)
Email from Todd Fertig, Pub. Info.
Officer, Kan. Dep't of Corr., to Beth A.
Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of
Law (Jan. 9, 2018) (on file with author)
Email from Samir Arif, Kan. Dep't of
Corr., to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of
Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (June 7, 2018)
(on file with author)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 196.045(2)(a);
431.073(2); 439.563(1), (3)(d), (5) (West
2018)
501 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:050 (2018)
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 11-00: Conditions
of Parole (Dec. 4, 2015)
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 12-00: Final
Discharge of Parole and Payment of
Restitution (Dec. 4, 2015)
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Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
R
R
R
R
E
Early
WP
M
Ip
E
Early (
Extend
7r,
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 21-00: Conditions
of Mandatory Reentry Supervision (Dec.
4, 2015)
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 22-00: Final
Discharge From Mandatory Reentry
Supervision (Dec. 4, 2015)
LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:574.7(C)(2)(a)(ix)(dd), 15:574.9(H)
(2018)
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:2(8), 18:102(A)(1),
18:104(C)(1)(b), 18:177(A)(1) (effective
Mar. 1, 2019)
LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 22, § 409 (2018)
Supervision Conditions, LA. DEP'T CORR.
Frequently Asked Questions, LA. DEP'T
CORR.
MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 6-
101(m); 7-401(c), (d)(1)-(2); 7-503; 7-
504(a), (b)(iii)-(iv); 7-701(a)-(b), (d), (g);
7-702(e), (g)(1) (West 2018)
MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 27, § 5; ch. 127,§§ 130, 131, 133A, 133B, 145, 148, 149
(2018)
120 MASS. CODE. REGS. 303.01 (2018)
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 791,236(5H8),
(12)-(13); 791.236a; 791.240a(10)(11)
(West 2018)
E MINN. STAT. §§ 201.145(3)(b), 243.05(3),
Extend ( 609.12(1), 609.165(1)-(2), 638.02(1)
(2018)
MINN. R. § 6600.1000 (2018)
Voting with a Criminal Record, MINN.
SEC'Y STATE
Register to Vote, MINN. SEC'Y STATE
Minn. Dep't of Corr., Division Directive
201.013: Supervision Fees-Field
Services (Dec. 20, 2016)
MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 47-7-5(7)(a4); 47-
7-38(5)(e); 47-7-40(1), (5); 47-7-49(1)
(2018)
29-201 MISS. CODE R. § 2.5(L)
(LexisNexis 2018)
Office of the Governor, Application for
Clemency 5
See supra note 122 and accompanying
text
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 115.133.2(2);
217.703(1), (3)-(4), (7); 559.100(2)-(3);
559.105(3) (2018)
Go Vote Missouri: Frequently Asked
Questions, Mo. SEC'Y STATE
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Montana R
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
E
Early
I, PW
E
Early
n, (
E
±
M
TP
R
wp
Early
R, C, (D
New Mexico E
Early
n
MONT, CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-20:(6)(b),
(7)(a)(iii)-(v); 46-23-215(2)(a) (2018)
MONT. ADMIN. R. 20.7.1101(11);
20.25.306; 20.25.702(l)(k), (2);
20.25.801(16)(c)-(e) (2018)
Conditions of Probation and Parole,
MONT. DEP'T CORR. (2012)
Paying Restitution and Supervision Fees,
MONT. DEP'T CORR.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-122, 29-2284, 32-
313, 83-116(1)(h) (2018)
NEB. BD. OF PAROLE R. §§ 2-101(U)(7), 3-
208(D), 4-103(D), 7-102(B)(3), 7-104
(2018)
Instructions for Filing an Application,
NEB. BD. OF PARDONS (2013)
Neb. Bd. of Pardons, Pardon Board
Application (2013)
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 209.4475(1)-(2);
213.126(1), (6) (2018)
NEV. REV, STAT. § 213.155(1)(b)-(c), (2)
(effective Jan. 1, 2019)
NEv. ADMIN. CODE §§ 213.065(1)(b)-(f),
(3); 213.230; 213.260 (2018)
Nev. Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, Procedures
for the Collection of Restitution (May 4,
2001)
Frequently Asked Questions, NEV. BD.
PAROLE COMM'RS
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:17 (2018)
Victim Services: Community-Based
Punishment, N.H. DEP'T CORR.
Victim Services: Conditions of Probation-
Parole, N.H. DEP'T CORR.
N.J. STAr. ANN. §§ 19.4-1(8), 30:4-
123.59(g), 30:4-123.60(b) (2018)
N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10A:71-6.4(a)(13),
(k); 1OA-71-6.5(a), (b)(3); 10A:71-6:7(d);
IOA:71-6:8(a); 1OA:71-6.9(a)(3) (2018)
State of N.J., Petition for Executive
Clemency (last updated June 2011)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-4-27.1(B)(2),
31-13-1(A)(1), 31-21-10(g)(2) (2018)
N.M. CODE R. § 22.510.15.8(0) (2018)
State v. Montano, 95 P.3d 1059, 1061
(N.M. Ct. App. 2004)
State v. Dean, 727 P.2d 944, 947-48
(1986)
Voter Registration Information, N.M.
SEC'Y STATE
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
M
, WEarly
E
Early nT
Extend
M
164
Voter Registration Eligibility
Requirements and FAQs, N.M. SECY
STATE
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-050200 (Mar.
9, 2017)
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-051500 1, 3-4
(July 31, 2015)
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-055000 1, 3-4
(Oct. 27, 2017)
Probation & Parole, N.M. CORR. DEP'T
("Supervision Conditions & Special
Programs")
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 75; 703(3), (4)
(McKinney 2018)
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2) (McKinney
2018)
N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 259-i(2)(a); 259-j(1),
(3) (McKinney 2018)
N.Y. COmp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 8003.4(a) (2018)
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018)
N.Y. State Dep't of Corrs. & Cmty
Supervision, Certificate of Relief from
Disabilities--Certificate of Good Conduct
Application and Instructions 3
Apply for Clemency, N.Y. STATE
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 13-1(1); 15A-1373(a);
15A-1374(b)(11a)-(11b), 12(c); 148-57.1(b)
(2017)
State v. Lambert, 252 S.E.2d 855 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1979)
Policy & Procedures, N.C. DEP'T PUB.
SAFETY 140, 158, 210, 241, 349-50 (Aug.
1, 2016)
Completing Parole/Post Release
Successfully, N.C. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY
N.C. Voting Rights Guide: People in the
Criminal Justice System, N.C. STATE BD.
ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENF'T
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-59-07, 12-59-15(6)
(2018)
N.D. Pardon Advisory Bd. Application,
SFN 14859 (Dec. 2010)
N.D. Parole Bd., Conditions of Parole,
SFN 7880 (June 2018) (on file with
author)
E-mail from Steven D. Hall, Dir. of
Transitional Plan. Serv., N.D. Dep't of
Corr. & Rehab., to Beth A. Colgan, Asst.
Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 19,
2018) (on file with author)
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Jurisdiction
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
E
E
Early
qi W,
<D
M
Authority
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R
R
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2967.28(D)(1),
(E)(3) (LexisNexis 2018)
OHIO ADMIN. R. §§ 5120:1-1-02(2),
5120:1-1-41(D) (2018)
Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., Policy 105-
PBD-05, Clemency Procedures: Non-
Death Penalty Cases § VI.C(4)(e) (July
17, 2017)
Ohio Dep't of Rehab & Corr., Conditions
of Supervision at 2
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.102(5)(a)-(b),
144.343(2)(b)-(c), 144.106 (2018)
37 PA. CODE §§ 63.4(6), 65.4(6) (2018)
61 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6138(c)(5), (d) (2018)
Parole Conditions, PA. BD. PROB. &
PAROLE
Understanding the Technical Parole
Violation Process in Pennsylvania, PA.
BD. PROB. & PAROLE (Dec. 2014)
Violations, PA. BD. PROB. & PAROLE
Factors Considered by the Board, PA. BD.
PARDONS (Aug. 15, 2012)
13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-16(a), 13-8-18,
13-8-19(a), 13-8-32(c) (2018)
E-mail from Lisa Blanchette, Asst, Prob.
& Parole Adm'r, to Beth A. Colgan, Asst.
Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 23,
2018) (on file with author)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-25-322(c), 24-21-
950(A)(3) (2018)
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About
Expungements and Pardons in South
Carolina Courts, S.C. JUD. DEP'T (2011)
How to Apply for a Pardon, S.C. DEP'T
PROB., PAROLE & PARDON SERV. (last
updated Dec. 19, 2017)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 16-22-29, 24-15-
11, 24-15A-6, 24-15A-7, 24-15A-8.1, 24-
15A-24, 24-15A-50 (2018)
S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Policy
8.1.A.7 Early Discharges § VI.7 (last
updated Aug. 2017)
S.D. Parole Services, Operational Memo.
7.3.E.5 § 7.A.1 (on file with author)
S.D. Parole Services, Operational Memo.
7.4.G,3 § V.B.3.e (on file with author)
S.D. Parole Services, Parole/Suspended
Sentence Standard Supervision
Agreement, at SA13C (on file with
author)
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Frequent Questions: Parole, Continued,
S.D. DEP'T CORR, (2018)
E-mail from Michael Winder, Commc'ns
& Info. Manager, S.D. Dep't of Corr., to
Beth A. Colgan, Asat. Prof. of Law, UCLA
Sch of Law (Mar. 20, 2018) (on file with
author)
Letter from Dennis Kaemingk, Cabinet
Sec'y, S.D. Dept of Corr., to Beth A.
Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of
Law (Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with author)
Tennessee E TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-28-117(a)(1),
Extend (a)(2)(A); 40-28-609(a); 40-29-202(a)(3)
IV (2018)
Tenn. Div. of Elections, Certificate of
Restoration of Voting Rights (Apr. 2017)
Texas E TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11002(A)(4)(A)
Early (2017)
TEX. CODE CRim. PRoC. ANN.
art. 42.037(h) (West 2018)
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 508.182;
508.189; 508.221; 508.222;
508.1555(a)(2), (4) (2017)
Utah R UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63M-7-404(6)(a), (c);
64-13-21(2)(a)-(b), (6)(a); 77-27-6; 77-27-
10(1)(a), (6); 77-27-11(1), (6) (LexisNexis
2018)
Parole Special Conditions, UTAH DEP'T
CORR. (2015)
Virginia VA. CODEANN. §§ 53.1-136, 53.1-150(B),
Early 'P 53.1-157, 53.1-231.2 (2018)
Extend W VA PAROLE BD., POLICY MANUAL 23-25
(Oct. 1, 2006)
Community Corrections-Frequently
Asked Questions, VA. DEP'TCORR.
West Virginia E W. VA. CODE §§ 3-2-2(b),; 61-11A-4(g);
Early 62-12-17(a)(5), (c); 62-12-18 (2018)
Wisconsin E M WIS. STAT. § 304.074(4); 304.078(1), (3);
Early 'P 973.20(14) (2018)
It Standard Rules of Community
Supervision, Wis. DEP'T CORR.
Office of the Governor of State of Wise.,
Application for Executive Clemency (last
updated Mar. 11, 2009)
Wisc. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Cmty. Corr.,
Electronic Case Reference Manual,
Discharge Section 5 (2012) (on file with
author)
Wise. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Cmty. Corr.,
Electronic Case Reference Manual,
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Supervision Process 1 (2012) (on file with
author)
Wyoming M Office of the Governor of State of Wyo.,
rp Application for a Pardon or Restoration of
Rights (last updated July 2016) (on file
with author)
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX D: PROBATION
This Appendix documents jurisdictions in which
reenfranchisement is dependent on completion of probation in ways
that allow for wealth-based penal disenfranchisement. Wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement can occur because payment relates to
eligibility for reenfranchisement ("E") or consideration of the merits for
discretionary forms of reenfranchisement ("M"), or may serve as a basis
for revocation of probation or other return to incarceration for
nonpayment ("R"). A would-be voter may be subject to wealth-based
penal disenfranchisement through the loss of early discharge from
probation ("Early") or an extension of the probation term ("Extend") due
to an inability to pay economic sanctions. Further detail of these
mechanisms are designated as follows:
n
(
Explicit mandate of payment of economic sanctions
Requirement of adherence to all probation conditions
Authority is sufficiently expansive (e.g., satisfactory
completion or violation of probation conditions, or no
limitations on discretion) so as to allow for the existence
of ongoing criminal debt to be the determining factor for
reenfranchisement
(D Probation decision includes a determination of whether
a person makes a good faith or reasonable effort to pay
±- Probation requirement is waivable
Automatic Discretio
Final Provisional Restoration
Application
E E
Early Early n
n
E
Early
it, <D
nary Authority
General
Clemency
ALA. CODE §§ 15-18-70, 15-22-36(c), 15-
22-36.1(a)(4)(a)-(c), 15-22-54(b) (2018)
Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Rules,
Regulations, and Procedures, art. 8, 1 7
Telephone Interview with Sarah
Stillman, Asst. Exec. Dir., Ala. Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles (June 14, 2018)
M ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.051(c),
Early W 12.55.100(a)(2)(A)-(B), 12.55.185(18),
33.05.020 (2018)
Executive Clemency Packet, STATE
ALASKA BD. PAROLE 6, 8, 13 (Jan. 20,
2018)
State of Alaska Dep't of Corr., Policy
910.04: Fines, Court Costs And
Restitution (Dec. 29, 2016)
Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
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Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Arizona E E M
Extend Extend n p
71
Arkansas
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
M
PExtend
it
E
Early
Ep
Extend
R
ill
E
Early it
Extend
ic, (D
E
Early n
Extend n, (D
Authority
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-808(B),
13-902(C)(1), 13-905, 13-912(A)(1) (2018)
Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Pardon
Application 3, 10 (last updated Jan. 9,
2015) (on file with author)
Judicial Restoration Application
Materials (see Appendix F)
Superior Court of Ariz. Greenlee Cty.,
Restoration of Civil Rights Application
(Aug. 2017) (on file with author)
ARK. CONST. amend, LI, § 11(d)(2)(A),
(C)-(D)
ARK. CODE ANN. f§ 5-4-205(f)(1), 5-4-306,
16-10-305, 16-93-311, 16-93-312(a)(3)
(2018)
Ark, Parole Bd., Executive Clemency
Application 2 (May 4, 2015)
See, e.g., Press Release, Ark. Governor's
Office, Governor Asa Hutchinson
Announces Intent to Grant Executive
Clemency (Sept. 5, 2018) ("The applicants
intended for pardons have. . fulfilled
all . .. probationary requirements , -,")
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4104, 4321,
4333(a), 4333(f), 4333(h), 4347(j) (2018)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 6102(a)(4),
6104(a), 6104(c) (2018)
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 32.1(b),
35(b)
State of Del. Dep't of Corr., Procedure
Number 7.5: The Collection of Monies
(Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with author)
D.C. CODE §§ 16-711, 24-304(a) (2018)
Court Services & Offender Supervision
Agency for D.C., Strategic Plan, Fiscal
Years 2014-2018, at 11
FLA. CONST. art VI, § 4
FLA. STAT. §§ 940.05; 948.06(1)(h), (2)-
(3), (5), (7) (2018)
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-302.111(1)
(2018)
Fla. Third Jud. Cir. Admin. Order 2017-
002, at 3-4 (on file with author)
Fla. Thirteenth Jud. Cir. Admin. Order
S-2016-019, at 4 (on file with author)
Fla. Fourteenth Jud. Cir. Admin. Order
2017-00-02, at 3 (on file with author)
Fla. Fifteenth Jud. Cir. Admin. Order
4.411-11/17, at 3 (on file with author)
Fla. Eighteenth Jud. Cir. Admin. Order
17-29-B, at 4 (on file with author)
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Telephonic Message from Paula Watkins,
Office of Court Admin., Second Jud. Cir.,
to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law,
UCLA Sch. of Law (Dec. 5, 2017) (on file
with author)
Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Application
for Clemency (Aug. 18, 2017)
Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Rules of
Executive Clemency 4-5, 8-9, 12-13
(Mar. 9, 2011)
Georgia E GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, 1 III
Early n GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-1(a)(1)(B), 17-
Extend 10-1(a)(2)(A), 21-2-216(b), 42-8-34(d)-(o)
n, w (2018)
Effect of New Georgia Constitution of
1983 on the Loss and Restoration of Civil
Rights, Op. Att'y Gen. Ga. 69 (1983) (on
file with author)
Frequently Asked Questions, GA. SEC'Y
STATE
Hawaii R HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 706-624(1)(g), (2)(d);
706-625(3), (5) (2018)
Idaho E E IDAHO CODE §§ 18-310(2), 19-2601, 19-
Early Early W 2608, 20-222(1), 20-225 (2018)
117 Extend IF State v. Wagenius, 581 P.2d 319, 324-26
Extend (Idaho 1978)
141 Pardon Application Information, IDAHO
COMMISSION PARDONS & PAROLE
Illinois R 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3(b)(8),
(b)(10)(iv)-(v), (g), (i)-(i)(5), (j); 5/5-6-4(d),
(h) (West 2018)
Indiana R IND. CODE §§ 35-38-2-1(b), (d); 35-38-2-
2.1; 35-38-2-2.3(6), (8), (21); 35-38-2-
3(a)(1), (g), (h)(3), (n) (2018)
Iowa E IOWA CODE §§ 905.14; 907.6; 907.7;
Early n 907.9(1), (4)(a) (2018)
Extend 7t IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 201-45.6(2)-(3),
M 205-14.3(3)(914) (2018)
it Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)--
Restoration of Citizenship Rights-Right
to Vote and Hold Public Office, OFFICE
GOVERNOR IOWA (Sept. 1, 2016)
Kansas E KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6607(b)(7), (13);
Early n 21-6607(c)(2), (3)(A); 21-6608(c)(7)-(8), (d)
Extend (2018)
It Crimes and Punishments, Op. Att'y Gen.
Kan. 2000-59 (Nov. 20, 2000)
Am I Eligible to Vote?, VOTE KANSAS
Kentucky E KY. CONST. § 145(1)
Extend it KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431.073(2);
533.020(4); 533.030(2)(g), (3) (West 2018)
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E
Early
Extend
RLouisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
R
R
R
4, (
E
Early
IF
Extend
7t, K
E
Early (, Ti
Extend IF
M
Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 S.W.3d
606 (Ky. 2013)
Ky. Div. of Prob. & Parole, Application
for Restoration of Civil Rights 2 (last
updated July 2012)
LA. CONST. art. 1, § 20
LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:574.7(C)(2)(a)(ix)(dd); 18:2(8);
30:875.2(A); 30:895(A), (C), (K), (M);
30:897(A); 30:985.1 (2018)
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:102(A)(1),
18:104(C)(1)(b), 18:177(A)(1) (effective
Mar. 1, 2019)
LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. § 900(A)(5)-
(7), 901.1 (West 2018)
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 409(H) (2018)
Rosamond v. Alexander, 846 So. 2d 829
(La. Ct. App. 2003)
Frequently Asked Questions, LA. DEP'T
CORR.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 6-223(d);
6-224(d); 6-226(b), (d), (f), (g)(1)-(3); 11-
607(a)(1)(iii) (West 2018)
MD. R. CRIM. PRO. 4-346 (West 2018)
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch, 276, §§ 87A. 92;
ch. 279, § 1 (2018)
Find Out What Happens If You Violate
Your Probation, OFF. COMM'R PROBATION
Guidelines for Probation Violation
Proceedings in the Superior Court, MASS.
Sup. CT. DEP'T (Feb. 1, 2016)
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 771.1(3); 771.3(8);
771.4; 771.4b(1)-(2), (4), (7) (2018)
Probation Supervision, MICH. DEP'T
CORR.
MINN. STAT. §§ 201.145(3)(b);
Extend ( 609.135(1)(a)-b), (2)(f)-(g), (4);
609.165(1)-(2); 638.02(1) (2018)
MINN. R. § 6600.1000 (2018)
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03(4)(E) (2018)
Register to Vote, MINN. SEC'Y STATE
Voting with a Criminal Record, MINN.
SEc'Y STATE
Minn. Dep't of Corr., Probation
Agreement (on file with author)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 47-7-2(q); 47-
7-35(1)(h); 47-7-37(1); 47-7-38(5)(e); 47-
7-40(3); 47-7-41; 47-7-47(5); 47-7-49(1);
47-7-402(2), (5) (2018)
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201-2 MISS. CODE R. § 6(B) (LexisNexis
2018)
Office of the Governor, Application for
Clemency 5
See supra notes 122 and accompanying
text
Missouri E Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 115.133.2(2), 217.703,
Early 559.021, 559.036(2), 559.100(2)-(3),
559.105(2) (2018)
Extend 28 Mo. Prac., Mo. Crim. Prac. Handbook
n, § 37:3 (2018)
Go Vote Missouri: Frequently Asked
Questions, Mo. SEC'Y STATE
Montana R MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-203(6)(b), 46-
18-203(7)(a)(iii)-(iv), 46-18-241 (2018)
MONT. ADMIN. R. 20-7-1101(11) (2018)
Paying Restitution and Supervision Fees,
MONT. DEP'T CORR.
Nebraska E E E NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2262(2)(1), (m), (s)-
Early Early 7t + (t); 29-2263(1)-(2), (4); 29-2264(1)-(2), (4),
(4)(b) (2018)
NEB. CT. R. § 6-1903(A)(3), (B) (2018)
Instructions for Filing an Application,
NEB. BD. PARDONS (2013)
Neb. Bd. of Pardons, Pardon Board
Application (2013)
Nevada E E NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 176A.430(1), (5)-(6);
Early 176A.500(1)-(2), (5)(a); 213.1076 (2018)
E, I M NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 176A.850(4),
213.155(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2019)
Extend NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 213.065(1)(b-(f),
(3); 213.230 (2018)
Criteria and Application Instructions
Community Cases, NEV. BD. PARDONS 1,
3 (Apr. 25, 2017)
New R N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 504-A:4(III);
Hampshire 651:2(V)-(VII)(a)(4), (b) (2018)
Victim Services: Community-Based
Punishment, N.H. DEP'T CORR.
Victim Services: Conditions of Probation-
Parole, N.H. DEP'T CORR.
New Jersey E E N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:45-1(a), (b)(11), (c),
Early D (d)(1); 2C:45-2(a)-(b), (c)(1)-(2); 2C:45-
'F 3(a)(4); 2C:46-1(b)(1); 19:4-1(8) (West
Extend 2018)
T1 State v. DeChristino, 562 A.2d 236, 238-
39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
State of N.J., Petition for Executive
Clemency (last updated June 2011)
Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
New Mexico
Early n
Extend
nt
North
Carolina
E
Early nt
Extend
North Dakota
Ohio
R
, 0
R M
Ip
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N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-4-27.1(B)(2); 31-13-
1(A)(1); 31-17-1(B)-(C), (H); 31-20-6
(2018)
State v. Lack, 650 P.2d 22, 28 (N.M.
1982)
Voter Registration Eligibility
Requirements and FAQs, N.M. SEC'Y
STATE
Voter Registration Information, N.M.
SEC'Y STATE
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-050200 (Mar.
9, 2017)
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-051500 3
(July 31, 2015)
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-053100 2(F)
(Mar. 9, 2017)
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-055000 1, 3-
4 (Oct. 27, 2017)
Offender Orientation Handbook, N.M.
CORR. DEP'T 1
Probation & Parole, N.M. CORR. DEP'T
("Supervision Conditions & Special
Programs")
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 13-1(1); 15A-1334(a),
(d); 15A-1342(b); 15A-1343 (2018)
Policy & Procedures, N.C. DEP'T PUB.
SAFETY 140, 158, 169, 210, 222, 235--36,
266, 268-69 (Aug. 1, 2016)
Completing Probation Successfully, N.C.
DEP'T PUB. SAFETY
NC Voting Rights Guide: People in the
Criminal Justice System, N.C. STATE BD.
ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENF'T
M N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32.07(2), (3)(k),
( D (4)(e)-(f), (4)(p), (7) (2018)
N.D. Pardon Advisory Bd. Application,
SFN 14859 (Dec, 2010)
E-mail from Steven D. Hall, Dir. of
Transitional Planning Serv., N.D. Dep't
of Corr, & Rehab., to Beth A. Colgan,
Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law
(July 19, 2018) (on file with author)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2951.021(A)(1)-
(2), (4); 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)-(ii); 2929.18
(LexisNexis 2018)
Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., Policy 105-
PBD-05, Clemency Procedures: Non-
Death Penalty Cases, § VI.C(4)(e) (July
17, 2017)
2019] WEALTH-BASED PENAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1:55
Jurisdiction Automatic Discretionary Authority
Final Provisional Restoration General
Application Clemency
Oregon R
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
M
E
Early YI
Extend W
R
R
174
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 137.540(1)(a),
137.545(5)(a)-(b), 137.593(2)(a),
137.593(c)-(d), 137.599 (2018)
OR. ADMIN. R. 213-010-0002(1)-(3) (2018)
37 PA. CONS. STAT. § 65.4(6) (2018)
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9771(b) (2018)
Factors Considered by the Board, PA. BD.
PARDONS (Aug. 15, 2012)
12 R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 12-19-8.1(a)(8), 12-
19-9(b)(5) (2018)
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)
E-mail from Lisa Blanchette, Asst. Prob.
& Parole Adm'r, to Beth A. Colgan, Asst.
Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 23,
2018) (on file with author)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-5-120(B)(3), 17-3-
30(B), 17-25-323, 24-21-430(6), 24-21-440,
24-21-950(A)(1) (2018)
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About
Expungements and Pardons in South
Carolina Courts, S.C. JUD. DEP'T (2011)
How to Apply for a Pardon, S.C. DEP'T
PROB., PAROLE & PARDON SERV. (last
updated Dec. 19, 2017)
Opinion regarding the interpretation of
Section 7-5-120(B)(3) of the South
Carolina Code, Op. Att'y Gen. S.C., 2014
WL 4382450 (Aug. 19, 2014)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 16-22-29, 23A-27-
18, 23A-27-25.1(2), 24-15A-6, 24-15A-8.1
(2018)
Elections & Voting: Felony Convictions,
S.D. SEC'Y STATE
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-303(d)(1),
(d)(11), (d)(12)(A), (i)(2)-(3), (p)(6)(A)-(B);
40-35-308(c); 40-35-311(e)(1) (2018)
Tenn. Div. of Elections, Certificate of
Restoration of Voting Rights (Apr. 2017)
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002(A)(4)(A)
(2017)
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN.
art. 42.037(h); 42A.651(a); 42A.652(a)-
(b); 42A.701(b)(1), (e)-(f); 42A.751(i);
42A.752(a); 42A.753(a), (c) (West 2018)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63M-7-404(6)(a), (c);
64-13-21(2)(a)-(b), (6)(a); 77-18-1(8)(f-
(h), (12)(e)(ii), (iv) (West 2018)
Probation Special Conditions, UTAH
DEP'T CORR.
E
Early
W
Extend
'IT
E
Early
R, (,
E
Extend
E
Early
, (D
Extend
K, (D
Utah R
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Virginia E VA, CODE ANN. § 19.2-303; 19.2-
Early T
Extend n, IF
303.3(B), (D); 19.2-304; 19.2-305(A)-(C);
19.2-305.1(A), (C); 53.1-231.2 (2018)
West Virginia E W. VA. CODE §§ 3-2-2(b); 61-11A-4(g); 62-
Early 12-9(a)(5)-(6), (b)(1)-(2); 62-12-11 (2018)
Extend
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. §§ 304.078(3); 973.09(1)(b),
Early n w (3)c)(1), (d)(2), (5), (1)(g), (1)(r) (2018)
Extend Standard Rules of Community
Supervision, Wis. DEPT CORR.
Office of the Governor of State of Wisc.,
Application for Executive Clemency (last
updated Mar. 11, 2009)
Wisc. Dept of Corr., Div. of Cmty. Corr.
Electronic Case Reference Manual,
Discharge Section 1 (2012) (on file with
author)
Wisc. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Cmty. Corr.,
Electronic Case Reference Manual,
Supervision Process 3-4 (2012) (on file
with author)
E-mail from Michael R. Haas, Staff
Counsel, Wis. Elections Comm'n, to Beth
A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch.
of Law (Mar. 20, 2018) (on file with
author)
E-mail from Michael R. Haas, Staff
Counsel, Wis. Elections Comm'n, to Beth
A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch.
of Law (Mar. 19, 2018) (on file with
author)
Wyoming E E M WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-108(a); 7-9-109;
Early ( Early W , q 7-13-105(a)(ii), (b)(ii), (c)(i)-(ii); 7-13-
Extend Extend 1J 302(a)(ii), 7-13-304(a); 7-13-305(a)-(b)
W (2018)
Office of the Governor of State of Wyo.,
Application for a Pardon or Restoration of
Rights (last updated July 2016) (on file
with author)
Wyo. Dep't of Corr., Policy & Procedure
#3.403 Inmate Rights 8 (July 1, 2018)
Wyo. Dep't of Corr., Application for
Restoration of Wyoming Voting Rights
(June 30, 2017) (on file with author)
Wyo. Dep't of Corr., Field Servs.
Operational Standards & Proc. #7.10
Restoration of Voting Rights (Jan. 2,
2018) (on file with author)
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APPENDIX E: FEDERAL AND OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTIONS
This Appendix documents jurisdictions that disenfranchise
people for federal or out-of-state convictions ("V") or in which the
primary disenfranchising language is sufficiently broad to allow for
federal and out-of-state convictions but where no official interpretation
exists ("t").
Jurisdiction Federal Out- Authority
of-
State
V V/ ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1(c)(47) (2017)
V E-mail from Jeremy Johnson, Alaska Div. of
Elections, to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of
Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Dec. 1, 2017) (on
file with author)
V ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-909, 13-910, 13-
912 (2018)
V/ V/ Merritt v. Jones, 533 S.W.2d 497, 387 (Ark.
.1976)
V/ CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2101(a), (c) (Deering
2018)
V/ COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-606 (2018)
Voters with Convictions FAQ, COLO. SEC'Y
STATE
V V CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-46, 9-46a (2017)
Letter from Lewis A. Button, III, Office of
the Sec'y of State, to Beth A. Colgan, Asst.
Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Jan. 3,
2018) (on file with author)
V V Email from Elaine Manlove, State Election
Comm'r of Del., to Beth A. Colgan, Asst.
Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Dec. 4,
2017) (on file with author)
t t D.C. CODE § 1-1001.02(2)(C), (7) (2018)
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 500.2(c) (2018)
Email from Matthew James, Asst. Att'y
Gen. Legal Counsel Div., Office of Att'y Gen.
of D.C., to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of
Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Aug. 24, 2018) (on
file with author)
V/ v/ Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Rules of
Executive Clemency 14 (Mar. 9, 2011)
V v/ GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-231 (2018)
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Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
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Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
t $ HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 11-13(1), (5); 831-2(a)(1)
(2018)
Telephone Interview with Tommy Johnson,
Parole & Pardons Adm'r, Haw. Paroling
Auth. (July 19, 2018)
V/ v/ IDAHO CODE § 18-310(4) (2018)
V / 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-1, 5/3-2, 5/3-5 (2018)
Illinois Voter Registration Application, ILL.
STATE BD. ELECTIONS (Sept. 2017)
V/ / IND. CODE §§ 3-5-5-2; 3-5-5-4; 3-5-5-8, 3-5-5-
9; 3-7-13-1; 3-7-13-4(a)-(b); 3-7-13-5; 3-7-46-
1 to -9 (2018)
E-mail from Matthew R. Kochevar, Co-Gen.
Counsel, Ind. Election Div., to Beth A.
Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of
Law (Aug. 15, 2018) (on file with author)
V IOWA CODE §§ 48A.6, 48A.30(1)(d) (2018)
V / KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6613(a)-(b) (2018)
V/ Ky. Div. of Prob. & Parole, Application for
Restoration of Civil Rights 2 (last updated
July 2012)
V/ Cardon v. Dauterive, 264 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct.
App. 1972)
Crothers v. Jones, 120 So. 2d 248 (La. 1960)
V V MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102 (2018)
Wagner v. Scurlock, 170 A. 539, 542 (Md.
1934)
Voter Registration, MD. STATE BD.
ELECTIONS
V/ V/ MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2018)
Absentee Voting, SEC'Y COMMONWEALTH
MASS.
E-mail from Mass. Elections Div., to Beth A.
Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of
Law (Aug. 8, 2018) (on file with author)
S V/ MICH. CONST. art. II, § 1
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 168.10(1), 168.11(1)-
(2), 168.758b (2018)
I / E-mail from Aaron Swanum, Info. Officer,
Minn. Dep't of Corr., to Beth A. Colgan,
Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (July
20, 2018) (on file with author)
V State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorius, 175
S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Mo. 1943)
Bruno v. Murdock, 406 S.W.2d 294, 297
(Mo. Ct. App. 1966)
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Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
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V t MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2
MONT. CODEANN. §§ 13-1-111; 13-1-112(1)-
(2), (4) (2018)
Melton v. Oleson, 530 P.2d 466, 470 (Mont.
1974)
How to Register to Vote, MONT. SEC'Y STATE
V/ V/ NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-113; 32-313(1), (3)
(2018)
V/ / NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1
/ N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 607-A:1, 607-
A:2(I)(a), 607-A:5(II)--(III), 654:2(I), 654:2-
a(I) (2018)
Paey v. Rodrigue, 400 A.2d 51, 53 (N.H.
1979)
V V N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1(8) (West 2018)
V V N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-13-1(A)(3) (2018)
Voter Registration Eligibility Requirements
and FAQs, N.M. SEC'Y STATE
V/ v/ N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 5-106(3)-(4) (McKinney
2018)
V/ v/ N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2(3)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 13-1(4)-(5), 163A-
841(a)(2) (2018)
t t N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-33-01(1)(a), 16.1-
01-04, 16-1-01-04.2 (2018)
V V OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§§ 2961 01(A)(1)-(2);
3503.1(A); 3503.02(A)-(B) (West 2018)
V/ OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 § 4-120.4 (2018)
Hughes v. Okla. State Election Bd., 413
P.2d 543, 548 (1966)
See supra note 152
V/ OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.281(5); 247.035(1)(a),
(c)-(d), (f), (2) (2018)
t t 25 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301(a);
1302(a)(1)(iii), (a)(3) (2018)
V/ V/ 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 17-1-3, 17-1-3.1(a)(2)
(2018)
E-mail from Emmanuel Hernandez, R.I. Bd.
of Elections, to Beth A. Colgan, Asst. Prof. of
Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (July 20, 2018) (on
file with author)
V/ v/ E-mail from Harrison Brant, Legal Counsel,
S.C. State Election Comm'n, to Beth A.
Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of
Law (Mar. 1, 2018) (on file with author)
E-mail from Harrison Brant, Legal Counsel,
S.C. State Election Comm'n, to Beth A.
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South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Colgan, Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of
Law (Dec. 15, 2017) (on file with author)
Opinion as to Whether an Individual
Convicted of a Violent Crime Would Be
Eligible to Purchase a Pistol, Op. Att'y Gen.
S.C. (Jan. 21, 1966), 1966 WL 11763
Opinion on Statute Defining Violent
Crimes, Op. Att'y Gen. S.C., (May 24, 1995),
1995 WL 803666
Opinion on Whether Certain Convictions
Disqualify One from Voting, Op. Att'y Gen.
S.C., (Aug. 3, 1984), 1984 WL 159901.
V/ S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 12-4-18 (2018)
Elections & Voting: Felony Convictions, S.D.
SEC'Y STATE
V/ / TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202(a) (2018)
/ / 31B TEx. JUR., ELECTIONS § 113 (3d ed. Oct.
2018)
/ / UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-2-101(1)(b),
(2)(a)(ii); 20A-2-101.5 (West 2018)
V V VA. CONST. art. II,§ 1
Opinion on Restoration of Felon Voting
Rights, Op. Att'y Gen. Va. (Aug. 3, 1999),
1999 WL 1211285
/ / WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.04.079 (2018)
Elections and Voting, WASH. SEC'Y STATE
V V W. VA. CODE § 3-2-23(2) (2018)
V V E-mail from Michael R. Haas, Staff Counsel,
Wis. Elections Comm'n, to Beth A. Colgan,
Asst. Prof. of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (Mar.
19, 2018) (on file with author)
V / WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-105(a), (c)(ii) (2018)
Wyo. Dep't of Corr., Policy & Procedure
#3.403 Inmate Rights (July 1, 2018)
Wyo. Dep't of Corr., WDOC Form #344:
Application for Restoration of Wyoming
Voting Rights (last updated June 30, 2017)
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APPENDIX F: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOURCES
This Appendix provides links to sources cited in Appendices A-
E that are publicly available. All other sources cited in appendices,
other than statutes and administrative rules, are on file with the
author.
Jurisdiction Authority
Alabama Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Rules, Regulations, and Procedures art. 8,
http://www.pardons.state.al.us/Rules.aspx#ArticleEight (last visited Sept. 15,
2018) [https://perma.cc/GSH2-XE7V]
Alaska Executive Clemency Packet, STATE ALASKA BD. PAROLE (Jan. 20, 2018),
http://www.correct.state.ak.us/Parole/documents/Final%20Clemency%20Applicatio
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VHG-G69L]
State of Alaska Dep't of Corr., Policy 910.04: Fines, Court Costs And Restitution
(Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.correct.state.ak.us/pnp/pdf/910.04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KR3-CRMH]
Arizona Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, Application for Absolute Discharge from Parole
(June 30, 2017),_https://boec.az.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/Absolute-
Discharge-Application-FormREVO63017.pdf [https://perma.cclZNE7-P69P]
Judicial Restoration Application Materials:
Cochise County (July 20, 2017),
https://www.cochise.az.gov/sites/default/files/court-administration/Restorationo
fRights.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW37-8AX5]
Coconino County (Aug. 2017),
http://www.coconino.az.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1880/49?bidld
[https://perma.cc/2F37-LEVF]
Graham County (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.graham.az.gov/DocumentCenter/View/869/GO-Restoration-of-
Civil-Rights-PDF?bidId [https://perma.cc/Q4XV-YNS2]
Maricopa County (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/eformsondemand/300.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Q8N-AQXM]
Mohave County (Nov. 18, 2010),
https://www.mohavecourts.comlcourt%20forms/Clerks%200ffice/Criminal/CRln
stRestoreCivilRights-sc.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN6C-8H5F]
Pima County (Aug. 2012),
http://www.sc.pima.gov/portals/O/1ibrary/revisedrestorationforms%208-12.pff
[https://perma.cc/BG7J-3698]
Pinal County (July 6, 2017),
http://www.coscpinalcountyaz.gov/assets/restoration-of-civil-rights-
application.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8PK-Z7AT]
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Jurisdiction Authority
Santa Cruz County,
https://www.santacruzcountyaz.gov/DocumentCenter/View/6815/RESTORATIO
N-OF-RIGHT-TO-VOTE (last visited Oct. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/L6TT-
3E7W]
Yavapai County (May 1, 2011),
http://courts.yavapai.us/Portals/1/Documents/App-to-Vacate-Judgment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72AP-BZXZ]
Yuma County, http://www.yumacountyaz.gov/home/showdocument?id=270 2 8
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/AH4T-GVSE]
Arkansas Ark. Parole Bd., Executive Clemency Application (May 4, 2015),
https://www.paroleboard.arkansas.gov/Websites/parole/images/PardonApplication0
50415.pdf [https/perma.cc/L5J6-JUMN]
Press Release, Ark. Governor's Office, Governor Asa Hutchinson Announces Intent
to Grant Executive Clemency (Sept. 5, 2018), https:f/governor.arkansas.gov/news-
medialpress-releases/governor-asa-hutchinson-announces-intent-to-grant-
executive-clemency-180905 [perma.ccl28EW-3KAW]
California Frequently Asked Questions: Offender Restitution Information, CAL. DEP'T CORR. &
REHAB., https://www.cdcr.ca.gov[Victim Services/restitutionoffender.html (last
visited Sept. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4V29-C8PQ]
Colorado Colo. Dep't of Corr., Community Return to Custody Standards (2014),
https://drive.google.com/filed/OB tbUw2-581yaHZ3TkYOZ2hzU2s/view
[https://perma.cc/8ZEG-D9WJ}
Div. of Adult Parole, Adult Parole: Adult Parole Offender Resources, Restitution,
COLO. DEP'T CORR., https://www.colorado.govipacific/cdoc/adult-parole (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/36BE-HZ7N]
Voters with Convictions FAQ, COLO. SEC'Y STATE,
https://wwwsos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/FAQs/VotigAndConviction.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) [https:/Iperma.cc/EP4B-KTDHI]
Connecticut n/a
Delaware Del. Bd. of Pardons, Board of Pardons Application Packet,
https:/fpardons.delaware.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/42/201 7/11/pardon
checklist1I1142017.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2018) [https://perma.ceW9QS-7735
District of Court Services & Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., Strategic Plan, Fiscal
Columbia Years 2014-2018, https://www.csosa.gov/wp-content/uploads/bsk-pdf-
manager/2018/03/csosa-strategic-plan-fy2014-fy2Ol8.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/SE7A-WLVR]
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Change Notice to Program Statement 5882.03 (Feb. 4,
1998), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5882_003.pdf [https://perma.cclK9JB-
73BU]
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. PAROLE COMM'N,
https://www.justice.gov/uspc/frequently-asked-questions#ql0 (last updated Sept.
29, 2015) [https://perma.cc/B24W-P37U]
Letter from Margret Nedelkoff Kellems, Deputy Mayor for Pub. Safety & Justice,
Gov't of D.C. Exec. Office of the Mayor, to David. A. Guard, Project Manager (Sept.
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Jurisdiction Authority
7, 2001), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/53ce893fe4bO76d747fd326elt/
53d6b6cle4b0113709a71827/1406580417410/DCletterl.pdf [https://perma.cclS3S5-
QLPF]
U.S. Dep't of Just., Petition for Commutation of Sentence (May 2, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pardon/legacy/2007/06/12/commutation-
form.pdf [https://perma.cc/PXW6-JQ8L]
U.S. DEP'T JUST., USPC RULES & PROCEDURES MANUAL (2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2010/08/27/uspc-
manual111507.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CLS-AQZC]
Florida Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Application for Clemency (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/clemency/ClemencyApplication.pdf
[https://perma.clK7BV-FUUA]
Fla. Office of Exec. Clemency, Rules of Executive Clemency (Mar. 9, 2011),
https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/2011-Amended-Rules-for-
Executive-Clemency.final_.3-9.pdf [https://perma.cclR8L8-WETPI
Georgia Frequently Asked Questions, GA. SEC'Y STATE,
http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/faq (last visited Sept. 10, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/QQ6U-QV93]
GA. JUST. PROJECT, 2014 FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT STUDY REPORT (2014),
https://www.gjp.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Report-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/648T-3UVVJ
Hawaii HAw. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, HAw. PAROLING AUTH., PAROLE HANDBOOK (1991),
http://dps.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Parole-Handhook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8M8N-258J]
Idaho Pardon Application Information, IDAHO COMM'N PARDONS & PAROLE,
https://parole.idaho.gov/pardonsinfoandapppage.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/UY3K-GWHK]
Illinois Illinois Voter Registration Application, ILL. STATE BD. ELECTIONS (Sept. 2017),
https://www.elections.il.gov/downloads/votinginformation/pdf/r-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q745-EDGD]
Indiana n/a
Iowa Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)-Restoration of Citizenship Rights-Right to
Vote and Hold Public Office, OFFICE GOVERNOR IOWA (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/filesldocuments/FAQ%20-o%2OVoting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34AG-NW7VI
Streamlined Application for Restoration of Citizenship Rights, OFFICE GOVERNOR
IOWA, https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/Voting%20Application%20-
%20REVISED%204.20.18.pdf (last updated Apr. 20, 2018) [https://perma.ce/7594-
9MNV]
Kansas Am I Eligible to Vote?, VOTE KANSAS, http://www.voteks.org/before-you-vote/am-i-
eligible.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9RKX-UQPD]
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Jurisdiction Authority
Kan. Dep't of Corr., IMPP 14-107A: Offender Fees Payment Procedures (May 27,
2015), https://www.doc.ks.gov/kdoc-policies/AdultIMPP/chapter-14/14-107a/view
[https://perma.cc/CRN2-2VEW]
Kan. Dep't of Corr., IMPP 14-120A: Good Time During Post-Release Supervision
(May 27, 2015), https://www.doc.ks.gov/kdoc-policies/AdultIMPP/chapter-14/14-
120alview [https://perma.cc/N5EL-3YC2]
Kan. Dep't of Corr., IMPP 14-133A, Parole Services: Discharge from Supervision
(July 25, 2017), https://www.doc.ks.gov/kdoc-policies/AdultIMPP/chapter- 14/14-
133a/view [https://perma.cc/ZN73-BQ2A]
Kan. Dep't of Corr., Policy Memorandum #17-12-003 to IMPP 14-120A (Nov. 27,
2017), https://www.doc.ks.gov/kdoc-policies/AdultIMPP/chapter-14/14-120alview
[https://perma.cclN5EL-3YC2]
Prisoner Review Bd., Conditions, KAN. DEP'T CORR. (last modified Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.doc.ks.gov/prb/conditions [https://perma.cc/3ZM8-BNRU]
Voter Registration Instructions, KAN. SEC'Y STATE,
http://www.kssos.org/forms/elections/voterregistration.pdf (last visited Sept. 10,
2018) [https://perma.cc/7AVD-FEJA]
Kentucky Ky. Div. of Prob. & Parole, Application for Restoration of Civil Rights,
https://corrections.ky.gov/depts/Probation%20and%2OParole/Documents/Restoratio
n%20of%20Civil%20Rights.pdf (last updated July 2012) [https://perma.cc/K2MT-
VRCH]
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 11-00: Conditions of Parole (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://justice.ky.gov/Documents/Parole%20Board/Policies%20and% 2 Procedures/
KYPB%2011-00%2OConditionsofParole%20eff%2012-4-15.pdf
[https:/perma.ce/384E-WTBK]
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 12-00: Final Discharge of Parole and Payment of
Restitution (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://justice.ky.gov/Documents/Parole%2OBoard/PolicieS%2Oand
%20Procedures/KYPB%2012-00%20Final%20Discharge%20eff%/ 2O1 2 -4-15.pdf
[https://perma.cclK4V2-PUBR]
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 21-00: Conditions of Mandatory Reentry Supervision (Dec.
4, 2015), https://justice.ky.govDocuments/Parole%20Board/Policies% 2f-0and% 2 0
Procedures/KYPB%2021-00%20Conditions%20of%20MRS%20eff' 2 02 015-12-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BJV-CMZJ]
Ky. Parole Bd., KYPB 22-00: Final Discharge From Mandatory Reentry
Supervision (Dec. 4, 2015), https://justice.ky.gov/Documents/Parole%2OBoard/
Policies%20and%20Procedures/KYPB%2022-00%20Discharge%20MRS%20eff%
2012-4-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K47-KCQF}
Louisiana Frequently Asked Questions, LA. DEP'T CORR.,
http://www.doc.louisiana.gov/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2018) [https://perma.cc/FYD8-X899]
Supervision Conditions, LA. DEP'T CORR., https://doc.louisiana.gov/supervision-
conditions (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/H7Z7-CNS3]
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Maryland Voter Registration, MD. STATE BD. ELECTIONS,
https://elections.maryland.gov/voter-registrationlindex.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2018) [https://perma.cclSL6P-249F]
Massachusetts Absentee Voting, SEC'Y COMMONWEALTH MASS.,
https://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/eleabsentee/absidx.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2018) [https://perma.cc/N53J-V546]
Find Out What Happens If You Violate Your Probation, OFFICE COMM'R PROB.,
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/find-out-what-happens-if-you-violate-your-
probation (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cclUE9Z-26FE]
Guidelines for Probation Violation Proceedings in the Superior Court, MASS. Sup.
CT. DEP'T (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.mass.gov/info-details/guidelines-for-
probation-violation-proceedings-in-the-superior-court#section-6:-final-violation-
hearing- [https://perma.cc/G7GH-VE97]
Michigan Probation Supervision, MICH. DEP'T CORR.,
https://www.michigan.govcorrections/0,4551,7-119-1435 1463---,00.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cclE3NS-RYHE]
Minnesota Minn. Bd. of Pardons, Application for Pardon or Commutation (2016),
https://mn.gov/doc/assets/APPLICATION-PARDON%20or%20COMMUTATION-
tcml089-320037.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRK5-LBQS]
Minn. Dep't of Corr., Division Directive 201.013: Supervision Fees-Field
Services (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW
DisplayTOC.asp?Opt=201.013.htm [https://perma.cc/YJS8-P5RK]
Register to Vote, MINN. SEC'Y STATE, https://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-
voting/register-to-vote/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7C5Q-7TSL]
Voting with a Criminal Record, MINN. SEC'Y STATE,
https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/3187/voting-with-a-criminal-record-2018.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LW45-5M5U]
Mississippi Office of the Governor, Application for Clemency,
http://www.recordclearing.org/wp-content/forms/Mississippi-Pardon-
Application.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) [https://perma.cc/PYZ8-QWF4]
Missouri Go Vote Missouri: Frequently Asked Questions, Mo. SEC'Y STATE,
https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/goVoteMissouri/questions (last visited Sept. 11,
2018) [https://perma.cc/3589-XRMM]
Montana Conditions of Probation and Parole, MONT. DEP'T CORR. (2012),
https://leg.mt.gov/contentCommittees/Interim/2013-2014/Law-and-
Justice/Meetings/February 2014/Exhibits/conditions-parole-doc-board.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D24E-ZVFXJ
How to Register to Vote, MONT. SECY STATE, https://sosmt.gov/elections/vote/ (last
visited Sept. 17, 2018) [https:,/perma.cc/84RV-FCEA]
Paying Restitution and Supervision Fees, MONT. DEP'T CORR.,
http://cor.mt.gov/ProbationParole/RestitutionSupervisionFees (last visited Sept.
11, 2018) [https://perma.ce/4WPQ.VU4M]
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Jurisdiction Authority
Nebraska Frequently Asked Questions, NEB. BD. PARDONS,
http://www.pardons.nebraska.gov/faq.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/GAX3-SZMIP]
Instructions for Filing an Application, NEB. BD. PARDONS (2013),
http://www.pardons.nebraska.gov/content/2013-instructions
[https://perma.cclD6HM-ZYEB]
Neb. Bd. of Pardons, Pardon Board Application (2013),
http://www.pardons.nebraska.gov/content/2013-new-application
[https://perma.ccl5ZN2-JQQM
NEB. BD. OF PAROLE RULES,
https://parole.nebraska.gov/sites/parole.nebraska.gov/files/doc/10- 3 -2 0 17%20Board
%20ofo2OParole%2Rules%20-%20website.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7GB-A36W]
Nevada Criteria and Application Instructions-Community Cases, NEV. BD PARDONS (Apr.
25, 2017), http://pardons.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pardonsnvgovconitent/About
CriteriaAndApplicationInstructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6PW-F7ED]
Frequently Asked Questions, NEV. BD. PAROLE COMM'RS,
http://parolenv.gov/FAQs/FAQ-answers/A~parolee owes-me restitution,ho-do
I collect. (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [https://permna.cclPYF2-A5UW]
Nev. Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, Procedures for the Collection of Restitution (May 4,
2001), http://parole.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/parolenvgov/content/Information/
RestitutionCollectionProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BDK-8CQQ]
Restoration of Voting Rights in Nevada, NEv. SEC'Y STATE,
https://www.nvsos.gov/soslelections/voters/restoration-of-voting-rights-in-nevada
(last visited Sept. 13, 2018) [https://perma.ced756F-NQL3)
New Victim Services: Community-Based Punishment, N.H. DEP'T CORR.,
Hampshire https://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/divisions/victim/pandp-offender.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2018) [https://perma.cclYLL9-6AHE]
Victim Services: Conditions of Probation-Parole, N.H. DEP'T CORR.,
https://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/divisions/victim/pandp-offender.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YLL9-6AHE]
New Jersey State of N.J., Petition for Executive Clemency,
https://www.nj.gov/parole/docs/executiveClemencyApplication.pdf (last updated
June 2011) [https:/perma.cc/9ZNC-FMSQJ
New Mexico N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-050200 (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://cd.nm.gov/policies/docs/CD-050200.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8RL-TQ3H]
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-051500 (July 31, 2015),
http://cd.nm.gov/policies/docs/CD-051500.pdf [https://perma.cclXC4X-UHEN]
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-053100 (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://cd.nm.gov/policies/docs/CD-053100.pdf [https://perma.cclP6FQ-UU8G]
N.M. Corr. Dep't, Policy CD-055000 (Oct. 27, 2017),
http://cd.nm.gov/policies/docs/CD-055000.pdf [https://perma.cclX3BP-76FE]
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New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Authority
Offender Orientation Handbook, N.M. CORR. DEP'T,
http://cd.nm.gov/ppd/docs/ofndr handbook.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/QE25-K92J]
Probation & Parole, N.M. CORR. DEP'T, http://cd.nm.gov/ppd/ppd.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cclEKY7-96XQ]
Voter Registration Information, N.M. SEC'Y STATE,
http://www.sos.state.nm.us/VoterInformation/VoterRegistrationInformation.asp
x (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cclDEE4-N7QE]
Voter Registration Eligibility Requirements and FAQs, N.M. SEC'Y STATE,
https://portal.sos.state.nm.us/OVR/WebPages/Eligibility.aspx (last visited Sept. 18,
2018) [https://perma.cc/RRF9-DCMW]
Apply for Clemency, N.Y. STATE, https://www.nygov/services/apply-clemency (last
visited Sept. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S7SS-7DEJ]
More than 24,000 Individuals Included in First Group of Conditional Pardons,
N.Y. STATE (May 22, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-
issues-first-group-conditional-pardons-restoring-right-vote-new-yorkers-parole
[https://permacc7WND-9ACW}
N.Y. Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Parole Handbook (Nov. 2010),
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Parole.Handbook.html#h8_8 [https://perma.cc/Z2Y3-
9CHE]
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO-181.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SVA9-W9VJ]
N.Y. State Dep't of Corrs. & Cmty Supervision, Certificate of Relief from
Disabilities-Certificate of Good Conduct Application and Instructions,
http://www.doces.ny.gov/pdf/DOCCS-CRD-Application.Instructions.pdf (last
visited Sept. 12, 2018), [https:/Iperma.ccl3QXJ-RBJE]
Completing Parole/Post Release Successfully, N.C. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY,
https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/documents/files/Completing-Parole-Post-Release.pdf (last
visited Sept. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cclTMF7-8LCA]
Completing Probation Successfully, N.C. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY,
https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/documents/files/Completing-Probation-Successfully.pdf
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/KR26-FNSA]
NC Voting Rights Guide: People in the Criminal Justice System, N.C. STATE BD.
ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENF'T, https://www.ncsbe.gov/Portals/0/Documents/
VotingRightsGuideCriminalJusticeSystem.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
[https://perma.ccl769F-6XC6]
Policy & Procedures, N.C. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY (Aug. 1, 2016), https://files.nc.gov/
ncdps/documents/files/PolicyO.pdf [https://perma.cclBK7R-J2KK]
N.D. Pardon Advisory Bd. Application, SFN 14859 (Dec. 2010), https://docr.nd.gov/
sites/www/files/documents/parole-pardon/pboardAPPLICATIONpdf
[https://perma.cc/G7F3-6T6Hj
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Ohio Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Conditions of Supervision,
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/pval/PDFs/ConditionsOfSupervision.pdf (last visited
Jan. 2, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4554-TP62]
Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., Policy 105-PBD-05, Clemency Procedures: Non-
Death Penalty Cases (July 17, 2017), http://drc.ohio.gov/Portals/0Policies/DRC%20
Policies/105-PBD-05%20(July%202017).pdf ver=2017-07-31-141430-593
[https://perma.cc/6XN8-9R42]
Oklahoma Voter Registration in Oklahoma, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (2018),
https://www.ok.govielections/Voter-Info/Register-toVote! [https://perma.ce/ZWY2-
GSRJ]
Okla. Voter Registration Application, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BOARD,
https://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/Oklahoma%2Vote/r%20Registration%20A
pplication%20form%20v4-20%20SEB%20web.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/2QZJ-246U]
Oregon n/a
Pennsylvania Factors Considered by the Board, PA. BD. PARDONS (Aug. 15, 2012),
https://www.bop.pa.gov/application-process/Pages/Factors-Considered-by-the-
Board.aspx [https://perma.ccY3QL-LDH3]
Parole Conditions, PA. BD. PROB. & PAROLE,
https://www.pbpp.pa.govUnderstanding%2OParole/offendersfams/Pages/General
Conditions-of-Parole.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) [https://perma.ceIT8NG-
CBA91
Understanding the Technical Parole Violation Process in Pennsylvania, PA. BD.
PROB. & PAROLE (Dec. 2014), https://www.pbpp.pa.gov/Information/Documents/
Publications/TPV%20Process%20December%202014.pdf [https://permace/672U-
U357]
Violations, PA. BD. PROB. & PAROLE,
https://www.pbpp.pa.govfUnderstanding%20Parole/PDM/PagesViolation.aspx
(last visited Sept. 12, 2018), [https://permacc/7AJB-JTGDJ
Rhode Island n/a
South Carolina Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) About Expungements and Pardons in South
Carolina Courts, S.C. Juo. DEP'T (2011), https://www.secourts.org/selfhelp/
FAQExpungementPardon.pdf [https://perma.ccPKT2-55QS]
How to Apply for a Pardon, S.C. DEP'T PROB., PAROLE & PARDON SERVS.,
https://www.dppps.sc.gov/content/download/138528/3154712/file/1118+Pardon+Ap
plication+Rvsd+12-19-17+Fillable.pdf (last updated Dec. 19, 2017)
[https:llperma.cc/Z5UM-CM7A)
South Dakota Elections & Voting: Felony Convictions, S.D. SEC'Y STATE,
https://sdsos.gov/elections-voting/voting/register-to-vote/felony-convictions.aspx
(last visited Sept. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VT6L-WNH7]
Frequent Questions: Parole, Continued, S.D. DEP'T CORR. (2018),
https://doc.sd.gov/about/faq/parole2.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZSU2-3D85]
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S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Executive Clemency Application,
https://doc.sd.gov/documents/executiveclemencypardonapplication_3_.pdf (last
updated June 2009) [https://perma.cc/2NMZ-V33Q]
S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, Policy 8.1.A.7 Early Discharges,
https://doc.sd.gov/documents/Board-8.1.A.7%20Early%20Discharge.pdf (last
updated Aug. 2017) [https://perma.cclGJH5-ZZYD]
Tennessee Tenn. Div. of Elections, Certificate of Restoration of Voting Rights (Apr. 2017),
https:/sos-tn-gov-files.s3.amazonawscom/forms/ss-3041.pdf
[https://perma.ce/66VF-KJD9J
Texas Full Pardon Application-Instructions, TEX. BD. PARDONS & PAROLES,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/forms/FP%20App.pdf (last updated Feb. 17, 2012)
[https://perma.cc/5PZQ-YEL3]
Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, FP-10 Criminal History Information (Feb. 17,
2012), http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/forms/FP%20App.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4W26-P56D]
Utah Parole Special Conditions, UTAH DEP'T CORR. (2015),
https://corrections.utahgovimages/Brooke/ParoleSpecialConditions2Ol5.pdf
[https://perma.ce/8RGE-34JNJ
Probation Special Conditions, UTAH DEP'T CORR.,
https://corrections.utah.gov/images/Brooke/ProbationSpecialConditions.pdf (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9YEG-QHS8]
Virginia Community Corrections-Frequently Asked Questions, VA. DEP'T CORR.
https://vadoc.virginia.gov/community/faqs.shtm (last visited Sept. 12, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/R486-N733]
Press Release, Office of the Governor of Va., Governor McAuliffe Announces New
Reforms to Restoration of Rights Process (June 23, 2015),
https://www.governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/all-releases/2017/mcauliffe-
administration/headline-826609-en.html [https://perma.cc/89R9-HUAC]
Restoration of Rights, SEC'Y COMMONWEALTH VA., https://www.restore.virginia.gov/
(last visited Sept. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/L8DL-RPTZ]
VA. PAROLE BD., POLICY MANUAL (Oct. 1, 2006),
https://vpb.virginia.gov/files/1107/vpb-policy-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC52-
DSDJ]
Washington Elections and Voting, WASH. SEC'Y STATE, https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/voter-
eligibility.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc4XFM-FBUL]
Governor of the State of Wash., Petition for Reprieve, Commutation, or Pardon,
www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/petitionA-doc (last updated
Jan. 2, 2013) [https://perma.ceIZ6WC-PK76]
West Virginia n/a
Wisconsin Office of the Governor of State of Wisc., Application for Executive Clemency,
http://www.recordclearing.org/wp-content/forms/Wisconsin-Pardon-Application.pdf
(last updated Mar. 11, 2009) [https://perma.ccl3ZS4-JMH3]
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Standard Rules of Community Supervision, WIS. DEP'T CORR.,
https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutDOC/CommunityCorrections/SupervisionRules.aspx
(last visited Sept. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NV4Z-MZ521
Wyoming Wyo. Dep't of Corr., Policy & Procedure #3.403 Inmate Rights (July 1, 2018),
https://docs.google.com/a/wyo.gov/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=d3lvLmdvdnxkb 2 N
8Z3g6YTE3M2Y2YWUyNGEzMDUy [https://perma.cc/7UJK-MMU9]
Wyo. Dep't of Corr., WDOC Form #344: Application for Restoration of Wyoming
Voting Rights, https://docs.google.com/alwyo.gov/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=
d31vLmdvdnxkb2N8Z3g6N2JkZDhOTUONTUOOTg5ZA (last updated June 30,
2017) [https://perma.cclPMH8-TQYH]

